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			5935 lines
		
	
	
		
			329 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C#
		
	
	
	
	
	
| namespace AIStudio.Settings.DataModel;
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| /// <summary>
 | ||
| /// Catalog of biases.
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| /// </summary>
 | ||
| /// <remarks>
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| /// Based on the work of Buster Benson, John Manoogian III, and Brian
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| /// Rene Morrissette. The biases were clustered and organized by
 | ||
| /// Buster Benson. The texts originally come from Wikipedia and
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| /// were reduced to a short definition by Brian Rene Morrissette.
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| /// John Manoogian III designed the original poster from Buster
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| /// Benson's work, which was then supplemented with definitions
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| /// by Brian Rene Morrissette.
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| ///
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| /// All texts were checked by Thorsten Sommer against the 2024
 | ||
| /// version of Wikipedia. Most texts were replaced with the latest
 | ||
| /// versions, and long texts were shortened to the essentials.
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| /// 
 | ||
| /// The texts were revised and, when necessary, supplemented by
 | ||
| /// Thorsten Sommer for integration into AI Studio. Sources and
 | ||
| /// additional links were also researched by Thorsten Sommer.
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| /// </remarks>
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| public static class BiasCatalog
 | ||
| {
 | ||
|     public static readonly Bias NONE = new()
 | ||
|     {
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|         Id = Guid.Empty,
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|         Category = BiasCategory.NONE,
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|         Name = "None",
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|         Description = "No bias selected.",
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|         Related = [],
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|         Links = [],
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|     };
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|     
 | ||
|     #region WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER
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| 
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|     private static readonly Bias MISATTRIBUTION_OF_MEMORY = new()
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|     {
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|         Id = new Guid("dd45c762-0599-4c6d-82e0-d10f7ee85bb1"),
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|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
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|         Name = "Misattribution of Memory",
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|         Description = 
 | ||
|             """
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|             # Misattribution of Memory
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|             The ability to remember information correctly, but being wrong about the source of
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|             that information. Includes the following three sub-effects:
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| 
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|             - Source Confusion:
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|             Source confusion is an attribute seen in different people’s accounts of the same
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|             event after hearing people speak about the situation. An example of this would
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|             be a witness who heard a police officer say he had a gun and then that witness
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|             later says they saw the gun even though they didn’t. The source of the memory
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|             is the police officer’s testimony, not actual perception.
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| 
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|             - Cryptomnesia:
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|             Individuals mistakenly believe that they are the original generators of the
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|             thought.
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| 
 | ||
|             - False Memory:
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|             False memories occur when a person’s identity and interpersonal relationships
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|             are strongly centered around a memory of an experience that did not actually
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|             take place. False memories are often the result of leading questions in a
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|             therapeutic practice termed Recovered Memory Therapy. In this practice,
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|             psychiatrists often put their patients under hypnosis to recover repressed
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|             memories. This can be detrimental, as the individual may recall memories that
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|             never occurred.
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|             """,
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|         
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|         Related = [],
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|         Links = [
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misattribution_of_memory",
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptomnesia",
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source-monitoring_error",
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_memory",
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|         ],
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|     };
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| 
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|     private static readonly Bias LIST_LENGTH_EFFECT = new()
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|     {
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|         Id = new Guid("688bba31-0b8e-49c5-8693-aecb37018a08"),
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|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
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|         Name = "List Length Effect",
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|         Description =
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|             """
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|             # List Length Effect
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|             The finding that recognition performance for a short list is superior to that for
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|             a long list.
 | ||
|             """,
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| 
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|         Related = [],
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|         Links = [
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases#Other_memory_biases",
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|         ],
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|     };
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| 
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|     private static readonly Bias MISINFORMATION_EFFECT = new()
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|     {
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|         Id = new Guid("2b69b071-6587-4ea1-a4f5-aee4e2fef43c"),
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|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
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|         Name = "Misinformation Effect",
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|         Description =
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|             """
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|             # Misinformation Effect
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|             When a person's recall of episodic memories becomes less accurate because of
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|             post-event information. The misinformation effect is an example of retroactive
 | ||
|             interference which occurs when information presented later interferes with the
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|             ability to retain previously encoded information. Individuals have also been
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|             shown to be susceptible to incorporating misleading information into their memory
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|             when it is presented within a question. Essentially, the new information that a
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|             person receives works backward in time to distort memory of the original event.
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|             """,
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| 
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|         Related = [
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|             new Guid("dd45c762-0599-4c6d-82e0-d10f7ee85bb1"), // MISATTRIBUTION_OF_MEMORY -> False Memory
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|             new Guid("4d377bac-062a-46d3-a1a5-46f3ac804a97"), // SUGGESTIBILITY
 | ||
|         ],
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|         Links = [
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misinformation_effect",
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|         ],
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|     };
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| 
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|     private static readonly Bias LEVELING_AND_SHARPENING = new()
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|     {
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|         Id = new Guid("d1ed47f9-2415-4fa3-8ca3-151e9e4ee3ca"),
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|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
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|         Name = "Leveling and Sharpening",
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|         Description =
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|             """
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|             # Leveling and Sharpening
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|             Leveling occurs when you hear or remember something, and drop details which do not fit cognitive
 | ||
|             categories and/or assumptions; sharpening occurs when you hear or remember something, and emphasize
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|             details which do fit cognitive categories and/or assumptions.
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|             """,
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| 
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|         Related = [],
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|         Links = [
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leveling_and_sharpening",
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|         ],
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|     };
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| 
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|     private static readonly Bias PEAK_END_RULE = new()
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|     {
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|         Id = new Guid("cf71d1e1-f49e-4d8f-a6c3-37056297bf13"),
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|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
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|         Name = "Peak-End Rule",
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|         Description =
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|             """
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|             # Peak-End Rule
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|             The peak–end rule is a psychological heuristic in which people judge an experience largely based on how
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|             they felt at its peak (i.e., its most intense point) and at its end, rather than based on the total sum
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|             or average of every moment of the experience. The effect occurs regardless of whether the experience is
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|             pleasant or unpleasant. To the heuristic, other information aside from that of the peak and end of the
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|             experience is not lost, but it is not used. This includes net pleasantness or unpleasantness and how
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|             long the experience lasted. The peak–end rule is thereby a specific form of the more general extension
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|             neglect and duration neglect.
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|             """,
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| 
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|         Related = [],
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|         Links = [
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak%E2%80%93end_rule",
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|         ],
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|     };
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| 
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|     private static readonly Bias FADING_AFFECT_BIAS = new()
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|     {
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|         Id = new Guid("0378a05c-b55b-4451-a7f4-b5e1d6287d83"),
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|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
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|         Name = "Fading Affect Bias",
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|         Description =
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|             """
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|             # Fading Affect Bias
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|             The fading affect bias, more commonly known as FAB, is a psychological phenomenon in which memories
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|             associated with negative emotions tend to be forgotten more quickly than those associated with positive
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|             emotions. FAB only refers to the feelings one has associated with the memories and not the content of
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|             the memories themselves.
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|             """,
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| 
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|         Related = [],
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|         Links = [
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fading_affect_bias",
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|         ],
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|     };
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| 
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|     private static readonly Bias NEGATIVITY_BIAS = new()
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|     {
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|         Id = new Guid("ef521fbb-c20b-47c9-87f8-a571a06a03eb"),
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|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
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|         Name = "Negativity Bias",
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|         Description =
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|             """
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|             # Negativity Bias
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|             The negativity bias, also known as the negativity effect, is a cognitive bias that, even when positive
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|             or neutral things of equal intensity occur, things of a more negative nature (e.g. unpleasant thoughts,
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|             emotions, or social interactions; harmful/traumatic events) have a greater effect on one's psychological
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|             state and processes than neutral or positive things. In other words, something very positive will
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|             generally have less of an impact on a person's behavior and cognition than something equally emotional but
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|             negative. The negativity bias has been investigated within many different domains, including the formation
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|             of impressions and general evaluations; attention, learning, and memory; and decision-making and risk
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|             considerations.
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|             """,
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| 
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|         Related = [
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|             new Guid("ad3ed908-c56e-411b-a130-8af8574ff67b"), // LOSS_AVERSION
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|         ],
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|         Links = [
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negativity_bias",
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|         ],
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|     };
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| 
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|     private static readonly Bias PREJUDICE = new()
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|     {
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|         Id = new Guid("efb6606f-4629-4e5e-973f-94d5ac496638"),
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|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
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|         Name = "Prejudice",
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|         Description =
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|             """
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|             # Prejudice
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|             Prejudice can be an affective feeling towards a person based on their perceived group membership. The word
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|             is often used to refer to a preconceived (usually unfavourable) evaluation or classification of another
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|             person based on that person's perceived personal characteristics, such as political affiliation, sex,
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|             gender, gender identity, beliefs, values, social class, age, disability, religion, sexuality, race,
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|             ethnicity, language, nationality, culture, complexion, beauty, height, body weight, occupation, wealth,
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|             education, criminality, sport-team affiliation, music tastes or other perceived characteristics.
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| 
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|             The word "prejudice" can also refer to unfounded or pigeonholed beliefs and it may apply to
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|             "any unreasonable attitude that is unusually resistant to rational influence". Gordon Allport defined
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|             prejudice as a "feeling, favorable or unfavorable, toward a person or thing, prior to, or not based on,
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|             actual experience". Auestad defines prejudice as characterized by "symbolic transfer", transfer of
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|             a value-laden meaning content onto a socially-formed category and then on to individuals who are taken to
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|             belong to that category, resistance to change, and overgeneralization.
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| 
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|             The United Nations Institute on Globalization, Culture and Mobility has highlighted research considering
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|             prejudice as a global security threat due to its use in scapegoating some populations and inciting others
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|             to commit violent acts towards them and how this can endanger individuals, countries, and the international
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|             community.
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|             """,
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| 
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|         Related = [],
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|         Links =
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|         [
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prejudice",
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|         ],
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|     };
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| 
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|     private static readonly Bias IMPLICIT_STEREOTYPES = new()
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|     {
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|         Id = new Guid("30bd6403-b7f4-4d16-9494-af6a22b349d3"),
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|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
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|         Name = "Implicit Stereotypes",
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|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
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|             # Implicit Stereotypes
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|             The unconscious attribution of particular qualities to a member of a certain social group. Implicit stereotypes are
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|             influenced by experience, and are based on learned associations between various qualities and social categories,
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|             including race or gender. Individuals' perceptions and behaviors can be affected by implicit stereotypes, even
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|             without the individuals' intention or awareness.
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| 
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|             An implicit bias or implicit stereotype is the pre-reflective attribution of particular qualities by an individual
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|             to a member of some social out group. Implicit stereotypes are thought to be shaped by experience and based on learned
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|             associations between particular qualities and social categories, including race and/or gender. Individuals' perceptions
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|             and behaviors can be influenced by the implicit stereotypes they hold, even if they are sometimes unaware they hold such
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|             stereotypes. Implicit bias is an aspect of implicit social cognition: the phenomenon that perceptions, attitudes, and
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|             stereotypes can operate prior to conscious intention or endorsement. The existence of implicit bias is supported by a
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|             variety of scientific articles in psychological literature. Implicit stereotype was first defined by psychologists
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|             Mahzarin Banaji and Anthony Greenwald in 1995.
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| 
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|             Explicit stereotypes, by contrast, are consciously endorsed, intentional, and sometimes controllable thoughts and beliefs.
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| 
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|             Implicit biases, however, are thought to be the product of associations learned through past experiences. Implicit
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|             biases can be activated by the environment and operate prior to a person's intentional, conscious endorsement. Implicit
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|             bias can persist even when an individual rejects the bias explicitly.
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|             """,
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| 
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|         Related = [],
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|         Links =
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|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implicit_stereotype",
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|         ],
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|     };
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| 
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|     private static readonly Bias IMPLICIT_ASSOCIATIONS = new()
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|     {
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|         Id = new Guid("6f1d8a61-cb64-44fe-9a52-5ee66c22fba4"),
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|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
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|         Name = "Implicit Associations",
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|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Implicit Associations
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|             A person's automatic association between mental representations of objects (concepts) in memory.
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|             *Controversial. This is not a bias, it is an association algorithm.*
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| 
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|             Related: The implicit-association test
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|             The implicit-association test (IAT) is an assessment intended to detect subconscious associations
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|             between mental representations of objects (concepts) in memory. Its best-known application is the
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|             assessment of implicit stereotypes held by test subjects, such as associations between particular
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|             racial categories and stereotypes about those groups. The test has been applied to a variety of
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|             belief associations, such as those involving racial groups, gender, sexuality, age, and religion
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|             but also the self-esteem, political views, and predictions of the test taker.
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|             """,
 | ||
| 
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|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
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|         [
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implicit_stereotype#Activation_of_implicit_stereotypes",
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|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implicit-association_test",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
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|     private static readonly Bias SPACING_EFFECT = new()
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|     {
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|         Id = new Guid("41e06aaf-73c2-4f48-9962-312d57308468"),
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|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
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|         Name = "Spacing Effect",
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|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Spacing Effect
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|             The spacing effect demonstrates that learning is more effective when study sessions are spaced out. This
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|             effect shows that more information is encoded into long-term memory by spaced study sessions, also known
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|             as spaced repetition or spaced presentation, than by massed presentation ("cramming").
 | ||
| 
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|             The phenomenon was first identified by Hermann Ebbinghaus, and his detailed study of it was published in
 | ||
|             the 1885 book "Über das Gedächtnis. Untersuchungen zur experimentellen Psychologie" (Memory: A Contribution
 | ||
|             to Experimental Psychology), which suggests that active recall with increasing time intervals reduces the
 | ||
|             probability of forgetting information. This robust finding has been supported by studies of many explicit
 | ||
|             memory tasks such as free recall, recognition, cued-recall, and frequency estimation.
 | ||
| 
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|             Researchers have offered several possible explanations of the spacing effect, and much research has been
 | ||
|             conducted that supports its impact on recall. In spite of these findings, the robustness of this phenomenon
 | ||
|             and its resistance to experimental manipulation have made empirical testing of its parameters difficult.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacing_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SUGGESTIBILITY = new()
 | ||
|     {
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|         Id = new Guid("4d377bac-062a-46d3-a1a5-46f3ac804a97"),
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|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
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|         Name = "Suggestibility",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Suggestibility
 | ||
|             The quality of being inclined to accept and act on the suggestions of others where false but plausible
 | ||
|             information is given and one fills in the gaps in certain memories with false information when recalling
 | ||
|             a scenario or moment. When the subject has been persistently told something about a past event, his or
 | ||
|             her memory of the event conforms to the repeated message.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             Suggestibility can be seen in people's day-to-day lives:
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             - Someone witnesses an argument after school. When later asked about the "huge fight" that occurred, he
 | ||
|               recalls the memory, but unknowingly distorts it with exaggerated fabrications, because he now thinks
 | ||
|               of the event as a "huge fight" instead of a simple argument.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             - Children are told by their parents they are good singers, so from then on they believe they are talented
 | ||
|               while their parents were in fact being falsely encouraging.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             - A teacher could trick his AP Psychology students by saying, "Suggestibility is the distortion of memory
 | ||
|               through suggestion or misinformation, right?" It is likely that the majority of the class would agree
 | ||
|               with him because he is a teacher and what he said sounds correct. However, the term is really the
 | ||
|               definition of the misinformation effect.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             However, suggestibility can also be seen in extremes, resulting in negative consequences:
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             - A witness' testimony is altered because the police or attorneys make suggestions during the interview,
 | ||
|               which causes their already uncertain observations to become distorted memories.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             - A young girl begins suffering migraines which lead to sleep deprivation and depression. Her therapist,
 | ||
|               a specialist in cases involving child abuse, repeatedly asks her whether her father had sexually abused
 | ||
|               her. This suggestion causes the young girl to fabricate memories of her father molesting her, which lead
 | ||
|               to her being placed in foster care and her father being tried on charges of abuse.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("2b69b071-6587-4ea1-a4f5-aee4e2fef43c"), // MISINFORMATION_EFFECT,
 | ||
|             new Guid("dd45c762-0599-4c6d-82e0-d10f7ee85bb1"), // MISATTRIBUTION_OF_MEMORY -> False Memory
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suggestibility",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias TIP_OF_THE_TONGUE_PHENOMENON = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("ad341a56-ffa5-4dd1-b3c6-ef2476b89b5a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Tip of the Tongue Phenomenon",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Tip of the Tongue Phenomenon
 | ||
|             Tip of the tongue (also known as TOT, or lethologica) is the phenomenon of failing to retrieve a word or term
 | ||
|             from memory, combined with partial recall and the feeling that retrieval is imminent. The phenomenon's name
 | ||
|             comes from the saying, "It's on the tip of my tongue." The tip of the tongue phenomenon reveals that
 | ||
|             lexical access occurs in stages.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             People experiencing the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon can often recall one or more features of the target word,
 | ||
|             such as the first letter, its syllabic stress, and words similar in sound, meaning, or both sound and meaning.
 | ||
|             Individuals report a feeling of being seized by the state, feeling something like mild anguish while
 | ||
|             searching for the word, and a sense of relief when the word is found. While many aspects of the
 | ||
|             tip-of-the-tongue state remain unclear, there are two major competing explanations for its occurrence:
 | ||
|             the direct-access view and the inferential view. Emotion and the strength of the emotional ties to what
 | ||
|             is trying to be remembered can also have an impact on the TOT phenomenon. The stronger the emotional ties,
 | ||
|             the longer it takes to retrieve the item from memory.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             TOT states should be distinguished from FOK (feeling of knowing) states. FOK, in contrast, is the feeling
 | ||
|             that one will be able to recognize — from a list of items — an item that is currently inaccessible. There
 | ||
|             are still currently opposing hypotheses in the psychological literature regarding the separability of the
 | ||
|             process underlying these concepts. However, there is some evidence that TOTs and FOKs draw on different
 | ||
|             parts of the brain.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tip_of_the_tongue",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias GOOGLE_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("aca65269-40cc-4a9f-b850-c0e2eb283987"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Google Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Google Effect
 | ||
|             The Google effect, also called digital amnesia, is the tendency to forget information that can be found
 | ||
|             readily online by using Internet search engines. According to the first study about the Google effect, people
 | ||
|             are less likely to remember certain details they believe will be accessible online. However, the study also
 | ||
|             claims that people's ability to learn information offline remains the same. This effect may also be seen
 | ||
|             as a change to what information and what level of detail is considered to be important to remember.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             In a big replication study published in Nature 2018, the Google effect was one of the experiments which
 | ||
|             could not be replicated.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias NEXT_IN_LINE_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("c0b3d9f9-c0d9-482f-bf6f-d52dffe58205"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Next-In-Line Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Next-In-Line Effect
 | ||
|             The next-in-line effect is the phenomenon of people being unable to recall information concerning events
 | ||
|             immediately preceding their turn to perform. The effect was first studied experimentally by Malcolm Brenner
 | ||
|             in 1973. In his experiment the participants were each in turn reading a word aloud from an index card, and
 | ||
|             after 25 words were asked to recall as many of all the read words as possible. The results of the experiment
 | ||
|             showed that words read aloud within approximately nine seconds before the subject's own turn were recalled
 | ||
|             worse than other words.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             The reason for the next-in-line effect appears to be a deficit in encoding the perceived information preceding
 | ||
|             a performance. That is, the information is never stored to long-term memory and thus cannot be retrieved later
 | ||
|             after the performance. One finding supporting this theory is that asking the subjects beforehand to pay more
 | ||
|             attention to events preceding their turn to perform can prevent the memory deficit and even result in
 | ||
|             overcompensation, making people remember the events before their turn better than others.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             In addition, the appearance of the next-in-line effect does not seem to be connected to the level of fear of
 | ||
|             negative evaluation. Both people with lower and higher anxiety levels are subject to the memory deficit.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next-in-line_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias TESTING_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("2fe5fbe7-3fff-4621-9111-21d8c3b8bcb2"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Testing Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Testing Effect
 | ||
|             The testing effect (also known as retrieval practice, active recall, practice testing, or test-enhanced learning)
 | ||
|             suggests long-term memory is increased when part of the learning period is devoted to retrieving information from
 | ||
|             memory. It is different from the more general practice effect, defined in the APA Dictionary of Psychology as
 | ||
|             "any change or improvement that results from practice or repetition of task items or activities."
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             Cognitive psychologists are working with educators to look at how to take advantage of tests—not as an assessment
 | ||
|             tool, but as a teaching tool since testing prior knowledge is more beneficial for learning when compared to only
 | ||
|             reading or passively studying material (even more so when the test is more challenging for memory).
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Testing_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ABSENT_MINDEDNESS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("f459e613-4f6a-472e-ab9a-0961f5f4a685"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Absent-Mindedness",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Absent-Mindedness
 | ||
|             In the field of psychology, absent-mindedness is a mental state wherein a person is forgetfully inattentive.
 | ||
|             It is the opposite mental state of mindfulness. Absentmindedness is often caused by things such as boredom,
 | ||
|             sleepiness, rumination, distraction, or preoccupation with one's own internal monologue. When experiencing
 | ||
|             absent-mindedness, people exhibit signs of memory lapses and weak recollection of recent events.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             Absent-mindedness can usually be a result of a variety of other conditions often diagnosed by clinicians,
 | ||
|             such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and depression. In addition to absent-mindedness leading
 | ||
|             to an array of consequences affecting daily life, it can have more severe, long-term problems.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             It can have three different causes:
 | ||
|             1) a low level of attention ("blanking" or "zoning out");
 | ||
|             2) intense attention to a single object of focus (hyperfocus) that makes a person oblivious to events around him or her;
 | ||
|             3) unwarranted distraction of attention from the object of focus by irrelevant thoughts or environmental events.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             Absent-mindedness is also noticed as a common characteristic of personalities with schizoid personality
 | ||
|             disorder.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Absent-mindedness",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias LEVELS_OF_PROCESSING_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("a4027640-1f52-4ff1-ae13-bd14a30d5b8d"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Levels of Processing Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Levels of Processing Effect
 | ||
|             The Levels of Processing model, created by Fergus I. M. Craik and Robert S. Lockhart in 1972, describes memory recall
 | ||
|             of stimuli as a function of the depth of mental processing. More analysis produce more elaborate and stronger memory
 | ||
|             than lower levels of processing. Depth of processing falls on a shallow to deep continuum. Shallow processing (e.g.,
 | ||
|             processing based on phonemic and orthographic components) leads to a fragile memory trace that is susceptible to rapid
 | ||
|             decay. Conversely, deep processing (e.g., semantic processing) results in a more durable memory trace. There are three
 | ||
|             levels of processing in this model. (1) Structural processing, or visual, is when we remember only the physical quality
 | ||
|             of the word (e.g. how the word is spelled and how letters look). (2) Phonemic processing includes remembering the word
 | ||
|             by the way it sounds (e.g. the word tall rhymes with fall). (3) Lastly, we have semantic processing in which we encode
 | ||
|             the meaning of the word with another word that is similar or has similar meaning. Once the word is perceived, the
 | ||
|             brain allows for a deeper processing.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("4f61b9fa-146a-4b6e-b075-f0ba2ee0d9d0"), // PROCESSING_DIFFICULTY_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levels_of_Processing_model",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SUFFIX_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("1f2b459b-26bc-4a2d-b48e-a9b06d34f924"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Suffix Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Suffix Effect
 | ||
|             The selective impairment in recall of the final items of a spoken list when the list is followed by a
 | ||
|             nominally irrelevant speech item, or suffix.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             Diminishment of the recency effect because a sound item is appended to the list that the subject is not
 | ||
|             required to recall. A form of serial position effect.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases#Other_memory_biases",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SERIAL_POSITION_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("fdd1e260-125b-4d06-bab5-a6204f96d5a7"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Serial-Position Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Serial-Position Effect
 | ||
|             Serial-position effect is the tendency of a person to recall the first and last items in a series best,
 | ||
|             and the middle items worst. When asked to recall a list of items in any order (free recall), people tend
 | ||
|             to begin recall with the end of the list, recalling those items best (the recency effect). Among earlier
 | ||
|             list items, the first few items are recalled more frequently than the middle items (the primacy effect).
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             One suggested reason for the primacy effect is that the initial items presented are most effectively stored
 | ||
|             in long-term memory because of the greater amount of processing devoted to them. (The first list item can
 | ||
|             be rehearsed by itself; the second must be rehearsed along with the first, the third along with the first
 | ||
|             and second, and so on.) The primacy effect is reduced when items are presented quickly and is enhanced
 | ||
|             when presented slowly (factors that reduce and enhance processing of each item and thus permanent storage).
 | ||
|             Longer presentation lists have been found to reduce the primacy effect.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             One theorised reason for the recency effect is that these items are still present in working memory when
 | ||
|             recall is solicited. Items that benefit from neither (the middle items) are recalled most poorly. An
 | ||
|             additional explanation for the recency effect is related to temporal context: if tested immediately after
 | ||
|             rehearsal, the current temporal context can serve as a retrieval cue, which would predict more recent items
 | ||
|             to have a higher likelihood of recall than items that were studied in a different temporal context (earlier
 | ||
|             in the list). The recency effect is reduced when an interfering task is given. Intervening tasks involve
 | ||
|             working memory, as the distractor activity, if exceeding 15 to 30 seconds in duration, can cancel out the
 | ||
|             recency effect. Additionally, if recall comes immediately after the test, the recency effect is consistent
 | ||
|             regardless of the length of the studied list, or presentation rate.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             Amnesiacs with poor ability to form permanent long-term memories do not show a primacy effect, but do show
 | ||
|             a recency effect if recall comes immediately after study. People with Alzheimer's disease exhibit a
 | ||
|             reduced primacy effect but do not produce a recency effect in recall.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("741cafef-3f47-45dd-a082-bb243eba124a"), // RECENCY_EFFECT,
 | ||
|             new Guid("78f65dab-ab6d-4c4c-81f5-250edd1e8991"), // PRIMACY_EFFECT 
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serial-position_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias PART_LIST_CUING = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("005b650d-74be-4c10-a279-33dcd5c13f84"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Part-List Cuing",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Part-List Cuing
 | ||
|             The re-exposure of a subset of learned material as a retrieval cue can impair recall of the remaining material.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links = [],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias RECENCY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("741cafef-3f47-45dd-a082-bb243eba124a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Recency Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Recency Bias
 | ||
|             Recency bias is a cognitive bias that favors recent events over historic ones; a memory bias. Recency bias
 | ||
|             gives "greater importance to the most recent event", such as the final lawyer's closing argument a jury hears
 | ||
|             before being dismissed to deliberate.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             Recency bias should not be confused with anchoring or confirmation bias. Recency bias is related to the
 | ||
|             serial-position effect known as the recency effect. It is not to be confused with recency illusion, the
 | ||
|             belief or impression that a word or language usage is of recent origin when in reality it is long-established.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("fdd1e260-125b-4d06-bab5-a6204f96d5a7"), // SERIAL_POSITION_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("78f65dab-ab6d-4c4c-81f5-250edd1e8991"), // PRIMACY_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recency_bias",
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serial-position_effect#Recency_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias PRIMACY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("78f65dab-ab6d-4c4c-81f5-250edd1e8991"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Primacy Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Primacy Effect
 | ||
|             In psychology and sociology, the primacy effect (also known as the primacy bias) is a cognitive bias that results
 | ||
|             in a subject recalling primary information presented better than information presented later on. For example, a
 | ||
|             subject who reads a sufficiently long list of words is more likely to remember words toward the beginning than
 | ||
|             words in the middle.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("fdd1e260-125b-4d06-bab5-a6204f96d5a7"), // SERIAL_POSITION_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("741cafef-3f47-45dd-a082-bb243eba124a"), // RECENCY_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serial-position_effect#Primacy_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias MEMORY_INHIBITION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("0a370e78-860b-4784-9acf-688b5e1c3148"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Memory Inhibition",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Memory Inhibition
 | ||
|             In psychology, memory inhibition is the ability not to remember irrelevant information. The scientific concept of memory
 | ||
|             inhibition should not be confused with everyday uses of the word "inhibition". Scientifically speaking, memory inhibition
 | ||
|             is a type of cognitive inhibition, which is the stopping or overriding of a mental process, in whole or in part, with or
 | ||
|             without intention.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             Memory inhibition is a critical component of an effective memory system. While some memories are retained for a lifetime,
 | ||
|             most memories are forgotten. According to evolutionary psychologists, forgetting is adaptive because it facilitates
 | ||
|             selectivity of rapid, efficient recollection. For example, a person trying to remember where they parked their car
 | ||
|             would not want to remember every place they have ever parked. In order to remember something, therefore, it is essential
 | ||
|             not only to activate the relevant information, but also to inhibit irrelevant information.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             *Controversial. This is not a bias, it is a logical information sorting algorithm.*
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("4e571eaf-7c2b-44c8-b8cb-0c8da658b82d"), // FREQUENCY_ILLUSION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_inhibition",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias MODALITY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("eeca14c3-8710-4522-8991-81db170d7f8b"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.WHAT_SHOULD_WE_REMEMBER,
 | ||
|         Name = "Modality Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Modality Effect
 | ||
|             The modality effect is a term used in experimental psychology, most often in the fields dealing with memory and learning,
 | ||
|             to refer to how learner performance depends on the presentation mode of studied items. Modality can refer to a number of
 | ||
|             characteristics of the presented study material. However, this term is usually used to describe the improved recall of
 | ||
|             the final items of a list when that list is presented verbally in comparison with a visual representation.
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|             Some studies use the term modality to refer to a general difference in performance based upon the mode of presentation.
 | ||
|             For example, Gibbons demonstrated modality effects in an experiment by making participants count either beeping sounds
 | ||
|             or visually presented dots. In his book about teaching Mathematics, Craig Barton refers to the Modality Effect, arguing
 | ||
|             that students learn better when images or narrations are presented alongside verbal narration, as opposed to being
 | ||
|             presented with on screen text.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modality_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     #endregion
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     #region TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias AVAILABILITY_HEURISTIC = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("d749ce96-32f3-4c3d-86f7-26ff4edabe4a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Availability Heuristic",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Availability Heuristic
 | ||
|             A mental shortcut that relies on immediate examples that come to a given person’s mind when evaluating
 | ||
|             a specific topic, concept, method or decision. The availability heuristic operates on the notion that
 | ||
|             if something can be recalled, it must be important, or at least more important than alternative
 | ||
|             solutions which are not as readily recalled. Subsequently, under the availability heuristic, people
 | ||
|             tend to heavily weigh their judgments toward more recent information, making new opinions biased
 | ||
|             toward that latest news.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The mental availability of an action's consequences is positively related to those consequences'
 | ||
|             perceived magnitude. In other words, the easier it is to recall the consequences of something,
 | ||
|             the greater those consequences are often perceived to be. Most notably, people often rely on the
 | ||
|             content of their recall if its implications are not called into question by the difficulty they
 | ||
|             have in recalling it.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             After seeing news stories about child abductions, people may judge that the likelihood of this event
 | ||
|             is greater. Media coverage can help fuel a person's example bias with widespread and extensive coverage
 | ||
|             of unusual events, such as homicide or airline accidents, and less coverage of more routine, less
 | ||
|             sensational events, such as common diseases or car accidents. For example, when asked to rate the
 | ||
|             probability of a variety of causes of death, people tend to rate "newsworthy" events as more likely
 | ||
|             because they can more readily recall an example from memory. Moreover, unusual and vivid events
 | ||
|             like homicides, shark attacks, or lightning are more often reported in mass media than common and
 | ||
|             un-sensational causes of death like common diseases.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             For example, many people think that the likelihood of dying from shark attacks is greater than that
 | ||
|             of dying from being hit by falling airplane parts when more people actually die from falling airplane
 | ||
|             parts. When a shark attack occurs, the deaths are widely reported in the media whereas deaths as a
 | ||
|             result of being hit by falling airplane parts are rarely reported in the media.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Availability_heuristic",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ATTENTIONAL_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("368cc51b-a235-4fa4-ad90-446c084ffae8"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Attentional Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Attentional Bias
 | ||
|             Attentional bias refers to how a person's perception is affected by selective factors in their attention.
 | ||
|             Attentional biases may explain an individual's failure to consider alternative possibilities when occupied
 | ||
|             with an existing train of thought. For example, cigarette smokers have been shown to possess an attentional
 | ||
|             bias for smoking-related cues around them, due to their brain's altered reward sensitivity. Attentional bias
 | ||
|             has also been associated with clinically relevant symptoms such as anxiety and depression.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attentional_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ILLUSORY_TRUTH_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("cadafb8f-d1ed-4c92-9c29-2f1cb0797a66"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Illusory Truth Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Illusory Truth Effect
 | ||
|             The illusory truth effect (also known as the illusion of truth effect, validity effect, truth effect,
 | ||
|             or the reiteration effect) is the tendency to believe false information to be correct after repeated
 | ||
|             exposure. This phenomenon was first identified in a 1977 study at Villanova University and Temple
 | ||
|             University. When truth is assessed, people rely on whether the information is in line with their
 | ||
|             understanding or if it feels familiar. The first condition is logical, as people compare new information
 | ||
|             with what they already know to be true. Repetition makes statements easier to process relative to new,
 | ||
|             unrepeated statements, leading people to believe that the repeated conclusion is more truthful. The
 | ||
|             illusory truth effect has also been linked to hindsight bias, in which the recollection of confidence
 | ||
|             is skewed after the truth has been received.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In a 2015 study, researchers discovered that familiarity can overpower rationality and that repetitively
 | ||
|             hearing that a certain statement is wrong can paradoxically cause it to feel right. Researchers
 | ||
|             observed the illusory truth effect's impact even on participants who knew the correct answer to begin
 | ||
|             with but were persuaded to believe otherwise through the repetition of a falsehood, to "processing fluency".
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The illusory truth effect plays a significant role in fields such as advertising, news media, and
 | ||
|             political propaganda.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b9edd2f0-8503-4eb5-a4c3-369fcb318894"), // HINDSIGHT_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusory_truth_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias MERE_EXPOSURE_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("8b6cd991-fcf4-4e45-b3ac-f20987667d94"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Mere-Exposure Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Mere-Exposure Effect
 | ||
|             The mere-exposure effect is a psychological phenomenon by which people tend to develop liking or disliking for
 | ||
|             things merely because they are familiar with them. In social psychology, this effect is sometimes called the
 | ||
|             familiarity principle. The effect has been demonstrated with many kinds of things, including words, Chinese
 | ||
|             characters, paintings, pictures of faces, geometric figures, and sounds. In studies of interpersonal
 | ||
|             attraction, the more often people see a person, the more pleasing and likeable they find that person.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The most obvious application of the mere-exposure effect is in advertising, but research on its effectiveness at
 | ||
|             enhancing consumer attitudes toward particular companies and products has been mixed.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The mere-exposure effect exists in most areas of human decision-making. For example, many stock traders tend
 | ||
|             to invest in securities of domestic companies merely because they are more familiar with them, even though
 | ||
|             international markets offer similar or better alternatives. The mere-exposure effect also distorts the
 | ||
|             results of journal-ranking surveys; academics who previously published or completed reviews for a particular
 | ||
|             academic journal rate it dramatically higher than those who did not. There are mixed results on the question
 | ||
|             of whether mere exposure can promote good relations between different social groups. When groups already
 | ||
|             have negative attitudes to each other, further exposure can increase hostility. A statistical analysis of
 | ||
|             voting patterns found that candidates' exposure has a strong effect on the number of votes they receive,
 | ||
|             distinct from the popularity of their policies.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mere-exposure_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CONTEXT_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("ccba2bca-8739-4b05-8c88-e54424e441d4"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Context Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Context Effect
 | ||
|             A context effect is an aspect of cognitive psychology that describes the influence of environmental factors
 | ||
|             on one's perception of a stimulus. The impact of context effects is considered to be part of top-down
 | ||
|             design. The concept is supported by the theoretical approach to perception known as constructive perception.
 | ||
|             Context effects can impact our daily lives in many ways such as word recognition, learning abilities, memory,
 | ||
|             and object recognition. It can have an extensive effect on marketing and consumer decisions. For example,
 | ||
|             research has shown that the comfort level of the floor that shoppers are standing on while reviewing products
 | ||
|             can affect their assessments of product's quality, leading to higher assessments if the floor is comfortable
 | ||
|             and lower ratings if it is uncomfortable. Because of effects such as this, context effects are currently
 | ||
|             studied predominantly in marketing.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Context effects can have a wide range of impacts in daily life. In reading difficult handwriting context
 | ||
|             effects are used to determine what letters make up a word. This helps us analyze potentially ambiguous
 | ||
|             messages and decipher them correctly. It can also affect our perception of unknown sounds based on the noise
 | ||
|             in the environment. For example, we may fill in a word we cannot make out in a sentence based on the
 | ||
|             other words we could understand. Context can prime our attitudes and beliefs about certain topics based
 | ||
|             on current environmental factors and our previous experiences with them.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Context effects also affect memory. We are often better able to recall information in the location in which
 | ||
|             we learned it or studied it. For example, while studying for a test it is better to study in the environment
 | ||
|             that the test will be taken in (i.e. classroom) than in a location where the information was not learned
 | ||
|             and will not need to be recalled. This phenomenon is called transfer-appropriate processing.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Context_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CUE_DEPENDENT_FORGETTING = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("944bc142-895e-4c7f-ba00-bbceefc383c9"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Cue-Dependent Forgetting",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Cue-Dependent Forgetting
 | ||
|             Cue-dependent forgetting, or retrieval failure, is the failure to recall information without memory cues.
 | ||
|             The term either pertains to semantic cues, state-dependent cues or context-dependent cues.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Upon performing a search for files in a computer, its memory is scanned for words. Relevant files containing
 | ||
|             this word or string of words are displayed. This is not how memory in the human mind works. Instead,
 | ||
|             information stored in the memory is retrieved by way of association with other memories. Some memories
 | ||
|             can not be recalled by simply thinking about them. Rather, one must think about something associated
 | ||
|             with it.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             For example, if someone tries and fails to recollect the memories they had about a vacation they went on,
 | ||
|             and someone mentions the fact that they hired a classic car during this vacation, this may make them remember
 | ||
|             all sorts of things from that trip, such as what they ate there, where they went and what books they read.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cue-dependent_forgetting",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias STATE_DEPENDENT_MEMORY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("bf83101d-47af-4d81-8306-935d4ab59fd7"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "State-Dependent Memory",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # State-Dependent Memory
 | ||
|             State-dependent memory or state-dependent learning is the phenomenon where people remember more information
 | ||
|             if their physical or mental state is the same at time of encoding and time of recall. State-dependent memory
 | ||
|             is heavily researched in regards to its employment both in regards to synthetic states of consciousness
 | ||
|             (such as under the effects of psychoactive drugs) as well as organic states of consciousness such as mood.
 | ||
|             While state-dependent memory may seem rather similar to context-dependent memory, context-dependent memory
 | ||
|             involves an individual's external environment and conditions (such as the room used for study and to take
 | ||
|             the test) while state-dependent memory applies to the individual's internal conditions (such as use of
 | ||
|             substances or mood).
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("6b049d68-9104-4579-a7a4-a744c11bd65f"), // CONTEXT_DEPENDENT_MEMORY
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State-dependent_memory",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CONTEXT_DEPENDENT_MEMORY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("6b049d68-9104-4579-a7a4-a744c11bd65f"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Context-Dependent Memory",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Context-Dependent Memory
 | ||
|             In psychology, context-dependent memory is the improved recall of specific episodes or information when the
 | ||
|             context present at encoding and retrieval are the same. In a simpler manner, "when events are represented
 | ||
|             in memory, contextual information is stored along with memory targets; the context can therefore cue memories
 | ||
|             containing that contextual information". One particularly common example of context-dependence at work occurs
 | ||
|             when an individual has lost an item (e.g. lost car keys) in an unknown location. Typically, people try to
 | ||
|             systematically "retrace their steps" to determine all of the possible places where the item might be located.
 | ||
|             Based on the role that context plays in determining recall, it is not at all surprising that individuals often
 | ||
|             quite easily discover the lost item upon returning to the correct context. This concept is heavily related to
 | ||
|             the encoding specificity principle.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             This example best describes the concept of context-dependent forgetting. However, the research literature on
 | ||
|             context-dependent memory describes a number of different types of contextual information that may affect
 | ||
|             recall such as environmental context-dependent memory, state-dependent learning, cognitive context-dependent
 | ||
|             memory and mood-congruent memory. Research has also shown that context-dependence may play an important role
 | ||
|             in numerous situations, such as memory for studied material, or events that have occurred following the
 | ||
|             consumption of alcohol or other drugs.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("bf83101d-47af-4d81-8306-935d4ab59fd7"), // STATE_DEPENDENT_MEMORY
 | ||
|             new Guid("ccba2bca-8739-4b05-8c88-e54424e441d4"), // CONTEXT_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Context-dependent_memory",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias FREQUENCY_ILLUSION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("4e571eaf-7c2b-44c8-b8cb-0c8da658b82d"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Frequency Illusion",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Frequency Illusion
 | ||
|             The frequency illusion (also known as the Baader–Meinhof phenomenon) is a cognitive bias in which a
 | ||
|             person notices a specific concept, word, or product more frequently after recently becoming aware of it.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The name "Baader–Meinhof phenomenon" was coined in 1994 by Terry Mullen in a letter to the St. Paul
 | ||
|             Pioneer Press. The letter describes how, after mentioning the name of the German terrorist group
 | ||
|             Baader–Meinhof once, he kept noticing it. This led to other readers sharing their own experiences of
 | ||
|             the phenomenon, leading it to gain recognition. It was not until 2005, when Stanford linguistics
 | ||
|             professor Arnold Zwicky wrote about this effect on his blog, that the name "frequency illusion"
 | ||
|             was coined.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The main cause behind frequency illusion, and other related illusions and biases, seems to be
 | ||
|             selective attention. Selective attention refers to the process of selecting and focusing on
 | ||
|             selective objects while ignoring distractions. This means that people have the
 | ||
|             unconscious cognitive ability to filter for what they are focusing on.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("af63ce77-f6c6-4e0f-8a9e-3daedc497f9a"), // CONFIRMATION_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("0a370e78-860b-4784-9acf-688b5e1c3148"), // MEMORY_INHIBITION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frequency_illusion",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias HOT_COLD_EMPATHY_GAP = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("e4e091cf-fed3-4c09-9c21-509db0b2729b"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Hot-Cold Empathy Gap",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Hot-Cold Empathy Gap
 | ||
|             A hot-cold empathy gap is a cognitive bias in which people underestimate the influences of visceral
 | ||
|             drives on their own attitudes, preferences, and behaviors. It is a type of empathy gap. The most
 | ||
|             important aspect of this idea is that human understanding is "state-dependent". For example, when
 | ||
|             one is angry, it is difficult to understand what it is like for one to be calm, and vice versa;
 | ||
|             when one is blindly in love with someone, it is difficult to understand what it is like for one
 | ||
|             not to be, (or to imagine the possibility of not being blindly in love in the future). Importantly,
 | ||
|             an inability to minimize one's gap in empathy can lead to negative outcomes in medical settings
 | ||
|             (e.g., when a doctor needs to accurately diagnose the physical pain of a patient).
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Hot-cold empathy gaps can be analyzed according to their direction:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Hot-to-cold: People under the influence of visceral factors (hot state) do not fully grasp how
 | ||
|               much their behavior and preferences are being driven by their current state; they think instead
 | ||
|               that these short-term goals reflect their general and long-term preferences.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             - Cold-to-hot: People in a cold state have difficulty picturing themselves in hot states, minimizing
 | ||
|               the motivational strength of visceral impulses. This leads to unpreparedness when visceral forces
 | ||
|               inevitably arise.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             They can also be classified in regards to their relation with time (past or future) and whether they
 | ||
|             occur intra- or inter-personally:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - intrapersonal prospective: the inability to effectively predict their own future behavior when in
 | ||
|               a different state. See also projection bias.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             - intrapersonal retrospective: when people recall or try to understand behaviors that happened in a
 | ||
|               different state.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             - interpersonal: the attempt to evaluate behaviors or preferences of another person who is in a
 | ||
|               state different from one's own.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Visceral factors
 | ||
|             Visceral factors are an array of influences which include hunger, thirst, love, sexual arousal,
 | ||
|             drug cravings for the drugs one is addicted to, physical pain, and desire for revenge. These
 | ||
|             drives have a disproportionate effect on decision making and behavior: the mind, when affected
 | ||
|             (i.e., in a hot state), tends to ignore all other goals in an effort to placate these influences.
 | ||
|             These states can lead a person to feel "out of control" and act impulsively.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("61ca5b76-66d0-4ce2-b260-7fd42696000a"), // PROJECTION_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hot-cold_empathy_gap",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias OMISSION_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("ad32d669-fc79-44c9-a570-609e1ccdc799"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Omission Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Omission Bias
 | ||
|             Omission bias is the phenomenon in which people prefer omission (inaction) over commission (action)
 | ||
|             and people tend to judge harm as a result of commission more negatively than harm as a result of
 | ||
|             omission. It can occur due to a number of processes, including psychological inertia, the perception
 | ||
|             of transaction costs, and the perception that commissions are more causal than omissions. In social
 | ||
|             political terms the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes how basic human rights are to
 | ||
|             be assessed in article 2, as "without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
 | ||
|             religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
 | ||
|             criteria that are often subject to one or another form of omission bias. It is controversial as to
 | ||
|             whether omission bias is a cognitive bias or is often rational. The bias is often showcased through
 | ||
|             the trolley problem and has also been described as an explanation for the endowment effect and
 | ||
|             status quo bias.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             A real-world example is when parents decide not to vaccinate their children because of the potential
 | ||
|             chance of death—even when the probability the vaccination will cause death is much less likely than
 | ||
|             death from the disease prevented.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b81482f8-b2cf-4b86-a5a4-fcd29aee4e69"), // ENDOWMENT_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("b9e05a25-ac09-407d-8aee-f54a04decf0b"), // STATUS_QUO_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omission_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias BASE_RATE_FALLACY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("1de0de03-a2a7-4248-b004-4152d84a3c86"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Base Rate Fallacy",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Base Rate Fallacy
 | ||
|             The base rate fallacy, also called base rate neglect or base rate bias, is a type of fallacy in
 | ||
|             which people tend to ignore the base rate (e.g., general prevalence) in favor of the individuating
 | ||
|             information (i.e., information pertaining only to a specific case). For example, if someone hears
 | ||
|             that a friend is very shy and quiet, they might think the friend is more likely to be a librarian
 | ||
|             than a salesperson, even though there are far more salespeople than librarians overall - hence
 | ||
|             making it more likely that their friend is actually a salesperson. Base rate neglect is a specific
 | ||
|             form of the more general extension neglect.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Another example: Students were asked to estimate the GPAs of hypothetical students. When given
 | ||
|             relevant statistics about GPA distribution, students tended to ignore them if given descriptive
 | ||
|             information about the particular student even if the new descriptive information was obviously
 | ||
|             of little or no relevance to GPA.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("8533edf9-3117-48c5-8f78-efbd996911f0"), // CONSERVATISM
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base_rate_fallacy",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias BIZARRENESS_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("7f2d9bd2-96e5-4100-85f8-a13b37e91a9f"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Bizarreness Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Bizarreness Effect
 | ||
|             Bizarreness effect is the tendency of bizarre material to be better remembered than common material.
 | ||
|             The scientific evidence for its existence is contested. Some research suggests it does exist, some
 | ||
|             suggests it doesn't exist and some suggests it leads to worse remembering.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             McDaniel and Einstein argues that bizarreness intrinsically does not enhance memory in their paper
 | ||
|             from 1986. They claim that bizarre information becomes distinctive. It is the distinctiveness that
 | ||
|             according to them makes encoding easier. Which makes common sense from an instinctual perspective
 | ||
|             as the human brain will disregard ingesting information it already is familiar with and will be
 | ||
|             particularly attuned to taking in new information as an adaptation technique.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bizarreness_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias HUMOUR_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("4c5ef2d4-5ebb-48ea-b9ee-9b2751ae6914"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Humour Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Humour Effect
 | ||
|             The tendency to better remember humorous items than non-humorous ones.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links = [],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias VON_RESTORFF_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("b922da6f-765e-42e9-b675-f8109c010f2f"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Von Restorff Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Von Restorff Effect
 | ||
|             The Von Restorff effect, also known as the "isolation effect", predicts that when multiple
 | ||
|             homogeneous stimuli are presented, the stimulus that differs from the rest is more likely
 | ||
|             to be remembered. The theory was coined by German psychiatrist and pediatrician Hedwig
 | ||
|             von Restorff (1906–1962), who, in her 1933 study, found that when participants were presented
 | ||
|             with a list of categorically similar items with one distinctive, isolated item on the list,
 | ||
|             memory for the item was improved.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             For example, if a person examines a shopping list with one item highlighted in bright green,
 | ||
|             he or she will be more likely to remember the highlighted item than any of the others.
 | ||
|             Additionally, in the following list of words – desk, chair, bed, table, chipmunk, dresser,
 | ||
|             stool, couch – "chipmunk" will be remembered the most as it stands out against the other
 | ||
|             words in its meaning.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             There have been many studies that demonstrate and confirm the von Restorff effect in children
 | ||
|             and young adults. Another study found that college-aged students performed better when trying
 | ||
|             to remember an outstanding item in a list during an immediate memory-task whereas elderly
 | ||
|             individuals did not remember it well, suggesting a difference in processing strategies
 | ||
|             between the age groups.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In yet another study, although a significant von Restorff effect was produced amongst both
 | ||
|             age groups when manipulating font color, it was found to be smaller in older adults than
 | ||
|             younger adults. This too indicates that older people display lesser benefits for distinctive
 | ||
|             information compared to younger people.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Restorff_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias PICTURE_SUPERIORITY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("2b8f679b-480c-4588-96b5-951767f870e3"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Picture Superiority Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Picture Superiority Effect
 | ||
|             The picture superiority effect refers to the phenomenon in which pictures and images are more
 | ||
|             likely to be remembered than are words. This effect has been demonstrated in numerous experiments
 | ||
|             using different methods. It is based on the notion that "human memory is extremely sensitive to
 | ||
|             the symbolic modality of presentation of event information". Explanations for the picture
 | ||
|             superiority effect are not concrete and are still being debated, however an evolutionary
 | ||
|             explanation is that sight has a long history stretching back millions of years and was
 | ||
|             crucial to survival in the past, whereas reading is a relatively recent invention, and
 | ||
|             specific cognitive processes, such as decoding symbols and linking them to meaning.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("eeca14c3-8710-4522-8991-81db170d7f8b"), // MODALITY_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Picture_superiority_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SELF_REFERENCE_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("302b0004-1f18-4ed0-8fc1-6396fc7e6dbe"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Self-Reference Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Self-Reference Effect
 | ||
|             The self-reference effect is a tendency for people to encode information differently depending on
 | ||
|             whether they are implicated in the information. When people are asked to remember information when
 | ||
|             it is related in some way to themselves, the recall rate can be improved.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-reference_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ANCHORING_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("fe94ab26-70bb-4682-b7ee-e2828e4b02bd"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Anchoring Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Anchoring Effect
 | ||
|             The anchoring effect is a psychological phenomenon in which an individual's judgments or decisions
 | ||
|             are influenced by a reference point or "anchor" which can be completely irrelevant. Both numeric
 | ||
|             and non-numeric anchoring have been reported in research. In numeric anchoring, once the value
 | ||
|             of the anchor is set, subsequent arguments, estimates, etc. made by an individual may change
 | ||
|             from what they would have otherwise been without the anchor. For example, an individual may
 | ||
|             be more likely to purchase a car if it is placed alongside a more expensive model (the anchor).
 | ||
|             Prices discussed in negotiations that are lower than the anchor may seem reasonable, perhaps
 | ||
|             even cheap to the buyer, even if said prices are still relatively higher than the actual market
 | ||
|             value of the car. Another example may be when estimating the orbit of Mars, one might start
 | ||
|             with the Earth's orbit (365 days) and then adjust upward until they reach a value that seems
 | ||
|             reasonable (usually less than 687 days, the correct answer).
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The original description of the anchoring effect came from psychophysics. When judging stimuli
 | ||
|             along a continuum, it was noticed that the first and last stimuli were used to compare the other
 | ||
|             stimuli (this is also referred to as "end anchoring"). This was applied to attitudes by Sherif
 | ||
|             et al. in their 1958 article "Assimilation and effects of anchoring stimuli on judgments".
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Anchoring in negotiation
 | ||
|             In the negotiation process anchoring serves to determine an accepted starting point for the
 | ||
|             subsequent negotiations. As soon as one side states their first price offer, the (subjective)
 | ||
|             anchor is set. The counterbid (counter-anchor) is the second-anchor.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anchoring_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CONSERVATISM_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("8533edf9-3117-48c5-8f78-efbd996911f0"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Conservatism Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Conservatism Bias
 | ||
|             In cognitive psychology and decision science, conservatism or conservatism bias is a bias which refers
 | ||
|             to the tendency to revise one's belief insufficiently when presented with new evidence. This bias
 | ||
|             describes human belief revision in which people over-weigh the prior distribution (base rate) and
 | ||
|             under-weigh new sample evidence when compared to Bayesian belief-revision. In other words, people
 | ||
|             update their prior beliefs as new evidence becomes available, but they do so more slowly than
 | ||
|             they would if they used Bayes' theorem.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In finance, evidence has been found that investors under-react to corporate events, consistent
 | ||
|             with conservatism. This includes announcements of earnings, changes in dividends, and stock splits.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("1de0de03-a2a7-4248-b004-4152d84a3c86"), // BASE_RATE_FALLACY
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservatism_(belief_revision)",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CONTRAST_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("bc69c14d-0f2d-47ce-b20f-836fae36beb6"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Contrast Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Contrast Effect
 | ||
|             A contrast effect is the enhancement or diminishment, relative to normal, of perception, cognition
 | ||
|             or related performance as a result of successive (immediately previous) or simultaneous exposure
 | ||
|             to a stimulus of lesser or greater value in the same dimension. (Here, normal perception, cognition
 | ||
|             or performance is that which would be obtained in the absence of the comparison stimulus—i.e.,
 | ||
|             one based on all previous experience.)
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Perception example: A neutral gray target will appear lighter or darker than it does in isolation
 | ||
|             when immediately preceded by, or simultaneously compared to, respectively, a dark gray or light
 | ||
|             gray target.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Cognition example: A person will appear more or less attractive than that person does in isolation
 | ||
|             when immediately preceded by, or simultaneously compared to, respectively, a less or more attractive
 | ||
|             person.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Performance example: A laboratory rat will work faster, or slower, during a stimulus predicting a
 | ||
|             given amount of reward when that stimulus and reward are immediately preceded by, or alternated with,
 | ||
|             respectively, different stimuli associated with either a lesser or greater amount of reward.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contrast_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias DISTINCTION_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("0c65fbf8-c74a-49a1-8a16-0e789bce9524"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Distinction Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Distinction Bias
 | ||
|             The tendency to view two options as more distinctive when evaluating them simultaneously than when
 | ||
|             evaluating them separately.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             For example, when televisions are displayed next to each other on the sales floor, the difference
 | ||
|             in quality between two very similar, high-quality televisions may appear great. A consumer may pay
 | ||
|             a much higher price for the higher-quality television, even though the difference in quality is
 | ||
|             imperceptible when the televisions are viewed in isolation. Because the consumer will likely be
 | ||
|             watching only one television at a time, the lower-cost television would have provided a similar
 | ||
|             experience at a lower cost.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             To avoid this bias, avoid comparing two jobs, or houses, directly. Instead, consider each job, or
 | ||
|             house, individually and make an overall assessment of each one on its own, and then compare
 | ||
|             assessments, which allows them to make a choice that accurately predicts future experience.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("593f2a10-46a6-471e-9ab3-86df740df6f2"), // LESS_IS_BETTER_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distinction_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias FOCUSING_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("490f26a1-3b9b-4048-9488-8ba93b8bd8af"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Focusing Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Focusing Effect
 | ||
|             A cognitive bias that occurs when people place too much importance on only one aspect of an
 | ||
|             evaluation, causing an error in accurately predicting the utility of a future outcome.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example: It is sunnier in California therefore people must be more happy there. Or a job
 | ||
|             that pays more money must be better.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links = [],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias FRAMING_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("a1950fc4-20e0-4d36-8e68-540b491b2d23"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Framing Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Framing Effect
 | ||
|             The framing effect is a cognitive bias in which people decide between options based on whether the options
 | ||
|             are presented with positive or negative connotations. Individuals have a tendency to make risk-avoidant
 | ||
|             or choices when options are positively framed, while selecting more loss-avoidant options when presented with
 | ||
|             a negative frame. In studies of the bias, options are presented in terms of the probability of either
 | ||
|             losses or gains. While differently expressed, the options described are in effect identical. Gain and
 | ||
|             loss are defined in the scenario as descriptions of outcomes, for example, lives lost or saved, patients
 | ||
|             treated or not treated, monetary gains or losses.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Prospect theory posits that a loss is more significant than the equivalent gain, that a sure gain (certainty
 | ||
|             effect and pseudocertainty effect) is favored over a probabilistic gain, and that a probabilistic loss is
 | ||
|             preferred to a definite loss. One of the dangers of framing effects is that people are often provided with
 | ||
|             options within the context of only one of the two frames.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The concept helps to develop an understanding of frame analysis within social movements, and also in the
 | ||
|             formation of political opinion where spin plays a large role in political opinion polls that are framed to
 | ||
|             encourage a response beneficial to the organization that has commissioned the poll. It has been suggested
 | ||
|             that the use of the technique is discrediting political polls themselves. The effect is reduced, or even
 | ||
|             eliminated, if ample credible information is provided to people.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Framing_effect_(psychology)",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias MONEY_ILLUSION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("33136203-8d52-42e5-ad32-561b3c288676"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Money Illusion",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Money Illusion
 | ||
|             In economics, money illusion, or price illusion, is a cognitive bias where money is thought of in nominal,
 | ||
|             rather than real terms. In other words, the face value (nominal value) of money is mistaken for its
 | ||
|             purchasing power (real value) at a previous point in time. Viewing purchasing power as measured by the
 | ||
|             nominal value is false, as modern fiat currencies have no intrinsic value and their real value depends
 | ||
|             purely on the price level. The term was coined by Irving Fisher in *Stabilizing the Dollar*. It was
 | ||
|             popularized by John Maynard Keynes in the early twentieth century, and Irving Fisher wrote an important
 | ||
|             book on the subject, *The Money Illusion*, in 1928.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The existence of money illusion is disputed by monetary economists who contend that people act rationally
 | ||
|             (i.e. think in real prices) with regard to their wealth. Eldar Shafir, Peter A. Diamond, and Amos
 | ||
|             Tversky (1997) have provided empirical evidence for the existence of the effect and it has been shown to
 | ||
|             affect behaviour in a variety of experimental and real-world situations.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Shafir et al. also state that money illusion influences economic behaviour in three main ways:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Price stickiness. Money illusion has been proposed as one reason why nominal prices are slow to change
 | ||
|               even where inflation has caused real prices to fall or costs to rise.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             - Contracts and laws are not indexed to inflation as frequently as one would rationally expect.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Social discourse, in formal media and more generally, reflects some confusion about real and nominal value.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Money illusion can also influence people's perceptions of outcomes. Experiments have shown that people
 | ||
|             generally perceive an approximate 2% cut in nominal income with no change in monetary value as unfair,
 | ||
|             but see a 2% rise in nominal income where there is 4% inflation as fair, despite them being almost rational
 | ||
|             equivalents. This result is consistent with the 'Myopic Loss Aversion theory'. Furthermore, the money illusion
 | ||
|             means nominal changes in price can influence demand even if real prices have remained constant.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Money_illusion",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias WEBER_FECHNER_LAW = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("528077d5-fdad-47df-89d4-6a32287c321b"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Weber–Fechner Law",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Weber–Fechner Law
 | ||
|             The Weber–Fechner laws are two related scientific laws in the field of psychophysics, known as Weber's law and
 | ||
|             Fechner's law. Both relate to human perception, more specifically the relation between the actual change in a
 | ||
|             physical stimulus and the perceived change. This includes stimuli to all senses: vision, hearing, taste, touch,
 | ||
|             and smell.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Ernst Heinrich Weber states that "the minimum increase of stimulus which will produce a perceptible increase
 | ||
|             of sensation is proportional to the pre-existent stimulus," while Gustav Fechner's law is an inference from
 | ||
|             Weber's law (with additional assumptions) which states that the intensity of our sensation increases as the
 | ||
|             logarithm of an increase in energy rather than as rapidly as the increase.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Psychological studies show that it becomes increasingly difficult to discriminate between two numbers as the
 | ||
|             difference between them decreases. This is called the distance effect. This is important in areas of magnitude
 | ||
|             estimation, such as dealing with large scales and estimating distances. It may also play a role in explaining
 | ||
|             why consumers neglect to shop around to save a small percentage on a large purchase, but will shop around to
 | ||
|             save a large percentage on a small purchase which represents a much smaller absolute dollar amount.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Preliminary research has found that pleasant emotions adhere to Weber’s Law, with accuracy in judging their
 | ||
|             intensity decreasing as pleasantness increases. However, this pattern wasn't observed for unpleasant emotions,
 | ||
|             suggesting a survival-related need for accurately discerning high-intensity negative emotions.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weber%E2%80%93Fechner_law",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CONFIRMATION_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("af63ce77-f6c6-4e0f-8a9e-3daedc497f9a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Confirmation Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Confirmation Bias
 | ||
|             Confirmation bias (also confirmatory bias, myside bias, or congeniality bias) is the tendency to search for,
 | ||
|             interpret, favor, and recall information in a way that confirms or supports one's prior beliefs or values.
 | ||
|             People display this bias when they select information that supports their views, ignoring contrary information,
 | ||
|             or when they interpret ambiguous evidence as supporting their existing attitudes. The effect is strongest for
 | ||
|             desired outcomes, for emotionally charged issues, and for deeply entrenched beliefs.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In social media, confirmation bias is amplified by the use of filter bubbles, or "algorithmic editing", which
 | ||
|             displays to individuals only information they are likely to agree with, while excluding opposing views. Some
 | ||
|             have argued that confirmation bias is the reason why society can never escape from filter bubbles, because
 | ||
|             individuals are psychologically hardwired to seek information that agrees with their preexisting values and
 | ||
|             beliefs. Others have further argued that the mixture of the two is degrading democracy—claiming that this
 | ||
|             "algorithmic editing" removes diverse viewpoints and information—and that unless filter bubble algorithms
 | ||
|             are removed, voters will be unable to make fully informed political decisions.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Many times in the history of science, scientists have resisted new discoveries by selectively interpreting or
 | ||
|             ignoring unfavorable data. Several studies have shown that scientists rate studies that report findings
 | ||
|             consistent with their prior beliefs more favorably than studies reporting findings inconsistent with
 | ||
|             their previous beliefs. Further, confirmation biases can sustain scientific theories or research programs
 | ||
|             in the face of inadequate or even contradictory evidence. The discipline of parapsychology is often cited
 | ||
|             as an example.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("4e571eaf-7c2b-44c8-b8cb-0c8da658b82d"), // FREQUENCY_ILLUSION
 | ||
|             new Guid("d749ce96-32f3-4c3d-86f7-26ff4edabe4a"), // AVAILABILITY_HEURISTIC
 | ||
|             new Guid("0378a05c-b55b-4451-a7f4-b5e1d6287d83"), // FADING_AFFECT_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("fee14af4-34af-4cd0-a72c-9ad489516b60"), // CONGRUENCE_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CONGRUENCE_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("fee14af4-34af-4cd0-a72c-9ad489516b60"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Congruence Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Congruence Bias
 | ||
|             Congruence bias is the tendency of people to over-rely on testing their initial hypothesis (the most congruent one)
 | ||
|             while neglecting to test alternative hypotheses. That is, people rarely try experiments that could disprove their
 | ||
|             initial belief, but rather try to repeat their initial results. It is a special case of the confirmation bias.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("af63ce77-f6c6-4e0f-8a9e-3daedc497f9a"), // CONFIRMATION_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congruence_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CHOICE_SUPPORTIVE_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("51337702-9dc4-442a-8584-78f56e9ec186"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Choice-supportive Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Choice-supportive Bias
 | ||
|             Choice-supportive bias or post-purchase rationalization is the tendency to retroactively ascribe positive attributes
 | ||
|             to an option one has selected and/or to demote the forgone options. It is part of cognitive science, and is a
 | ||
|             distinct cognitive bias that occurs once a decision is made. For example, if a person chooses option A instead of
 | ||
|             option B, they are likely to ignore or downplay the faults of option A while amplifying or ascribing new negative
 | ||
|             faults to option B. Conversely, they are also likely to notice and amplify the advantages of option A and not notice
 | ||
|             or de-emphasize those of option B.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("dd45c762-0599-4c6d-82e0-d10f7ee85bb1"), // MISATTRIBUTION_OF_MEMORY
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Choice-supportive_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SELECTIVE_PERCEPTION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("91fded4f-de89-405e-8627-dba49cf5deaa"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Selective Perception",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Selective Perception
 | ||
|             Selective perception is the tendency not to notice and more quickly forget stimuli that cause emotional discomfort
 | ||
|             and contradict prior beliefs. For example, a teacher may have a favorite student because they are biased by in-group
 | ||
|             favoritism. The teacher ignores the student's poor attainment. Conversely, they might not notice the progress of
 | ||
|             their least favorite student. It can also occur when consuming mass media, allowing people to see facts and
 | ||
|             opinions they like while ignoring those that do not fit with particular opinions, values, beliefs, or frame of
 | ||
|             reference. Psychologists believe this process occurs automatically.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("75e51ef5-f992-41c2-8778-0002c617db9a"), // OSTRICH_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("1dfd3e9e-e44e-44cf-b8a0-95dea7a0e780"), // NORMALCY_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selective_perception",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias OBSERVER_EXPECTANCY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("c06c9a63-15aa-4601-aff4-ddfe6dd9727a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Observer-Expectancy Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Observer-Expectancy Effect
 | ||
|             The observer-expectancy effect[a] is a form of reactivity in which a researcher's cognitive bias causes them to
 | ||
|             subconsciously influence the participants of an experiment. Confirmation bias can lead to the experimenter
 | ||
|             interpreting results incorrectly because of the tendency to look for information that conforms to their hypothesis,
 | ||
|             and overlook information that argues against it. It is a significant threat to a study's internal validity, and
 | ||
|             is therefore typically controlled using a double-blind experimental design.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The classic example of experimenter bias is that of "Clever Hans", an Orlov Trotter horse claimed by his owner
 | ||
|             von Osten to be able to do arithmetic and other tasks. As a result of the large public interest in Clever Hans,
 | ||
|             philosopher and psychologist Carl Stumpf, along with his assistant Oskar Pfungst, investigated these claims.
 | ||
|             Ruling out simple fraud, Pfungst determined that the horse could answer correctly even when von Osten did not
 | ||
|             ask the questions. However, the horse was unable to answer correctly when either it could not see the questioner,
 | ||
|             or if the questioner themselves was unaware of the correct answer: When von Osten knew the answers to the questions,
 | ||
|             Hans answered correctly 89% of the time. However, when von Osten did not know the answers, Hans guessed only 6% of
 | ||
|             questions correctly. Pfungst then proceeded to examine the behaviour of the questioner in detail, and showed that
 | ||
|             as the horse's taps approached the right answer, the questioner's posture and facial expression changed in ways
 | ||
|             that were consistent with an increase in tension, which was released when the horse made the final, correct tap.
 | ||
|             This provided a cue that the horse had learned to use as a reinforced cue to stop tapping.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("af63ce77-f6c6-4e0f-8a9e-3daedc497f9a"), // CONFIRMATION_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blinded_experiment",
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observer-expectancy_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias OSTRICH_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("75e51ef5-f992-41c2-8778-0002c617db9a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Ostrich Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Ostrich Effect
 | ||
|             The ostrich effect, also known as the ostrich problem, was originally coined by Galai & Sade (2003). The name
 | ||
|             comes from the common (but false) legend that ostriches bury their heads in the sand to avoid danger. This
 | ||
|             effect is a cognitive bias where people tend to “bury their head in the sand” and avoid potentially negative
 | ||
|             but useful information, such as feedback on progress, to avoid psychological discomfort.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             There is neuroscientific evidence of the ostrich effect. Sharot et al. (2012) investigated the differences in
 | ||
|             positive and negative information when updating existing beliefs. Consistent with the ostrich effect,
 | ||
|             participants presented with negative information were more likely to avoid updating their beliefs.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             An everyday example of the ostrich effect in a financial context is people avoiding checking their bank account
 | ||
|             balance after spending a lot of money. There are known negative implications of the ostrich effect in healthcare.
 | ||
|             For example, people with diabetes avoid monitoring their blood sugar levels.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("91fded4f-de89-405e-8627-dba49cf5deaa"), // SELECTIVE_PERCEPTION
 | ||
|             new Guid("1dfd3e9e-e44e-44cf-b8a0-95dea7a0e780"), // NORMALCY_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ostrich_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SUBJECTIVE_VALIDATION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("85612b34-0a78-454e-a204-7840bc11521c"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Subjective Validation",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Subjective Validation
 | ||
|             Subjective validation, sometimes called personal validation effect, is a cognitive bias by which people will
 | ||
|             consider a statement or another piece of information to be correct if it has any personal meaning or significance
 | ||
|             to them. People whose opinion is affected by subjective validation will perceive two unrelated events (i.e., a
 | ||
|             coincidence) to be related because their personal beliefs demand that they be related. Closely related to the
 | ||
|             Forer effect, subjective validation is an important element in cold reading. It is considered to be the main
 | ||
|             reason behind most reports of paranormal phenomena.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example: Belief in a cold reading. Cold reading is a set of techniques used by mentalists, psychics, fortune-tellers,
 | ||
|             and mediums. Without prior knowledge, a practiced cold-reader can quickly obtain a great deal of information by
 | ||
|             analyzing the person's body language, age, clothing or fashion, hairstyle, gender, sexual orientation, religion,
 | ||
|             ethnicity, level of education, manner of speech, place of origin, etc. during a line of questioning.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("05e4a15d-5c3e-42e9-88aa-bb40350d17e2"), // BARNUM_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjective_validation",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias BARNUM_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("2cb8514a-c4a2-4cf6-aed7-72d7870ace84"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Barnum Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Barnum Effect
 | ||
|             The Barnum effect, also called the Forer effect or, less commonly, the Barnum–Forer effect, is a common psychological
 | ||
|             phenomenon whereby individuals give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly are
 | ||
|             tailored specifically to them, yet which are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people.
 | ||
|             This effect can provide a partial explanation for the widespread acceptance of some paranormal beliefs and practices,
 | ||
|             such as astrology, fortune telling, aura reading, and some types of personality tests.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example: Belief in a cold reading. Cold reading is a set of techniques used by mentalists, psychics, fortune-tellers,
 | ||
|             and mediums. Without prior knowledge, a practiced cold-reader can quickly obtain a great deal of information by
 | ||
|             analyzing the person's body language, age, clothing or fashion, hairstyle, gender, sexual orientation, religion,
 | ||
|             ethnicity, level of education, manner of speech, place of origin, etc. during a line of questioning.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("85612b34-0a78-454e-a204-7840bc11521c"), // SUBJECTIVE_VALIDATION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barnum_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CONTINUED_INFLUENCE_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("7169c5e4-ca95-4568-b816-a36e2049993b"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Continued Influence Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Continued Influence Effect
 | ||
|             The tendency to believe previously learned misinformation even after it has been corrected. Misinformation can still
 | ||
|             influence inferences one generates after a correction has occurred.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("2b69b071-6587-4ea1-a4f5-aee4e2fef43c"), // MISINFORMATION_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases#Other_memory_biases",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SEMMELWEIS_REFLEX = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("48e2374a-9919-43eb-baa6-fc8c4f837d31"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Semmelweis Reflex",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Semmelweis Reflex
 | ||
|             The Semmelweis reflex or "Semmelweis effect" is a metaphor for the reflex-like tendency to reject new evidence
 | ||
|             or new knowledge because it contradicts established norms, beliefs, or paradigms.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("af63ce77-f6c6-4e0f-8a9e-3daedc497f9a"), // CONFIRMATION_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("7256f3f1-6650-4c45-bb85-36d81c9edd1a"), // AUTHORITY_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semmelweis_reflex",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias BIAS_BLIND_SPOT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("d8f01e8b-23c3-47da-979e-f18a3d4e104d"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Bias Blind Spot",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Bias Blind Spot
 | ||
|             The bias blind spot is the cognitive bias of recognizing the impact of biases on the judgment of others, while failing
 | ||
|             to see the impact of biases on one's own judgment. The term was created by Emily Pronin, a social psychologist from
 | ||
|             Princeton University's Department of Psychology, with colleagues Daniel Lin and Lee Ross. The bias blind spot is named
 | ||
|             after the visual blind spot. Most people appear to exhibit the bias blind spot. In a sample of more than 600 residents
 | ||
|             of the United States, more than 85% believed they were less biased than the average American. Only one participant
 | ||
|             believed that they were more biased than the average American. People do vary with regard to the extent to which
 | ||
|             they exhibit the bias blind spot. This phenomenon has been successfully replicated and it appears that in general,
 | ||
|             stronger personal free will beliefs are associated with bias blind spot. It appears to be a stable individual
 | ||
|             difference that is measurable.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The bias blind spot appears to be a true blind spot in that it is unrelated to actual decision making ability.
 | ||
|             Performance on indices of decision making competence are not related to individual differences in bias blind spot.
 | ||
|             In other words, most people appear to believe that they are less biased than others, regardless of their actual
 | ||
|             decision making ability.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("80f9b496-798a-4a1e-a426-815f23b8698e"), // INTROSPECTION_ILLUSION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bias_blind_spot",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias INTROSPECTION_ILLUSION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("80f9b496-798a-4a1e-a426-815f23b8698e"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Introspection Illusion",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Introspection Illusion
 | ||
|             The introspection illusion is a cognitive bias in which people wrongly think they have direct insight into the origins
 | ||
|             of their mental states, while treating others' introspections as unreliable. The illusion has been examined in
 | ||
|             psychological experiments, and suggested as a basis for biases in how people compare themselves to others. These
 | ||
|             experiments have been interpreted as suggesting that, rather than offering direct access to the processes underlying
 | ||
|             mental states, introspection is a process of construction and inference, much as people indirectly infer others' mental
 | ||
|             states from their behaviour.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             When people mistake unreliable introspection for genuine self-knowledge, the result can be an illusion of superiority
 | ||
|             over other people, for example when each person thinks they are less biased and less conformist than the rest of the
 | ||
|             group. Even when experimental subjects are provided with reports of other subjects' introspections, in as detailed a
 | ||
|             form as possible, they still rate those other introspections as unreliable while treating their own as reliable.
 | ||
|             Although the hypothesis of an introspection illusion informs some psychological research, the existing evidence is
 | ||
|             arguably inadequate to decide how reliable introspection is in normal circumstances.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The phrase "introspection illusion" was coined by Emily Pronin. Pronin describes the illusion as having four components:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - People give a strong weighting to introspective evidence when assessing themselves.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - They do not give such a strong weight when assessing others.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - People disregard their own behaviour when assessing themselves (but not others).
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Own introspections are more highly weighted than others. It is not just that people lack access to each other's
 | ||
|               introspections: they regard only their own as reliable.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("f8fd4635-69b3-47be-8243-8c7c6749cae2"), // ILLUSORY_SUPERIORITY 
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Introspection_illusion",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ILLUSORY_SUPERIORITY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("f8fd4635-69b3-47be-8243-8c7c6749cae2"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Illusory Superiority",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Illusory Superiority
 | ||
|             In social psychology, illusory superiority is a cognitive bias wherein people overestimate their own qualities and
 | ||
|             abilities compared to others. Illusory superiority is one of many positive illusions, relating to the self, that
 | ||
|             are evident in the study of intelligence, the effective performance of tasks and tests, and the possession of
 | ||
|             desirable personal characteristics and personality traits. Overestimation of abilities compared to an objective
 | ||
|             measure is known as the overconfidence effect.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The term "illusory superiority" was first used by the researchers Van Yperen and Buunk, in 1991. The phenomenon is
 | ||
|             also known as the above-average effect, the superiority bias, the leniency error, the sense of relative superiority,
 | ||
|             the primus inter pares effect, and the Lake Wobegon effect, named after the fictional town where all the children are
 | ||
|             above average. The Dunning-Kruger effect is a form of illusory superiority shown by people on a task where their
 | ||
|             level of skill is low.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b821d449-64e5-4c0a-9d5a-3fda609a9b86"), // OVERCONFIDENCE_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("b9c06da1-d2eb-4871-8159-a2a6d25e9eff"), // DUNNING_KRUGER_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("80f9b496-798a-4a1e-a426-815f23b8698e"), // INTROSPECTION_ILLUSION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusory_superiority",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias OVERCONFIDENCE_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("b821d449-64e5-4c0a-9d5a-3fda609a9b86"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Overconfidence Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Overconfidence Effect
 | ||
|             The overconfidence effect is a well-established bias in which a person's subjective confidence in their
 | ||
|             judgments is reliably greater than the objective accuracy of those judgments, especially when confidence
 | ||
|             is relatively high.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The most common way in which overconfidence has been studied is by asking people how confident they are of
 | ||
|             specific beliefs they hold or answers they provide. The data show that confidence systematically exceeds
 | ||
|             accuracy, implying people are more sure that they are correct than they deserve to be.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The following is an incomplete list of events related or triggered by bias/overconfidence and a failing
 | ||
|             (safety) culture:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Chernobyl disaster
 | ||
|             - Sinking of the Titanic
 | ||
|             - Space Shuttle Challenger disaster
 | ||
|             - Space Shuttle Columbia disaster
 | ||
|             - Deepwater Horizon oil spill
 | ||
|             - Titan submersible implosion
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("f8fd4635-69b3-47be-8243-8c7c6749cae2"), // ILLUSORY_SUPERIORITY
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overconfidence_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias NAÏVE_CYNICISM = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("5ae6f7ec-3be2-47ad-ad75-0ed114f97fe0"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Naïve Cynicism",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Naïve Cynicism
 | ||
|             Naïve cynicism is a philosophy of mind, cognitive bias and form of psychological egoism that occurs when
 | ||
|             people naïvely expect more egocentric bias in others than actually is the case.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The term was formally proposed by Justin Kruger and Thomas Gilovich and has been studied across a wide range
 | ||
|             of contexts including: negotiations, group-membership, marriage, economics, government policy and more.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The theory of naïve cynicism can be described as:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - I am not biased.
 | ||
|             - You are biased if you disagree with me.
 | ||
|             - Your intentions/actions reflect your underlying egocentric biases.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             As with naïve cynicism, the theory of naïve realism hinges on the acceptance of the following three beliefs:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - I am not biased.
 | ||
|             - Reasonable people are not biased.
 | ||
|             - All others are biased.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Naïve cynicism can be thought of as the counter to naïve realism, which is the belief that an individual
 | ||
|             perceives the social world objectively while others perceive it subjectively.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             It is important to discern that naïve cynicism is related to the notion that others have an egocentric bias
 | ||
|             that motivates them to do things for their own self-interest rather than for altruistic reasons.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Both of these theories, however, relate to the extent that adults credit or discredit the beliefs or statements
 | ||
|             of others.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example: Cold War
 | ||
|             The American reaction to a Russian SALT treaty during the Cold War is one well-known example of naïve cynicism
 | ||
|             in history. Political leaders negotiating on behalf of the United States discredited the offer simply because
 | ||
|             it was proposed by the Russian side.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Former U.S. congressman Floyd Spence indicates the use of naïve cynicism in this quote:
 | ||
|             "I have had a philosophy for some time in regard to SALT, and it goes like this: the Russians will not accept
 | ||
|             a SALT treaty that is not in their best interest, and it seems to me that if it is their best interests, it
 | ||
|             can‘t be in our best interest."
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_cynicism",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias NAÏVE_REALISM = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("f0ad095e-8e9c-4bfb-855e-11fb5dd58cea"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.TOO_MUCH_INFORMATION,
 | ||
|         Name = "Naïve Realism",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Naïve Realism
 | ||
|             In social psychology, naïve realism is the human tendency to believe that we see the world around us objectively,
 | ||
|             and that people who disagree with us must be uninformed, irrational, or biased.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Naïve realism provides a theoretical basis for several other cognitive biases, which are systematic errors when it
 | ||
|             comes to thinking and making decisions. These include the false consensus effect, actor–observer bias, bias blind
 | ||
|             spot, and fundamental attribution error, among others.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Lee Ross and fellow psychologist Andrew Ward have outlined three interrelated assumptions, or "tenets", that make up
 | ||
|             naïve realism. They argue that these assumptions are supported by a long line of thinking in social psychology,
 | ||
|             along with several empirical studies. According to their model, people:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Believe that they see the world objectively and without bias.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Expect that others will come to the same conclusions, so long as they are exposed to the same information and
 | ||
|             interpret it in a rational manner.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Assume that others who do not share the same views must be ignorant, irrational, or biased.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("bc0dc6d3-5115-4def-91ae-a38aebed185e"), // FALSE_CONSENSUS_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("d8f01e8b-23c3-47da-979e-f18a3d4e104d"), // BIAS_BLIND_SPOT
 | ||
|             new Guid("5da6dcf4-ed01-4e14-99b0-7a624b16cf17"), // ACTOR_OBSERVER_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("f1570784-f8ec-46fd-8bb8-763aef31a04a"), // FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("ca2d4f1f-924f-44ae-886b-19240cf2c8c0"), // ULTIMATE_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_realism_(psychology)",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     #endregion
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     #region NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CONFABULATION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("2bbea096-a2a6-413f-85ce-32b5ae18669f"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Confabulation",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Confabulation
 | ||
|             In psychology, confabulation is a memory error consisting of the production of fabricated, distorted, or misinterpreted
 | ||
|             memories about oneself or the world. People who confabulate present with incorrect memories ranging from subtle inaccuracies
 | ||
|             to surreal fabrications, and may include confusion or distortion in the temporal framing (timing, sequence or duration) of
 | ||
|             memories. In general, they are very confident about their recollections, even when challenged with contradictory evidence.
 | ||
|             Confabulation occurs when individuals mistakenly recall false information, without intending to deceive.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confabulation",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CLUSTERING_ILLUSION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("2c2ed1a8-aa4d-486d-a9b4-5a16ae9230c9"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Clustering Illusion",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Clustering Illusion
 | ||
|             The clustering illusion is the tendency to erroneously consider the inevitable "streaks" or "clusters" arising in small
 | ||
|             samples from random distributions to be non-random. The illusion is caused by a human tendency to underpredict the amount
 | ||
|             of variability likely to appear in a small sample of random or pseudorandom data.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("7fce783e-2120-4aad-9805-2c2a2b937b7d"), // ILLUSION_OF_CONTROL
 | ||
|             new Guid("465418ae-54b8-42ef-a29e-6ee9e9ffa769"), // INSENSITIVITY_TO_SAMPLE_SIZE
 | ||
|             new Guid("61cd7e34-23be-43ef-ab97-8118cef7d23f"), // MONTE_CARLO_FALLACY
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clustering_illusion",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias INSENSITIVITY_TO_SAMPLE_SIZE = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("465418ae-54b8-42ef-a29e-6ee9e9ffa769"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Insensitivity to Sample Size",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Insensitivity to Sample Size
 | ||
|             Insensitivity to sample size is a cognitive bias that occurs when people judge the probability of obtaining a sample statistic
 | ||
|             without respect to the sample size. For example, in one study, subjects assigned the same probability to the likelihood of
 | ||
|             obtaining a mean height of above six feet (183 cm) in samples of 10, 100, and 1,000 men. In other words, variation is more
 | ||
|             likely in smaller samples, but people may not expect this.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("2c2ed1a8-aa4d-486d-a9b4-5a16ae9230c9"), // CLUSTERING_ILLUSION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insensitivity_to_sample_size",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias NEGLECT_OF_PROBABILITY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("44c6efd7-53f1-4d22-82fe-25e941390089"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Neglect of Probability",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Neglect of Probability
 | ||
|             The neglect of probability, a type of cognitive bias, is the tendency to disregard probability when making a decision under
 | ||
|             uncertainty and is one simple way in which people regularly violate the normative rules for decision making. Small risks are
 | ||
|             typically either neglected entirely or hugely overrated. The continuum between the extremes is ignored. The term probability
 | ||
|             neglect was coined by Cass Sunstein.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             There are many related ways in which people violate the normative rules of decision making with regard to probability including
 | ||
|             the hindsight bias, the neglect of prior base rates effect, and the gambler's fallacy. However, this bias is different, in that,
 | ||
|             rather than incorrectly using probability, the actor disregards it.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b9edd2f0-8503-4eb5-a4c3-369fcb318894"), // HINDSIGHT_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("1de0de03-a2a7-4248-b004-4152d84a3c86"), // BASE_RATE_FALLACY
 | ||
|             new Guid("61cd7e34-23be-43ef-ab97-8118cef7d23f"), // MONTE_CARLO_FALLACY
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neglect_of_probability",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ANECDOTAL_FALLACY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("a448fe93-b176-4b5f-9498-f57f3f970a67"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Anecdotal Fallacy",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Anecdotal Fallacy
 | ||
|             Misuse of anecdotal evidence is an informal fallacy and is sometimes referred to as the "person who" fallacy
 | ||
|             ("I know a person who..."; "I know of a case where..." etc.) which places undue weight on experiences of close
 | ||
|             peers which may not be typical.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             A common way anecdotal evidence becomes unscientific is through fallacious reasoning such as the "Post hoc ergo
 | ||
|             propter hoc" fallacy, the human tendency to assume that if one event happens after another, then the first must
 | ||
|             be the cause of the second. Another fallacy involves inductive reasoning. For instance, if an anecdote illustrates
 | ||
|             a desired conclusion rather than a logical conclusion, it is considered a faulty or hasty generalization.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anecdotal_evidence",
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post_hoc_ergo_propter_hoc",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ILLUSION_OF_VALIDITY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("8f68af8b-7b27-4697-bcf6-8bd4a5392a22"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Illusion of Validity",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Illusion of Validity
 | ||
|             A cognitive bias in which a person overestimates his or her ability to interpret and predict accurately the outcome
 | ||
|             when analyzing a set of data, in particular when the data analyzed show a very consistent pattern — that is, when the
 | ||
|             data "tell" a coherent story. This effect persists even when the person is aware of all the factors that limit the
 | ||
|             accuracy of his or her predictions, that is when the data and/or methods used to judge them lead to highly fallible
 | ||
|             predictions. 
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example: Subjects reported higher confidence in a prediction of the final grade point average of a student after
 | ||
|             seeing a first-year record of consistent B’s than a first-year record of an even number of A’s and C’s. Consistent
 | ||
|             patterns may be observed when input variables are highly redundant or correlated, which may increase subjective
 | ||
|             confidence. However, a number of highly correlated inputs should not increase confidence much more than only one
 | ||
|             of the inputs; instead higher confidence should be merited when a number of highly independent inputs show a
 | ||
|             consistent pattern.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("ecfa5b28-3900-45ba-89c7-f8d995dfe406"), // WYSIATI
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusion_of_validity",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias WYSIATI = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("ecfa5b28-3900-45ba-89c7-f8d995dfe406"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is)",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is)
 | ||
|             It solves a difficult problem by replacing it with a simpler problem that you know about. One problem does not solve
 | ||
|             the other. The acronym WYSIATI stands for "What you see is all there is." It was coined by Nobel laureate Daniel
 | ||
|             Kahneman in his book "Thinking, Fast and Slow." WYSIATI refers to the fact that we make decisions based on the
 | ||
|             information we currently have. For example, when we meet an unknown person, we decide within seconds whether we
 | ||
|             like the person or not.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thinking,_Fast_and_Slow",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias MASKED_MAN_FALLACY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("5ddf8011-0ba2-4341-9e18-46178f8d4fbe"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Masked-Man Fallacy",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Masked-Man Fallacy
 | ||
|             In philosophical logic, the masked-man fallacy (also known as the intensional fallacy or epistemic fallacy) is
 | ||
|             committed when one makes an illicit use of Leibniz's law in an argument. Leibniz's law states that if A and B
 | ||
|             are the same object, then A and B are indiscernible (that is, they have all the same properties). By modus tollens,
 | ||
|             this means that if one object has a certain property, while another object does not have the same property, the two
 | ||
|             objects cannot be identical. The fallacy is "epistemic" because it posits an immediate identity between a subject's
 | ||
|             knowledge of an object with the object itself, failing to recognize that Leibniz's Law is not capable of accounting
 | ||
|             for intensional contexts.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The name of the fallacy comes from the example:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Premise 1: I know who Claus is.
 | ||
|             - Premise 2: I do not know who the masked man is.
 | ||
|             - Conclusion: Therefore, Claus is not the masked man.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The premises may be true and the conclusion false if Claus is the masked man and the speaker does not know that.
 | ||
|             Thus the argument is a fallacious one.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masked-man_fallacy",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias RECENCY_ILLUSION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("d0a79f6e-7786-4dd7-8a3f-62f167252171"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Recency Illusion",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Recency Illusion
 | ||
|             The recency illusion is the belief or impression, on the part of someone who has only recently become aware of a
 | ||
|             long-established phenomenon, that the phenomenon itself must be of recent origin. The term was coined by Arnold
 | ||
|             Zwicky, a linguist at Stanford University who is primarily interested in examples involving words, meanings,
 | ||
|             phrases, and grammatical constructions. However, use of the term is not restricted to linguistic phenomena:
 | ||
|             Zwicky has defined it simply as, "the belief that things you have noticed only recently are in fact recent".
 | ||
|             According to Zwicky, the illusion is caused by selective attention.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("91fded4f-de89-405e-8627-dba49cf5deaa"), // SELECTIVE_PERCEPTION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recency_illusion",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias GAMBLERS_FALLACY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("61cd7e34-23be-43ef-ab97-8118cef7d23f"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Gambler's Fallacy",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Gambler's Fallacy
 | ||
|             he gambler's fallacy, also known as the Monte Carlo fallacy or the fallacy of the maturity of chances, is the belief
 | ||
|             that, if an event (whose occurrences are independent and identically distributed) has occurred less frequently than
 | ||
|             expected, it is more likely to happen again in the future (or vice versa). The fallacy is commonly associated with
 | ||
|             gambling, where it may be believed, for example, that the next dice roll is more than usually likely to be six
 | ||
|             because there have recently been fewer than the expected number of sixes.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In a study aimed at discovering if the negative autocorrelation that exists with the gambler's fallacy existed in
 | ||
|             the decision made by U.S. asylum judges, results showed that after two successive asylum grants, a judge would be
 | ||
|             5.5% less likely to approve a third grant.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In the decision making of loan officers, it can be argued that monetary incentives are a key factor in biased
 | ||
|             decision making, rendering it harder to examine the gambler's fallacy effect. However, research shows that loan
 | ||
|             officers who are not incentivised by monetary gain are 8% less likely to approve a loan if they approved one
 | ||
|             for the previous client.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Several video games feature the use of loot boxes, a collection of in-game items awarded on opening with random
 | ||
|             contents set by rarity metrics, as a monetization scheme. Since around 2018, loot boxes have come under scrutiny
 | ||
|             from governments and advocates on the basis they are akin to gambling, particularly for games aimed at youth.
 | ||
|             Some games use a special "pity-timer" mechanism, that if the player has opened several loot boxes in a row
 | ||
|             without obtaining a high-rarity item, subsequent loot boxes will improve the odds of a higher-rate item drop.
 | ||
|             This is considered to feed into the gambler's fallacy since it reinforces the idea that a player will eventually
 | ||
|             obtain a high-rarity item (a win) after only receiving common items from a string of previous loot boxes.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("44c6efd7-53f1-4d22-82fe-25e941390089"), // NEGLECT_OF_PROBABILITY
 | ||
|             new Guid("2c2ed1a8-aa4d-486d-a9b4-5a16ae9230c9"), // CLUSTERING_ILLUSION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gambler%27s_fallacy",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias HOT_HAND_FALLACY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("5fd14849-7041-42ee-976e-9a2b10522d29"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Hot Hand Fallacy",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Hot Hand Fallacy
 | ||
|             The "hot hand" (also known as the "hot hand phenomenon" or "hot hand fallacy") is a phenomenon, previously
 | ||
|             considered a cognitive social bias, that a person who experiences a successful outcome has a greater
 | ||
|             chance of success in further attempts. The concept is often applied to sports and skill-based tasks
 | ||
|             in general and originates from basketball, where a shooter is more likely to score if their previous
 | ||
|             attempts were successful; i.e., while having the "hot hand.” While previous success at a task can indeed
 | ||
|             change the psychological attitude and subsequent success rate of a player, researchers for many years
 | ||
|             did not find evidence for a "hot hand" in practice, dismissing it as fallacious. However, later research
 | ||
|             questioned whether the belief is indeed a fallacy. Some recent studies using modern statistical
 | ||
|             analysis have observed evidence for the "hot hand" in some sporting activities; however, other recent
 | ||
|             studies have not observed evidence of the "hot hand". Moreover, evidence suggests that only a small
 | ||
|             subset of players may show a "hot hand" and, among those who do, the magnitude (i.e., effect size) of the
 | ||
|             "hot hand" tends to be small.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hot_hand",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ILLUSORY_CORRELATION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("829d3178-8ebc-417c-b587-2ead31525327"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Illusory Correlation",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Illusory Correlation
 | ||
|             In psychology, illusory correlation is the phenomenon of perceiving a relationship between variables
 | ||
|             (typically people, events, or behaviors) even when no such relationship exists. A false association
 | ||
|             may be formed because rare or novel occurrences are more salient and therefore tend to capture one's
 | ||
|             attention. This phenomenon is one way stereotypes form and endure. Hamilton & Rose (1980) found that
 | ||
|             stereotypes can lead people to expect certain groups and traits to fit together, and then to overestimate
 | ||
|             the frequency with which these correlations actually occur. These stereotypes can be learned and perpetuated
 | ||
|             without any actual contact occurring between the holder of the stereotype and the group it is about.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example: A woman has her purse stolen by a person of a specific demographic. Henceforth, she keeps her
 | ||
|             close purse each time she sees a similar person.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example: A man holds the belief that people in urban environments tend to be rude. Therefore, when he
 | ||
|             meets someone who is rude he assumes that the person lives in a city, rather than a rural area.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusory_correlation",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias PAREIDOLIA = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("274cc868-df03-4fae-9dca-ccb07a66aeaf"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Pareidolia",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Pareidolia
 | ||
|             Pareidolia is the tendency for perception to impose a meaningful interpretation on a nebulous stimulus,
 | ||
|             usually visual, so that one detects an object, pattern, or meaning where there is none. Pareidolia is
 | ||
|             a type of apophenia.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Common examples include perceived images of animals, faces, or objects in cloud formations; seeing faces
 | ||
|             in inanimate objects; or lunar pareidolia like the Man in the Moon or the Moon rabbit. The concept of
 | ||
|             pareidolia may extend to include hidden messages in recorded music played in reverse or at higher- or
 | ||
|             lower-than-normal speeds, and hearing voices (mainly indistinct) or music in random noise, such as that
 | ||
|             produced by air conditioners or by fans.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("6ab69dc8-6fcc-42c3-b190-90125a15b49f"), // APHOPHENIA
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareidolia",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias APOPHENIA = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("6ab69dc8-6fcc-42c3-b190-90125a15b49f"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Apophenia",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Apophenia
 | ||
|             Apophenia is the tendency to perceive meaningful connections between unrelated things. The term
 | ||
|             (German: Apophänie from the Greek verb ἀποφαίνειν (apophaínein)) was coined by psychiatrist Klaus
 | ||
|             Conrad in his 1958 publication on the beginning stages of schizophrenia. He defined it as "unmotivated
 | ||
|             seeing of connections [accompanied by] a specific feeling of abnormal meaningfulness". He described the
 | ||
|             early stages of delusional thought as self-referential over-interpretations of actual sensory
 | ||
|             perceptions, as opposed to hallucinations. Apophenia has also come to describe a human propensity to
 | ||
|             unreasonably seek definite patterns in random information, such as can occur in gambling.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Pareidolia is a type of apophenia involving the perception of images or sounds in random stimuli.
 | ||
|             Gamblers may imagine that they see patterns in the numbers that appear in lotteries, card games, or
 | ||
|             roulette wheels, where no such patterns exist. A common example of this is the gambler's fallacy.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("274cc868-df03-4fae-9dca-ccb07a66aeaf"), // PAREIDOLIA
 | ||
|             new Guid("61cd7e34-23be-43ef-ab97-8118cef7d23f"), // MONTE_CARLO_FALLACY
 | ||
|             new Guid("2c2ed1a8-aa4d-486d-a9b4-5a16ae9230c9"), // CLUSTERING_ILLUSION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apophenia",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ANTHROPOMORPHISM = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("70470097-52a8-4ea7-a85c-ed88ad1ed972"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Anthropomorphism",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Anthropomorphism
 | ||
|             Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human traits, emotions, or intentions to non-human entities.
 | ||
|             It is considered to be an innate tendency of human psychology. Personification is the related
 | ||
|             attribution of human form and characteristics to abstract concepts such as nations, emotions, and
 | ||
|             natural forces, such as seasons and weather. Both have ancient roots as storytelling and artistic
 | ||
|             devices, and most cultures have traditional fables with anthropomorphized animals as characters.
 | ||
|             People have also routinely attributed human emotions and behavioral traits to wild as well as
 | ||
|             domesticated animals.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Anthropomorphism can be used to assist learning. Specifically, anthropomorphized words and
 | ||
|             describing scientific concepts with intentionality can improve later recall of these concepts.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In people with depression, social anxiety, or other mental illnesses, emotional support animals
 | ||
|             are a useful component of treatment partially because anthropomorphism of these animals can satisfy
 | ||
|             the patients' need for social connection.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropomorphism",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias GROUP_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("577e79e5-0a53-4c4c-a2ea-d039870bfbb9"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Group Attribution Error",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Group Attribution Error
 | ||
|             The group attribution error refers to people's tendency to believe either
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             (a) the characteristics of an individual group member are reflective of
 | ||
|                 the group as a whole, or
 | ||
|                 
 | ||
|             (b) a group's decision outcome must reflect the preferences of individual
 | ||
|                 group members, even when external information is available suggesting otherwise.
 | ||
|                 
 | ||
|             The group attribution error shares an attribution bias analogous to the fundamental
 | ||
|             attribution error. Rather than focusing on individual's behavior, it relies on group
 | ||
|             outcomes and attitudes as its main basis for conclusions.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("f1570784-f8ec-46fd-8bb8-763aef31a04a"), // FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("efceb4b1-e19f-4997-9f96-1657bb269b2d"), // ATTRIBUTION_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_attribution_error",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ATTRIBUTION_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("efceb4b1-e19f-4997-9f96-1657bb269b2d"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Attribution Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Attribution Bias
 | ||
|             In psychology, an attribution bias or attributional errors is a cognitive bias that refers to the
 | ||
|             systematic errors made when people evaluate or try to find reasons for their own and others' behaviors.
 | ||
|             It refers to the systematic patterns of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment, often leading to
 | ||
|             perceptual distortions, inaccurate assessments, or illogical interpretations of events and behaviors.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Attributions are the judgments and assumptions people make about why others behave a certain way. However,
 | ||
|             these judgments may not always reflect the true situation. Instead of being completely objective, people
 | ||
|             often make errors in perception that lead to skewed interpretations of social situations. Attribution
 | ||
|             biases are present in everyday life. For example, when a driver cuts someone off, the person who has been
 | ||
|             cut off is often more likely to attribute blame to the reckless driver's inherent personality traits (e.g.,
 | ||
|             "That driver is rude and incompetent") rather than situational circumstances (e.g., "That driver may have
 | ||
|             been late to work and was not paying attention").
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Additionally, there are many different types of attribution biases, such as the ultimate attribution error,
 | ||
|             fundamental attribution error, actor-observer bias, and hostile attribution bias. Each of these biases
 | ||
|             describes a specific tendency that people exhibit when reasoning about the cause of different behaviors.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("ca2d4f1f-924f-44ae-886b-19240cf2c8c0"), // ULTIMATE_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("f1570784-f8ec-46fd-8bb8-763aef31a04a"), // FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("5da6dcf4-ed01-4e14-99b0-7a624b16cf17"), // ACTOR_OBSERVER_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("e85d8b16-5a36-4b63-af07-72c5188f089f"), // HOSTILE_ATTRIBUTION_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attribution_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias HOSTILE_ATTRIBUTION_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("e85d8b16-5a36-4b63-af07-72c5188f089f"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Hostile Attribution Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Hostile Attribution Bias
 | ||
|             Hostile attribution bias, or hostile attribution of intent, is the tendency to interpret others' behaviors as
 | ||
|             having hostile intent, even when the behavior is ambiguous or benign. For example, a person with high levels
 | ||
|             of hostile attribution bias might see two people laughing and immediately interpret this behavior as two people
 | ||
|             laughing about them, even though the behavior was ambiguous and may have been benign.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("efceb4b1-e19f-4997-9f96-1657bb269b2d"), // ATTRIBUTION_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hostile_attribution_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ULTIMATE_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("ca2d4f1f-924f-44ae-886b-19240cf2c8c0"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Ultimate Attribution Error",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Ultimate Attribution Error
 | ||
|             The ultimate attribution error is a type of attribution error which describes how attributions of outgroup
 | ||
|             behavior are more negative than ingroup behavior. As a cognitive bias, the error results in negative outgroup
 | ||
|             behavior being more likely to be attributed to factors internal and specific to the actor, such as personality,
 | ||
|             and the attribution of negative ingroup behavior to external factors such as luck or circumstance. The bias
 | ||
|             reinforces negative stereotypes and prejudice about the outgroup and favouritism of the ingroup through positive
 | ||
|             stereotypes. The theory also extends to the bias that positive acts performed by ingroup members are more likely
 | ||
|             a result of their personality.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Four categories have been identified that describe the negative attribution of positive outgroup behaviour.
 | ||
|             First, that the outgroup member is an exception to a general rule; second, that the member was lucky or had specific
 | ||
|             advantages; third, that the member was highly motivated; and lastly that the behaviour as attributable to situational causes.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("efceb4b1-e19f-4997-9f96-1657bb269b2d"), // ATTRIBUTION_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("efb6606f-4629-4e5e-973f-94d5ac496638"), // PREJUDICE
 | ||
|             new Guid("46c2a0b2-6b1b-4e02-86ea-3cff2bf292d0"), // STEREOTYPE
 | ||
|             new Guid("b1cc861b-f445-450b-9bdf-e9d222abdb4e"), // IN_GROUP_FAVORITISM
 | ||
|             new Guid("b57a862b-b490-4d61-96b8-29d548c2eee4"), // POSITIVITY_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("f1570784-f8ec-46fd-8bb8-763aef31a04a"), // FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("5da6dcf4-ed01-4e14-99b0-7a624b16cf17"), // ACTOR_OBSERVER_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimate_attribution_error",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias IN_GROUP_FAVORITISM = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("b1cc861b-f445-450b-9bdf-e9d222abdb4e"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "In-Group Favoritism",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # In-Group Favoritism
 | ||
|             In-group favoritism, sometimes known as in-group–out-group bias, in-group bias, intergroup bias, or
 | ||
|             in-group preference, is a pattern of favoring members of one's in-group over out-group members.
 | ||
|             This can be expressed in evaluation of others, in allocation of resources, and in many other ways.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             This effect has been researched by many psychologists and linked to many theories related to group 
 | ||
|             conflict and prejudice. The phenomenon is primarily viewed from a social psychology standpoint.
 | ||
|             Studies have shown that in-group favoritism arises as a result of the formation of cultural groups.
 | ||
|             These cultural groups can be divided based on seemingly trivial observable traits, but with time,
 | ||
|             populations grow to associate certain traits with certain behavior, increasing covariation. This
 | ||
|             then incentivizes in-group bias.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Two prominent theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of in-group favoritism are realistic conflict
 | ||
|             theory and social identity theory. Realistic conflict theory proposes that intergroup competition,
 | ||
|             and sometimes intergroup conflict, arises when two groups have opposing claims to scarce resources.
 | ||
|             In contrast, social identity theory posits a psychological drive for positively distinct social
 | ||
|             identities as the general root cause of in-group favoring behavior.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("ca2d4f1f-924f-44ae-886b-19240cf2c8c0"), // ULTIMATE_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("6f5f4cbf-e6f3-439b-ad78-81b2dd266315"), // OUT_GROUP_HOMOGENEITY
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In-group_favoritism",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias STEREOTYPING = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("46c2a0b2-6b1b-4e02-86ea-3cff2bf292d0"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Stereotyping",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Stereotyping
 | ||
|             In social psychology, a stereotype is a generalized belief about a particular category of people.
 | ||
|             It is an expectation that people might have about every person of a particular group. The type of
 | ||
|             expectation can vary; it can be, for example, an expectation about the group's personality, preferences,
 | ||
|             appearance or ability. Stereotypes are often overgeneralized, inaccurate, and resistant to new information.
 | ||
|             A stereotype does not necessarily need to be a negative assumption. They may be positive, neutral, or negative.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("ca2d4f1f-924f-44ae-886b-19240cf2c8c0"), // ULTIMATE_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stereotype",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ESSENTIALISM = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("179535d0-5da5-4c0f-b9b3-fb6644496254"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Essentialism",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Essentialism
 | ||
|             The view that all objects have an essential substance that make the thing what it is, and without which
 | ||
|             it would be not that kind of thing.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Essentialism has emerged as an important concept in psychology, particularly developmental psychology.
 | ||
|             In 1991, Kathryn Kremer and Susan Gelman studied the extent to which children from four–seven years old
 | ||
|             demonstrate essentialism. Children believed that underlying essences predicted observable behaviours.
 | ||
|             Children were able to describe living objects' behaviour as self-perpetuated and non-living objects'
 | ||
|             behavior as a result of an adult influencing the object. Understanding the underlying causal mechanism
 | ||
|             for behaviour suggests essentialist thinking. Younger children were unable to identify causal
 | ||
|             mechanisms of behaviour whereas older children were able to. This suggests that essentialism is rooted
 | ||
|             in cognitive development. It can be argued that there is a shift in the way that children represent
 | ||
|             entities, from not understanding the causal mechanism of the underlying essence to showing sufficient
 | ||
|             understanding.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             *Controversial. This is a philosophical viewpoint not a cognitive bias.*
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essentialism",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias FUNCTIONAL_FIXEDNESS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("4346bdf9-4448-413f-92cd-4d146bf4789d"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Functional Fixedness",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Functional Fixedness
 | ||
|             Functional fixedness is a cognitive bias that limits a person to use an object only in the way it is traditionally
 | ||
|             used. The concept of functional fixedness originated in Gestalt psychology, a movement in psychology that emphasizes
 | ||
|             holistic processing. Karl Duncker defined functional fixedness as being a mental block against using an object in a
 | ||
|             new way that is required to solve a problem. This "block" limits the ability of an individual to use components given
 | ||
|             to them to complete a task, as they cannot move past the original purpose of those components. For example, if someone
 | ||
|             needs a paperweight, but they only have a hammer, they may not see how the hammer can be used as a paperweight.
 | ||
|             Functional fixedness is this inability to see a hammer's use as anything other than for pounding nails; the person
 | ||
|             couldn't think to use the hammer in a way other than in its conventional function.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             When tested, 5-year-old children show no signs of functional fixedness. It has been argued that this is because at
 | ||
|             age 5, any goal to be achieved with an object is equivalent to any other goal. However, by age 7, children have
 | ||
|             acquired the tendency to treat the originally intended purpose of an object as special.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functional_fixedness",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias MORAL_CREDENTIAL_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("e36f82b7-43dd-4073-99d9-c33073007185"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Moral Credential Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Moral Credential Effect
 | ||
|             Self-licensing (also moral self-licensing, moral licensing, or licensing effect) is a term used in social
 | ||
|             psychology and marketing to describe the subconscious phenomenon whereby increased confidence and security
 | ||
|             in one's self-image or self-concept tends to make that individual worry less about the consequences of
 | ||
|             subsequent immoral behavior and, therefore, more likely to make immoral choices and act immorally.
 | ||
|             In simple terms, self-licensing occurs when people allow themselves to indulge after doing something positive
 | ||
|             first; for example, drinking a diet soda with a greasy hamburger and fries can lead one to subconsciously
 | ||
|             discount the negative attributes of the meal's high caloric and cholesterol content.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             A large subset of this effect, the moral credential effect, is a bias that occurs when a person's track
 | ||
|             record as a good egalitarian establishes in them an unconscious ethical certification, endorsement, or
 | ||
|             license that increases the likelihood of less egalitarian decisions later. This effect occurs even when
 | ||
|             the audience or moral peer group is unaware of the affected person's previously established moral credential.
 | ||
|             For example, individuals who had the opportunity to recruit a woman or Black person in one setting were more
 | ||
|             likely to say later, in a different setting, that a job would be better suited for a man or a white person.
 | ||
|             Similar effects also appear to occur when a person observes another person from a group they identify with
 | ||
|             making an egalitarian decision.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Self-licensing can have negative societal consequences since it has a permissive effect on behaviors such
 | ||
|             as racial prejudice and discrimination, selfishness, poor dietary and health habits, and excessive
 | ||
|             energy consumption.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             But recent scholarship has failed to replicate seminal studies of the licensing effect, and meta-analysis
 | ||
|             found it to be exaggerated by publication bias. Furthermore, where licensing typically assumes that a
 | ||
|             good deed is the cause that makes subsequent transgressions more likely, an alternative (or additional)
 | ||
|             account is that people are faced with a temptation to do something morally dubious, and use a prior good
 | ||
|             deed as an excuse or reason why it is allowed for them to indulge.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-licensing",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias JUST_WORLD_FALLACY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("50c5f877-e656-494d-bc15-57c45a190cf9"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Just-World Fallacy",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Just-World Fallacy
 | ||
|             The just-world fallacy, or just-world hypothesis, is the cognitive bias that assumes that "people get what
 | ||
|             they deserve" – that actions will necessarily have morally fair and fitting consequences for the actor.
 | ||
|             For example, the assumptions that noble actions will eventually be rewarded and evil actions will eventually
 | ||
|             be punished fall under this fallacy. In other words, the just-world fallacy is the tendency to attribute
 | ||
|             consequences to—or expect consequences as the result of— either a universal force that restores moral balance
 | ||
|             or a universal connection between the nature of actions and their results. This belief generally implies the
 | ||
|             existence of cosmic justice, destiny, divine providence, desert, stability, order, or the anglophone colloquial
 | ||
|             use of "karma". It is often associated with a variety of fundamental fallacies, especially in regard to
 | ||
|             rationalizing suffering on the grounds that the sufferers "deserve" it. This is called victim blaming.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             This fallacy popularly appears in the English language in various figures of speech that imply guaranteed
 | ||
|             punishment for wrongdoing, such as: "you got what was coming to you", "what goes around comes around",
 | ||
|             "chickens come home to roost", "everything happens for a reason", and "you reap what you sow". This
 | ||
|             hypothesis has been widely studied by social psychologists since Melvin J. Lerner conducted seminal work
 | ||
|             on the belief in a just world in the early 1960s. Research has continued since then, examining the
 | ||
|             predictive capacity of the fallacy in various situations and across cultures, and clarifying and expanding
 | ||
|             the theoretical understandings of just-world beliefs.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just-world_fallacy",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ARGUMENT_FROM_FALLACY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("704695f1-9753-478b-9e9f-878e3a01e041"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Argument from Fallacy",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Argument from Fallacy
 | ||
|             Argument from fallacy is the formal fallacy of analyzing an argument and inferring that, since it contains
 | ||
|             a fallacy, its conclusion must be false. It is also called argument to logic (argumentum ad logicam), the
 | ||
|             fallacy fallacy, the fallacist's fallacy, and the bad reasons fallacy.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example 1:
 | ||
|             - Alice: All cats are animals. Ginger is an animal. Therefore, Ginger is a cat.
 | ||
|             - Bob: You have just fallaciously affirmed the consequent. You are incorrect. Therefore, Ginger is not a cat.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example 2:
 | ||
|             - Alice: I speak English. Therefore, I am English.
 | ||
|             - Bob: Americans and Canadians, among others, speak English too. By assuming that speaking English and being
 | ||
|               English always go together, you have just committed the package-deal fallacy. You are incorrect. Therefore,
 | ||
|               you are not English.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             Both of Bob's rebuttals are arguments from fallacy. Ginger may or may not be a cat, and Alice may or may not
 | ||
|             be English. The fact that Alice's argument was fallacious is not, in itself, proof that her conclusion is false.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_fallacy",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias AUTHORITY_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("7256f3f1-6650-4c45-bb85-36d81c9edd1a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Authority Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Authority Bias
 | ||
|             Authority bias is the tendency to attribute greater accuracy to the opinion of an authority figure (unrelated to
 | ||
|             its content) and be more influenced by that opinion. An individual is more influenced by the opinion of this
 | ||
|             authority figure, believing their views to be more credible, and hence place greater emphasis on the authority
 | ||
|             figure's viewpoint and are more likely to obey them. This concept is considered one of the social cognitive
 | ||
|             biases or collective cognitive biases.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Cultural differences in the strength of authority bias have been identified, in which the differences in edits
 | ||
|             made to Wikipedia articles by administrators and regular users were compared for accuracy. In Western Europe,
 | ||
|             the bias has a negligible effect. In Eastern Europe, the bias is larger and the administrator's edits are
 | ||
|             perceived as more likely to be true (despite the edits being inaccurate), indicating a cultural difference
 | ||
|             in the extent to which authority bias is experienced.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Business: The authority bias is demonstrated in the case of the highest-paid persons' opinion (HIPPO) impact,
 | ||
|             which describes how employees and other stakeholders in the solution environment tend to go with the opinions
 | ||
|             and impressions of the highly paid people in an organization.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("af63ce77-f6c6-4e0f-8a9e-3daedc497f9a"), // CONFIRMATION_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("b1d46b0f-fa51-4e82-b0aa-71ba2c6ad1f1"), // BANDWAGON_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authority_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias AUTOMATION_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("c9e10d5b-6a32-4766-b937-aa03e276f018"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Automation Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Automation Bias
 | ||
|             Automation bias is the propensity for humans to favor suggestions from automated decision-making systems and to
 | ||
|             ignore contradictory information made without automation, even if it is correct. Automation bias stems from
 | ||
|             the social psychology literature that found a bias in human-human interaction that showed that people assign more
 | ||
|             positive evaluations to decisions made by humans than to a neutral object. The same type of positivity bias
 | ||
|             has been found for human-automation interaction, where the automated decisions are rated more positively
 | ||
|             than neutral. This has become a growing problem for decision making as intensive care units, nuclear power
 | ||
|             plants, and aircraft cockpits have increasingly integrated computerized system monitors and decision aids
 | ||
|             to mostly factor out possible human error. Errors of automation bias tend to occur when decision-making
 | ||
|             is dependent on computers or other automated aids and the human is in an observatory role but able to
 | ||
|             make decisions. Examples of automation bias range from urgent matters like flying a plane on automatic
 | ||
|             pilot to such mundane matters as the use of spell-checking programs.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             An operator's trust in the system can also lead to different interactions with the system, including system
 | ||
|             use, misuse, disuse, and abuse. Automation use and disuse can also influence stages of information processing:
 | ||
|             information acquisition, information analysis, decision making and action selection, and action implementation.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             For example, information acquisition, the first step in information processing, is the process by which a user
 | ||
|             registers input via the senses. An automated engine gauge might assist the user with information acquisition
 | ||
|             through simple interface features—such as highlighting changes in the engine's performance—thereby directing
 | ||
|             the user's selective attention. When faced with issues originating from an aircraft, pilots may tend to
 | ||
|             overtrust an aircraft's engine gauges, losing sight of other possible malfunctions not related to the engine.
 | ||
|             This attitude is a form of automation complacency and misuse. If, however, the pilot devotes time to interpret
 | ||
|             the engine gauge, and manipulate the aircraft accordingly, only to discover that the flight turbulence has not
 | ||
|             changed, the pilot may be inclined to ignore future error recommendations conveyed by an engine gauge—a form
 | ||
|             of automation complacency leading to disuse.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b821d449-64e5-4c0a-9d5a-3fda609a9b86"), // OVERCONFIDENCE_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automation_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias BANDWAGON_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("b1d46b0f-fa51-4e82-b0aa-71ba2c6ad1f1"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Bandwagon Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Bandwagon Effect
 | ||
|             The bandwagon effect is a psychological phenomenon where people adopt certain behaviors, styles, or attitudes
 | ||
|             simply because others are doing so. More specifically, it is a cognitive bias by which public opinion or
 | ||
|             behaviours can alter due to particular actions and beliefs rallying amongst the public. It is a psychological
 | ||
|             phenomenon whereby the rate of uptake of beliefs, ideas, fads and trends increases with respect to the proportion
 | ||
|             of others who have already done so. As more people come to believe in something, others also "hop on the bandwagon"
 | ||
|             regardless of the underlying evidence.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Following others' actions or beliefs can occur because of conformism or deriving information from others. Much of
 | ||
|             the influence of the bandwagon effect comes from the desire to 'fit in' with peers; by making similar selections
 | ||
|             as other people, this is seen as a way to gain access to a particular social group. An example of this is fashion
 | ||
|             trends wherein the increasing popularity of a certain garment or style encourages more acceptance. When individuals
 | ||
|             make rational choices based on the information they receive from others, economists have proposed that information
 | ||
|             cascades can quickly form in which people ignore their personal information signals and follow the behaviour of
 | ||
|             others. Cascades explain why behaviour is fragile as people understand that their behaviour is based on a very
 | ||
|             limited amount of information. As a result, fads form easily but are also easily dislodged. The phenomenon is
 | ||
|             observed in various fields, such as economics, political science, medicine, and psychology. In social psychology,
 | ||
|             people's tendency to align their beliefs and behaviors with a group is known as 'herd mentality' or 'groupthink'.
 | ||
|             The reverse bandwagon effect (also known as the snob effect in certain contexts) is a cognitive bias that causes
 | ||
|             people to avoid doing something, because they believe that other people are doing it.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("7256f3f1-6650-4c45-bb85-36d81c9edd1a"), // AUTHORITY_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandwagon_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias PLACEBO_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("8d76fae9-cd8e-46b5-9cbc-c8fffa6613a8"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Placebo Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Placebo Effect
 | ||
|             The psychological phenomenon in which the recipient perceives an improvement in condition due to personal
 | ||
|             expectations rather than treatment itself.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Placebo",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias OUT_GROUP_HOMOGENEITY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("6f5f4cbf-e6f3-439b-ad78-81b2dd266315"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Out-Group Homogeneity",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Out-Group Homogeneity
 | ||
|             The out-group homogeneity effect is the perception of out-group members as more similar to one another than are in-group members,
 | ||
|             e.g. "they are alike; we are diverse". Perceivers tend to have impressions about the diversity or variability of group members around
 | ||
|             those central tendencies or typical attributes of those group members. Thus, outgroup stereotypicality judgments are overestimated,
 | ||
|             supporting the view that out-group stereotypes are overgeneralizations. The term "outgroup homogeneity effect", "outgroup homogeneity
 | ||
|             bias" or "relative outgroup homogeneity" have been explicitly contrasted with "outgroup homogeneity" in general, the latter referring
 | ||
|             to perceived outgroup variability unrelated to perceptions of the ingroup.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The outgroup homogeneity effect is sometimes referred to as "outgroup homogeneity bias". Such nomenclature hints at a broader
 | ||
|             meta-theoretical debate that is present in the field of social psychology. This debate centres on the validity of heightened perceptions
 | ||
|             of ingroup and outgroup homogeneity, where some researchers view the homogeneity effect as an example of cognitive bias and error, while
 | ||
|             other researchers view the effect as an example of normal and often adaptive social perception. The out-group homogeneity effect has
 | ||
|             been found using a wide variety of different social groups, from political and racial groups to age and gender groups.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b1cc861b-f445-450b-9bdf-e9d222abdb4e"), // IN_GROUP_FAVORITISM
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Out-group_homogeneity",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CROSS_RACE_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("d36f046d-fe5c-4f4a-8d7f-14427b834581"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Cross-Race Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Cross-Race Effect
 | ||
|             The cross-race effect (sometimes called cross-race bias, other-race bias, own-race bias or other-race effect) is the tendency to more easily
 | ||
|             recognize faces that belong to one's own racial group, or racial groups that one has been in contact with. In social psychology, the
 | ||
|             cross-race effect is described as the "ingroup advantage," whereas in other fields, the effect can be seen as a specific form of the
 | ||
|             "ingroup advantage" since it is only applied in interracial or inter-ethnic situations. The cross-race effect is thought to contribute
 | ||
|             to difficulties in cross-race identification, as well as implicit racial bias.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             A number of theories as to why the cross-race effect exists have been conceived, including social cognition and perceptual expertise.
 | ||
|             However, no model has been able to fully account for the full body of evidence.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Cross-race identification bias
 | ||
|             This effect refers to the decreased ability of people of one race to recognize faces and facial expressions of people of another race. This
 | ||
|             differs from the cross-race bias because this effect is found mostly during eyewitness identification as well as identification of a suspect
 | ||
|             in a line-up. In these situations, many people feel as if races other than their own look alike, and they have difficulty distinguishing
 | ||
|             between members of different ethnic groups. Cross-race identification bias is also known as the misinformation effect since people are
 | ||
|             considered to be misinformed about other races and have difficulty identifying them. A study was made which examined 271 real court
 | ||
|             cases. In photographic line-ups, 231 witnesses participated in cross-race versus same-race identification. In cross-race lineups,
 | ||
|             only 45% were correctly identified versus 60% for same-race identifications. In a study dealing with eyewitness testimony,
 | ||
|             investigators examined forty participants in a racially diverse area of the US. Participants watched a video of a property crime
 | ||
|             being committed, then in the next 24 hours came to pick the suspect out of a photo line-up. Most of the participants in the study
 | ||
|             either misidentified the suspect or stated the suspect was not in the line-up at all. Correct identification of the suspect
 | ||
|             occurred more often when the eyewitness and the suspect were of the same race. In another study, 86 convenience store
 | ||
|             clerks were asked to identify three customers: one white, one black, and one Mexican, all of whom had purchased in the store
 | ||
|             earlier that day. The clerks tended to identify customers belonging to their own race accurately, but were more likely to make
 | ||
|             errors when attempting to identify other races members. Meanwhile, another study found that "alcohol intoxication reduces
 | ||
|             the own-race bias in face recognition," albeit by impairing accurate perception and leaving in place or increasing random error
 | ||
|             rather than by improving facial recognition of members of other groups.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-race_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CHEERLEADER_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("79f705e9-c461-4ad7-8b5e-83358aa345f7"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Cheerleader Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Cheerleader Effect
 | ||
|             The cognitive bias which causes people to think individuals are more attractive when they are in a group. This effect occurs
 | ||
|             with male-only, female-only and mixed gender groups; and both small and large groups. The effect occurs to the same extent
 | ||
|             with groups of four and 16 people. Participants in studies looked more at the attractive people than the unattractive people
 | ||
|             in the group. The effect does not occur because group photos give the impression that individuals have more social or emotional
 | ||
|             intelligence. This was shown to be the case by a study which used individual photos grouped together in a single image, rather
 | ||
|             than photos taken of people in a group. The study generated the same effect.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheerleader_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias POSITIVITY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("b57a862b-b490-4d61-96b8-29d548c2eee4"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Positivity Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Positivity Effect
 | ||
|             The positivity effect is the ability to constructively analyze a situation where the desired results are not achieved, but still
 | ||
|             obtain positive feedback that assists one's future progression. Empirical research findings suggest that the positivity effect
 | ||
|             can be influenced by internal positive speech, where engaging in constructive self-dialogue can significantly improve one’s
 | ||
|             ability to perceive and react to challenging situations more optimistically.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The findings of a study show that the optimism bias in future-oriented thinking fulfils a self-improvement purpose while also
 | ||
|             suggesting this bias probably reflects a common underpinning motivational process across various future-thinking domains,
 | ||
|             either episodic or semantic.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## In attribution
 | ||
|             The positivity effect as an attribution phenomenon relates to the habits and characteristics of people when evaluating
 | ||
|             the causes of their behaviors. To positively attribute is to be open to attributing a person’s inherent disposition as
 | ||
|             the cause of their positive behaviors, and the situations surrounding them as the potential cause of their negative
 | ||
|             behaviors.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## In perception
 | ||
|             Two studies by Emilio Ferrara have shown that, on online social networks like Twitter and Instagram, users prefer to share
 | ||
|             positive news, and are emotionally affected by positive news more than twice as much as they are by negative news.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("ef521fbb-c20b-47c9-87f8-a571a06a03eb"), // NEGATIVITY_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("ca2d4f1f-924f-44ae-886b-19240cf2c8c0"), // ULTIMATE_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("f1570784-f8ec-46fd-8bb8-763aef31a04a"), // FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("5da6dcf4-ed01-4e14-99b0-7a624b16cf17"), // ACTOR_OBSERVER_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positivity_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias NOT_INVENTED_HERE = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("72fd9f08-b3c2-40b7-8d56-a2e84d776041"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Not Invented Here",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Not Invented Here
 | ||
|             Not invented here (NIH) is the tendency to avoid using or buying products, research, standards, or knowledge from external origins.
 | ||
|             It is usually adopted by social, corporate, or institutional cultures. Research illustrates a strong bias against ideas from the
 | ||
|             outside.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The reasons for not wanting to use the work of others are varied, but can include a desire to support a local economy instead of
 | ||
|             paying royalties to a foreign license-holder, fear of patent infringement, lack of understanding of the foreign work, an
 | ||
|             unwillingness to acknowledge or value the work of others, jealousy, belief perseverance, or forming part of a wider turf war.
 | ||
|             As a social phenomenon, this tendency can manifest itself as an unwillingness to adopt an idea or product because it originates
 | ||
|             from another culture, a form of tribalism and/or an inadequate effort in choosing the right approach for the business.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The term is typically used in a pejorative sense. The opposite predisposition is sometimes called "proudly found elsewhere" (PFE)
 | ||
|             or "invented elsewhere".
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Not_invented_here",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias REACTIVE_DEVALUATION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("46493445-4a8b-4488-901c-85da417c80a3"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Reactive Devaluation",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Reactive Devaluation
 | ||
|             Reactive devaluation is a cognitive bias that occurs when a proposal is devalued if it appears to originate from an antagonist. The
 | ||
|             bias was proposed by Lee Ross and Constance Stillinger (1988). Reactive devaluation could be caused by loss aversion or attitude
 | ||
|             polarization, or naïve realism.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In an initial experiment, Stillinger and co-authors asked pedestrians in the US whether they would support a drastic bilateral
 | ||
|             nuclear arms reduction program. If they were told the proposal came from President Ronald Reagan, 90 percent said it would be
 | ||
|             favorable or even-handed to the United States; if they were told the proposal came from a group of unspecified policy analysts,
 | ||
|             80 percent thought it was favorable or even; but, if respondents were told it came from Mikhail Gorbachev only 44 percent thought
 | ||
|             it was favorable or neutral to the United States.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In another experiment, a contemporaneous controversy at Stanford University led to the university divesting of South African
 | ||
|             assets because of the apartheid regime. Students at Stanford were asked to evaluate the University's divestment plan before
 | ||
|             it was announced publicly and after such. Proposals including the actual eventual proposal were valued more highly when they
 | ||
|             were hypothetical.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In another study, experimenters showed Israeli participants a peace proposal which had been actually proposed by Israel. If
 | ||
|             participants were told the proposal came from a Palestinian source, they rated it lower than if they were told (correctly)
 | ||
|             the identical proposal came from the Israeli government. If participants identified as "hawkish" were told it came from a
 | ||
|             "dovish" Israeli government, they believed it was relatively bad for their people and good for the other side, but not if
 | ||
|             participants identified as "doves".
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("ad3ed908-c56e-411b-a130-8af8574ff67b"), // LOSS_AVERSION
 | ||
|             new Guid("f0ad095e-8e9c-4bfb-855e-11fb5dd58cea"), // NAÏVE_REALISM
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactive_devaluation",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias WELL_TRAVELLED_ROAD_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("9ee2b5b5-463c-4bca-af85-087683f89ab3"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Well-Travelled Road Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Well-Travelled Road Effect
 | ||
|             The well travelled road effect is a cognitive bias in which travellers will estimate the time taken to traverse routes differently
 | ||
|             depending on their familiarity with the route. Frequently travelled routes are assessed as taking a shorter time than unfamiliar
 | ||
|             routes. This effect creates errors when estimating the most efficient route to an unfamiliar destination, when one candidate
 | ||
|             route includes a familiar route, whilst the other candidate route includes no familiar routes. The effect is most salient when
 | ||
|             subjects are driving, but is still detectable for pedestrians and users of public transport. The effect has been observed for
 | ||
|             centuries but was first studied scientifically in the 1980s and 1990s following from earlier "heuristics and biases" work
 | ||
|             undertaken by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Well_travelled_road_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias MENTAL_ACCOUNTING = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("9444923f-90c9-4269-a4dc-291513fa6d12"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Mental Accounting",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Mental Accounting
 | ||
|             Mental accounting (or psychological accounting) is a model of consumer behaviour developed by Richard Thaler that attempts to describe the
 | ||
|             process whereby people code, categorize and evaluate economic outcomes. Mental accounting incorporates the economic concepts of prospect
 | ||
|             theory and transactional utility theory to evaluate how people create distinctions between their financial resources in the form of mental
 | ||
|             accounts, which in turn impacts the buyer decision process and reaction to economic outcomes. People are presumed to make mental accounts
 | ||
|             as a self control strategy to manage and keep track of their spending and resources. People budget money into mental accounts for savings
 | ||
|             (e.g., saving for a home) or expense categories (e.g., gas money, clothing, utilities). People also are assumed to make mental accounts to
 | ||
|             facilitate savings for larger purposes (e.g., a home or college tuition). Mental accounting can result in people demonstrating greater
 | ||
|             loss aversion for certain mental accounts, resulting in cognitive bias that incentivizes systematic departures from consumer rationality.
 | ||
|             Through an increased understanding of mental accounting differences in decision making based on different resources, and different
 | ||
|             reactions based on similar outcomes can be greater understood.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             As Thaler puts it, “All organizations, from General Motors down to single person households, have explicit and/or implicit accounting
 | ||
|             systems. The accounting system often influences decisions in unexpected ways”.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             A more proximal psychological mechanism through which mental accounting influences spending is through its influence on the pain of
 | ||
|             paying that is associated with spending money from a mental account. Pain of paying is a negative affective response associated
 | ||
|             with a financial loss. Prototypical examples are the unpleasant feeling that one experiences when watching the fare increase on a
 | ||
|             taximeter or at the gas pump. When considering an expense, consumers appear to compare the cost of the expense to the size of an
 | ||
|             account that it would deplete (e.g., numerator vs. denominator). A $30 t-shirt, for example, would be a subjectively larger
 | ||
|             expense when drawn from $50 in one's wallet than $500 in one's checking account. The larger the fraction, the more pain of
 | ||
|             paying the purchase appears to generate and the less likely consumers are to then exchange money for the good. Other evidence
 | ||
|             of the relation between pain of paying and spending include the lower debt held by consumers who report experiencing a higher
 | ||
|             pain of paying for the same goods and services than consumers who report experiencing less pain of paying.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("ad3ed908-c56e-411b-a130-8af8574ff67b"), // LOSS_AVERSION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_accounting",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias APPEAL_TO_POSSIBILITY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("73ca0caa-25e5-4edb-91d4-f375a773f82c"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Appeal to Probability",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Appeal to Probability
 | ||
|             An appeal to probability (or appeal to possibility, also known as possibiliter ergo probabiliter, "possibly, therefore
 | ||
|             probably") is the logical fallacy of taking something for granted because it is possibly the case. The fact that an
 | ||
|             event is possible does not imply that the event is probable, nor that the event was realized.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             A fallacious appeal to possibility:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - If it can happen (premise).
 | ||
|             - It will happen. (invalid conclusion)
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Something can go wrong (premise).
 | ||
|             - Therefore, something will go wrong (invalid conclusion).
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - If I do not bring my umbrella (premise)
 | ||
|             - It will rain. (invalid conclusion).
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Murphy's law is a (typically deliberate, tongue-in-cheek) invocation of the fallacy.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeal_to_probability",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias NORMALCY_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("1dfd3e9e-e44e-44cf-b8a0-95dea7a0e780"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Normalcy Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Normalcy Bias
 | ||
|             Normalcy bias, or normality bias, is a cognitive bias which leads people to disbelieve or minimize threat warnings. Consequently,
 | ||
|             individuals underestimate the likelihood of a disaster, when it might affect them, and its potential adverse effects. The normalcy
 | ||
|             bias causes many people to prepare inadequately for natural disasters, market crashes, and calamities caused by human error. About
 | ||
|             80% of people reportedly display normalcy bias during a disaster.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The normalcy bias can manifest in response to warnings about disasters and actual catastrophes. Such events can range in scale
 | ||
|             from incidents such as traffic collisions to global catastrophic risk. The event may involve social constructionism phenomena
 | ||
|             such as loss of money in market crashes, or direct threats to continuity of life: as in natural disasters like a tsunami or
 | ||
|             violence in war.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Normalcy bias has also been called analysis paralysis, the ostrich effect, and by first responders, the negative panic. The
 | ||
|             opposite of normalcy bias is overreaction, or worst-case scenario bias, in which small deviations from normality are dealt
 | ||
|             with as signals of an impending catastrophe.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## Prevention
 | ||
|             The negative effects of normalcy bias can be combated through the four stages of disaster response:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - preparation, including publicly acknowledging the possibility of disaster and forming contingency plans.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - warning, including issuing clear, unambiguous, and frequent warnings and helping the public to understand and believe them.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - impact, the stage at which the contingency plans take effect and emergency services, rescue teams, and disaster relief
 | ||
|               teams work in tandem.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             - aftermath, reestablishing equilibrium after the fact, by providing both supplies and aid to those in need.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("75e51ef5-f992-41c2-8778-0002c617db9a"), // OSTRICH_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("91fded4f-de89-405e-8627-dba49cf5deaa"), // SELECTIVE_PERCEPTION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normalcy_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ZERO_SUM_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("35c21723-8dd7-4fea-9404-b26660fa6db1"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Zero-Sum Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Zero-Sum Thinking & Zero-Sum Bias
 | ||
|             Zero-sum thinking perceives situations as zero-sum games, where one person's gain would be another's loss. The term is
 | ||
|             derived from game theory. However, unlike the game theory concept, zero-sum thinking refers to a psychological
 | ||
|             construct — a person's subjective interpretation of a situation. Zero-sum thinking is captured by the saying
 | ||
|             "your gain is my loss" (or conversely, "your loss is my gain").
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Rozycka-Tran et al. (2015) defined zero-sum thinking as:
 | ||
|             "A general belief system about the antagonistic nature of social relations, shared by people in a society or culture
 | ||
|             and based on the implicit assumption that a finite amount of goods exists in the world, in which one person's winning
 | ||
|             makes others the losers, and vice versa ... a relatively permanent and general conviction that social relations are
 | ||
|             like a zero-sum game. People who share this conviction believe that success, especially economic success, is possible
 | ||
|             only at the expense of other people's failures."
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Zero-sum bias is a cognitive bias towards zero-sum thinking; it is people's tendency to intuitively judge that a
 | ||
|             situation is zero-sum, even when this is not the case. This bias promotes zero-sum fallacies, false beliefs that
 | ||
|             situations are zero-sum. Such fallacies can cause other false judgements and poor decisions. In economics,
 | ||
|             "zero-sum fallacy" generally refers to the fixed-pie fallacy.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## Examples
 | ||
|             There are many examples of zero-sum thinking, some of them fallacious.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - When jurors assume that any evidence compatible with more than one theory offers no support for any theory, even
 | ||
|               if the evidence is incompatible with some possibilities or the theories are not mutually exclusive.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - When students in a classroom think they are being graded on a curve when in fact they are being graded based
 | ||
|               on predetermined standards.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - In a negotiation when one negotiator thinks that they can only gain at the expense of the other party (i.e.,
 | ||
|               that mutual gain is not possible).
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - In the context of social group competition, the belief that more resources for one group (e.g., immigrants)
 | ||
|               means less for others (e.g., non-immigrants).
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Jack of all trades, master of none: the idea that having more skills means having less aptitude (also known
 | ||
|               as compensatory reasoning).
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - In copyright infringement debate, the idea that every unauthorized duplication is a lost sale.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - When politicians argue that international trade must mean that one party is "winning" and another is "losing"
 | ||
|               when transfer of goods and services at mutually-agreeable prices is in general mutually beneficial, or that a
 | ||
|               trade deficit represents "losing" money to another country.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Group membership is sometimes treated as zero-sum, such that stronger membership in one group is seen as
 | ||
|               weaker membership in another.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-sum_thinking",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SURVIVORSHIP_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("87ef31b2-6b2a-4fbb-9974-fefec5480c28"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Survivorship Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Survivorship Bias
 | ||
|             Survivorship bias or survival bias is the logical error of concentrating on entities that passed a selection
 | ||
|             process while overlooking those that did not. This can lead to incorrect conclusions because of incomplete data.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Survivorship bias is a form of selection bias that can lead to overly optimistic beliefs because multiple
 | ||
|             failures are overlooked, such as when companies that no longer exist are excluded from analyses of financial
 | ||
|             performance. It can also lead to the false belief that the successes in a group have some special property,
 | ||
|             rather than just coincidence as in correlation "proves" causality.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Another kind of survivorship bias would involve thinking that an incident happened in a particular way when
 | ||
|             the only people who were involved in the incident who can speak about it are those who survived it. Even if
 | ||
|             one knew that some people are dead, they would not have their voice to add to the conversation, making it
 | ||
|             biased.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## Examples
 | ||
|             ### Finance and Economics
 | ||
|             In finance, survivorship bias is the tendency for failed companies to be excluded from performance studies
 | ||
|             because they no longer exist. It often causes the results of studies to skew higher because only companies
 | ||
|             that were successful enough to survive until the end of the period are included. For example, a mutual fund
 | ||
|             company's selection of funds today will include only those that are successful now. Many losing funds are
 | ||
|             closed and merged into other funds to hide poor performance. In theory, 70% of extant funds could truthfully
 | ||
|             claim to have performance in the first quartile of their peers, if the peer group includes funds that have
 | ||
|             closed.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ### Business
 | ||
|             Michael Shermer in Scientific American and Larry Smith of the University of Waterloo have described
 | ||
|             how advice about commercial success distorts perceptions of it by ignoring all of the businesses and college
 | ||
|             dropouts that failed. Journalist and author David McRaney observes that the "advice business is a monopoly
 | ||
|             run by survivors. When something becomes a non-survivor, it is either completely eliminated, or whatever
 | ||
|             voice it has is muted to zero". Alec Liu wrote in Vice that "for every Mark Zuckerberg, there's
 | ||
|             thousands of also-rans, who had parties no one ever attended, obsolete before we ever knew they
 | ||
|             existed."
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In his book The Black Swan, financial writer Nassim Taleb called the data obscured by survivorship bias
 | ||
|             "silent evidence".
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Survivorship_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SUBADDITIVITY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("73e39503-4a2e-4090-88c2-5ce20565a722"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Subadditivity Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Subadditivity Effect
 | ||
|             The subadditivity effect is the tendency to judge probability of the whole to be less than the
 | ||
|             probabilities of the parts.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example:
 | ||
|             For instance, subjects in one experiment judged the probability of death from cancer in the United
 | ||
|             States was 18%, the probability from heart attack was 22%, and the probability of death from
 | ||
|             "other natural causes" was 33%. Other participants judged the probability of death from a natural
 | ||
|             cause was 58%. Natural causes are made up of precisely cancer, heart attack, and "other natural
 | ||
|             causes," however, the sum of the latter three probabilities was 73%, and not 58%. According to
 | ||
|             Tversky and Koehler (1994) this kind of result is observed consistently.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subadditivity_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias DENOMINATION_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("a913b2cf-dc2f-4dd9-87dc-3e11efb9457b"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Denomination Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Denomination Effect
 | ||
|             The denomination effect is a form of cognitive bias relating to currency, suggesting people may be
 | ||
|             less likely to spend larger currency denominations than their equivalent value in smaller denominations.
 | ||
|             It was proposed by Priya Raghubir, professor at the New York University Stern School of Business, and
 | ||
|             Joydeep Srivastava, professor at University of Maryland, in their 2009 paper "Denomination Effect".
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Raghubir and Srivastava conducted three studies in their research on the denomination effect; their
 | ||
|             findings suggested people may be more likely to spend money represented by smaller denominations and
 | ||
|             that consumers may prefer to receive money in a large denomination when there is a need to control
 | ||
|             spending. The denomination effect can occur when large denominations are perceived as less exchangeable
 | ||
|             than smaller denominations.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The effect's influence on spending decisions has implications throughout various sectors in society,
 | ||
|             including consumer welfare, monetary policy and the finance industry. For example, during the Great
 | ||
|             Recession, one businessman observed employees using more coins rather than banknotes in an office
 | ||
|             vending machine, perceiving the customers used coins to feel thriftier. Raghubir and Srivastava
 | ||
|             also suggested the effect may involve incentives to alter future behavior and that a large
 | ||
|             denomination can serve as a mechanism to prevent the urge to spend.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("9444923f-90c9-4269-a4dc-291513fa6d12"), // MENTAL_ACCOUNTING
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denomination_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias MILLERS_LAW = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("81ca1f50-aaf9-4416-a94a-3676b26e510a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Miller's Law",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Miller's Law
 | ||
|             The observation, also by George A. Miller, that the number of objects the average person can hold in
 | ||
|             working memory is about seven. It was put forward in a 1956 edition of Psychological Review in a
 | ||
|             paper titled "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two".
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miller%27s_law",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ILLUSION_OF_TRANSPARENCY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("c727e47c-da6f-4804-a1d0-9027af645218"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Illusion of Transparency",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Illusion of Transparency
 | ||
|             The illusion of transparency is a tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which their personal
 | ||
|             mental state is known by others. Another manifestation of the illusion of transparency (sometimes called
 | ||
|             the observer's illusion of transparency) is a tendency for people to overestimate how well they understand
 | ||
|             others' personal mental states. This cognitive bias is similar to the illusion of asymmetric insight.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("a44a6bcf-b2b8-47f1-84e0-d740af56aa1e"), // ILLUSION_OF_ASYMMETRIC_INSIGHT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusion_of_transparency",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CURSE_OF_KNOWLEDGE = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("697f58a7-45d7-4268-8951-81681fb005de"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Curse of Knowledge",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Curse of Knowledge
 | ||
|             The curse of knowledge, also called the curse of expertise or expert's curse, is a cognitive bias
 | ||
|             that occurs when a person who has specialized knowledge assumes that others share in that knowledge.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             For example, in a classroom setting, teachers may have difficulty if they cannot put themselves
 | ||
|             in the position of the student. A knowledgeable professor might no longer remember the difficulties
 | ||
|             that a young student encounters when learning a new subject for the first time. This curse of
 | ||
|             knowledge also explains the danger behind thinking about student learning based on what appears
 | ||
|             best to faculty members, as opposed to what has been verified with students.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curse_of_knowledge",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SPOTLIGHT_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("1a6f6356-6d61-4892-8494-0257a7fa718b"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Spotlight Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Spotlight Effect
 | ||
|             The spotlight effect is the psychological phenomenon by which people tend to believe they are being
 | ||
|             noticed more than they really are. Being that one is constantly in the center of one's own world,
 | ||
|             an accurate evaluation of how much one is noticed by others is uncommon. The reason for the spotlight
 | ||
|             effect is the innate tendency to forget that although one is the center of one's own world, one is
 | ||
|             not the center of everyone else's. This tendency is especially prominent when one does something
 | ||
|             atypical.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Research has empirically shown that such drastic over-estimation of one's effect on others is widely
 | ||
|             common. Many professionals in social psychology encourage people to be conscious of the spotlight
 | ||
|             effect and to allow this phenomenon to moderate the extent to which one believes one is in a
 | ||
|             social spotlight.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spotlight_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias EXTRINSIC_INCENTIVE_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("07237744-843d-4c0c-81b5-0c9c8664daea"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Extrinsic Incentives Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Extrinsic Incentives Bias
 | ||
|             The extrinsic incentives bias is an attributional bias according to which people attribute relatively
 | ||
|             more to "extrinsic incentives" (such as monetary reward) than to "intrinsic incentives" (such as
 | ||
|             learning a new skill) when weighing the motives of others rather than themselves.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             It is a counter-example to the fundamental attribution error as according to the extrinsic bias
 | ||
|             others are presumed to have situational motivations while oneself is seen as having dispositional
 | ||
|             motivations. This is the opposite of what the fundamental attribution error would predict. It also
 | ||
|             might help to explain some of the backfiring effects that can occur when extrinsic incentives are
 | ||
|             attached to activities that people are intrinsically motivated to do. The term was first proposed
 | ||
|             by Chip Heath, citing earlier research by others in management science.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example:
 | ||
|             In the simplest experiment Heath reported, MBA students were asked to rank the expected job motivations
 | ||
|             of Citibank customer service representatives. Their average ratings were as follows:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             1. Amount of pay
 | ||
|             2. Having job security
 | ||
|             3. Quality of fringe benefits
 | ||
|             4. Amount of praise from your supervisor
 | ||
|             5. Doing something that makes you feel good about yourself
 | ||
|             6. Developing skills and abilities
 | ||
|             7. Accomplishing something worthwhile
 | ||
|             8. Learning new things
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Actual customer service representatives rank ordered their own motivations as follows:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             1. Developing skills and abilities
 | ||
|             2. Accomplishing something worthwhile
 | ||
|             3. Learning new things
 | ||
|             4. Quality of fringe benefits
 | ||
|             5. Having job security
 | ||
|             6. Doing something that makes you feel good about yourself
 | ||
|             7. Amount of pay
 | ||
|             8. Amount of praise from your supervisor
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The order of the predicted and actual reported motivations was nearly reversed; in particular, pay was
 | ||
|             rated first by others but near last for respondents of themselves. Similar effects were observed when
 | ||
|             MBA students rated managers and their classmates.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Debiasing:
 | ||
|             Heath suggests trying to infer others' motivations as one would by inferring one's own motivations.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("f1570784-f8ec-46fd-8bb8-763aef31a04a"), // FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("bf8f304d-2e8e-4a90-a9c5-7bd56f6058a6"), // BACKFIRE_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extrinsic_incentives_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ILLUSION_OF_EXTERNAL_AGENCY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("184c9dc0-6885-4dee-b777-bc1725cc7e2c"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Illusion of External Agency",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Illusion of External Agency
 | ||
|             People typically underestimate their capacity to generate satisfaction with future outcomes. When people
 | ||
|             experience such self-generated satisfaction, they may mistakenly conclude that it was caused by an
 | ||
|             influential, insightful, and benevolent external agent.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             When outcomes are unchangeable, people are more likely to turn ‘truly mediocre’ into ‘falsely great’.
 | ||
|             This subjective transformation is often termed a psychological immune response, in that it is our brain
 | ||
|             kicking in to protect us from the emotional consequences of undesirable outcomes. The illusion of external
 | ||
|             agency is thought to arise from this undetected transformation of ‘truly mediocre’ outcomes to ‘falsely
 | ||
|             great’ ones.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links = [],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ILLUSION_OF_ASYMMETRIC_INSIGHT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("a44a6bcf-b2b8-47f1-84e0-d740af56aa1e"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Illusion of Asymmetric Insight",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Illusion of Asymmetric Insight
 | ||
|             The illusion of asymmetric insight is a cognitive bias whereby people perceive their knowledge of others to
 | ||
|             surpass other people's knowledge of them. This bias "has been traced to people's tendency to view their own
 | ||
|             spontaneous or off-the-cuff responses to others' questions as relatively unrevealing even though they view
 | ||
|             others' similar responses as meaningful".
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             A study finds that people seem to believe that they know themselves better than their peers know themselves
 | ||
|             and that their social group knows and understands other social groups better than other social groups know
 | ||
|             them. For example: Person A knows Person A better than Person B knows Person B or Person A. This bias may be
 | ||
|             sustained by a few cognitive beliefs, including:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - The personal conviction that observed behaviors are more revealing of other people than of the self, while
 | ||
|               private thoughts and feelings are more revealing of the self.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             - The more an individual perceives negative traits ascribed to someone else, the more doubt individuals express
 | ||
|               about this person's self-knowledge. But, this doubt does not exist for our own self-knowledge. (For example:
 | ||
|               if Person A believes Person B has some great character flaw, Person A will distrust Person B's self-knowledge,
 | ||
|               while sustaining that they do not hold that same flaw in self-knowledge.)
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("c727e47c-da6f-4804-a1d0-9027af645218"), // ILLUSION_OF_TRANSPARENCY
 | ||
|             new Guid("f1570784-f8ec-46fd-8bb8-763aef31a04a"), // FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("f0ad095e-8e9c-4bfb-855e-11fb5dd58cea"), // NAÏVE_REALISM
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusion_of_asymmetric_insight",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias TELESCOPING_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("88b90cfb-93f5-429b-b00f-fabe7ada485c"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Telescoping Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Telescoping Effect
 | ||
|             In cognitive psychology, the telescoping effect (or telescoping bias) refers to the temporal displacement of an
 | ||
|             event whereby people perceive recent events as being more remote than they are and distant events as being more
 | ||
|             recent than they are. The former is known as backward telescoping or time expansion, and the latter as is known
 | ||
|             as forward telescoping.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The approximate time frame in which events switch from being displaced backward in time to forward in time is three
 | ||
|             years, with events occurring three years in the past being equally likely to be reported with forward telescoping
 | ||
|             bias as with backward telescoping bias. Although telescoping occurs in both the forward and backward directions,
 | ||
|             in general the effect is to increase the number of events reported too recently. This net effect in the forward
 | ||
|             direction is because forces that impair memory, such as lack of salience, also impair time perception.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Telescoping leads to an over-reporting of the frequency of events. This over-reporting is because participants
 | ||
|             include events beyond the period, either events that are too recent for the target time period (backward
 | ||
|             telescoping) or events that are too old for the target time period (forward telescoping).
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## Real-world example
 | ||
|             A real-world example of the telescoping effect is the case of Ferdi Elsas, an infamous kidnapper and murderer
 | ||
|             in the Netherlands. When he was let out of prison, most of the general population did not believe he had been
 | ||
|             in prison long enough. Due to forward telescoping, people thought Ferdi Elsas' sentence started more recently
 | ||
|             than it actually did. Telescoping has important real world applications, especially in survey research. Marketing
 | ||
|             firms often use surveys to ask when consumers last bought a product, and government agencies often use surveys
 | ||
|             to discover information about drug abuse or about victimology. Telescoping may bias answers to these questions.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telescoping_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ROSY_RETROSPECTION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("5e08ec28-0814-499f-82bd-eb7afb2080aa"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Rosy Retrospection",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Rosy Retrospection
 | ||
|             Rosy retrospection is a proposed psychological phenomenon of recalling the past more positively than it
 | ||
|             was actually experienced. The highly unreliable nature of human memory is well documented and accepted
 | ||
|             amongst psychologists. Some research suggests a 'blue retrospective' which also exaggerates negative
 | ||
|             emotions.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Though it is a cognitive bias which distorts one's view of reality, it is suggested that rosy retrospection
 | ||
|             serves a useful purpose in increasing self-esteem and sense of well-being. Simplifications and exaggerations
 | ||
|             of memories such as occur in rosy retrospection may make it easier for the brain to store long-term memories,
 | ||
|             as removing details may reduce the burden of those memories by requiring the generation and maintenance of
 | ||
|             fewer neural connections.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Declinism, the predisposition to view the past more favourably and the future more negatively, may be related
 | ||
|             to cognitive biases like rosy retrospection. Rosy retrospection is very closely related to the concept of
 | ||
|             nostalgia, though the broader phenomenon of nostalgia is not usually seen as based on a biased perspective.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The English idiom "rose-colored glasses" or "rose-tinted glasses" refers to perceiving something more
 | ||
|             positively than it is in reality. The Romans occasionally referred to this phenomenon with the Latin phrase
 | ||
|             "memoria praeteritorum bonorum", which translates into English roughly as "memory of good past", or more
 | ||
|             idiomatically as "good old days".
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b9edd2f0-8503-4eb5-a4c3-369fcb318894"), // HINDSIGHT_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("7bf44f8f-a4b0-404c-8f15-8ca6e3322d32"), // OPTIMISM_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("b57a862b-b490-4d61-96b8-29d548c2eee4"), // POSITIVITY_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("23e4b2ad-c915-4d47-ab2d-79a3dce2a7e5"), // DECLINISM
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosy_retrospection",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias PROJECTION_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("61ca5b76-66d0-4ce2-b260-7fd42696000a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Projection Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Projection Bias
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## Affective forecasting
 | ||
|             Affective forecasting, also known as hedonic forecasting or the hedonic forecasting mechanism, is the
 | ||
|             prediction of one's affect (emotional state) in the future. As a process that influences preferences,
 | ||
|             decisions, and behavior, affective forecasting is studied by both psychologists and economists, with
 | ||
|             broad applications.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## Bias
 | ||
|             Projection bias is the tendency to falsely project current preferences onto a future event. When people
 | ||
|             are trying to estimate their emotional state in the future they attempt to give an unbiased estimate.
 | ||
|             However, people's assessments are contaminated by their current emotional state. Thus, it may be difficult
 | ||
|             for them to predict their emotional state in the future, an occurrence known as mental contamination. For
 | ||
|             example, if a college student was currently in a negative mood because he just found out he failed a test,
 | ||
|             and if the college student forecasted how much he would enjoy a party two weeks later, his current negative
 | ||
|             mood may influence his forecast. In order to make an accurate forecast the student would need to be aware
 | ||
|             that his forecast is biased due to mental contamination, be motivated to correct the bias, and be able to
 | ||
|             correct the bias in the right direction and magnitude.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Projection bias can arise from empathy gaps (or hot/cold empathy gaps), which occur when the present and
 | ||
|             future phases of affective forecasting are characterized by different states of physiological arousal,
 | ||
|             which the forecaster fails to take into account. For example, forecasters in a state of hunger are likely
 | ||
|             to overestimate how much they will want to eat later, overlooking the effect of their hunger on future
 | ||
|             preferences. As with projection bias, economists use the visceral motivations that produce empathy gaps
 | ||
|             to help explain impulsive or self-destructive behaviors, such as smoking.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("8e0f2242-6ad8-4e1e-a9e5-b55a4166781a"), // IMPACT_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("e4e091cf-fed3-4c09-9c21-509db0b2729b"), // HOT_COLD_EMPATHY_GAP
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affective_forecasting#Projection_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias IMPACT_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("8e0f2242-6ad8-4e1e-a9e5-b55a4166781a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Impact Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Impact Bias
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## Affective forecasting
 | ||
|             Affective forecasting, also known as hedonic forecasting or the hedonic forecasting mechanism, is the
 | ||
|             prediction of one's affect (emotional state) in the future. As a process that influences preferences,
 | ||
|             decisions, and behavior, affective forecasting is studied by both psychologists and economists, with
 | ||
|             broad applications.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## Bias
 | ||
|             One of the most common sources of error in affective forecasting across various populations and situations
 | ||
|             is impact bias, the tendency to overestimate the emotional impact of a future event, whether in terms of
 | ||
|             intensity or duration. The tendencies to overestimate intensity and duration are both robust and reliable
 | ||
|             errors found in affective forecasting.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             One study documenting impact bias examined college students participating in a housing lottery. These students
 | ||
|             predicted how happy or unhappy they would be one year after being assigned to either a desirable or an undesirable
 | ||
|             dormitory. These college students predicted that the lottery outcomes would lead to meaningful differences in
 | ||
|             their own level of happiness, but follow-up questionnaires revealed that students assigned to desirable or
 | ||
|             undesirable dormitories reported nearly the same levels of happiness. Thus, differences in forecasts
 | ||
|             overestimated the impact of the housing assignment on future happiness.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Some studies specifically address "durability bias," the tendency to overestimate the length of time future
 | ||
|             emotional responses will last. Even if people accurately estimate the intensity of their future emotions, they
 | ||
|             may not be able to estimate their duration. Durability bias is generally stronger in reaction to negative events.
 | ||
|             This is important because people tend to work toward events they believe will cause lasting happiness, and according
 | ||
|             to durability bias, people might be working toward the wrong things. Similar to impact bias, durability bias causes
 | ||
|             a person to overemphasize where the root cause of their happiness lies.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("61ca5b76-66d0-4ce2-b260-7fd42696000a"), // PROJECTION_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affective_forecasting#Impact_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias PRO_INNOVATION_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("fa033e14-41f3-45a9-887f-17e30f24c4e5"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Pro-Innovation Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Pro-Innovation Bias
 | ||
|             In diffusion of innovation theory, a pro-innovation bias is a belief that innovation should be adopted by the whole
 | ||
|             society without the need for its alteration. The innovation's "champion" has a such strong bias in favor of the
 | ||
|             innovation, that they may not see its limitations or weaknesses and continue to promote it nonetheless.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example:
 | ||
|             A feeling of nuclear optimism emerged in the 1950s in which it was believed that all power generators in the future
 | ||
|             would be atomic in nature. The atomic bomb would render all conventional explosives obsolete and nuclear power plants
 | ||
|             would do the same for power sources such as coal and oil. There was a general feeling that everything would use a
 | ||
|             nuclear power source of some sort, in a positive and productive way, from irradiating food to preserve it, to the
 | ||
|             development of nuclear medicine. There would be an age of peace and plenty in which atomic energy would "provide the
 | ||
|             power needed to desalinate water for the thirsty, irrigate the deserts for the hungry, and fuel interstellar travel
 | ||
|             deep into outer space". This use would render the Atomic Age as significant a step in technological progress as the
 | ||
|             first smelting of Bronze, of Iron, or the commencement of the Industrial Revolution.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Roger Smith, then chairman of General Motors, said in 1986: "By the turn of the century, we will live in a paperless
 | ||
|             society." In the late 20th century, there were many predictions of this kind. This transformation has so far not taken
 | ||
|             place.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pro-innovation_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias TIME_SAVING_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("f262db5e-b668-4bf9-9591-e38e153717da"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Time-Saving Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Time-Saving Bias
 | ||
|             Time-saving bias is a concept that describes people's tendency to misestimate the time that could be saved (or
 | ||
|             lost) when increasing (or decreasing) speed. In general, people underestimate the time that could be saved when
 | ||
|             increasing from a relatively low speed—e.g., 25 mph (40 km/h) or 40 mph (64 km/h)—and overestimate the time that
 | ||
|             could be saved when increasing from a relatively high speed—e.g., 55 mph (89 km/h) or 90 mph (140 km/h). People
 | ||
|             also underestimate the time that could be lost when decreasing from a low speed and overestimate the time that
 | ||
|             could be lost when decreasing from a high speed.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-saving_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias PLANNING_FALLACY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("144a4177-96fa-428f-8f42-bd7c3671c8a6"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Planning Fallacy",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Planning Fallacy
 | ||
|             The planning fallacy is a phenomenon in which predictions about how much time will be needed to complete a future task
 | ||
|             display an optimism bias and underestimate the time needed. This phenomenon sometimes occurs regardless of the individual's
 | ||
|             knowledge that past tasks of a similar nature have taken longer to complete than generally planned. The bias affects
 | ||
|             predictions only about one's own tasks. On the other hand, when outside observers predict task completion times, they
 | ||
|             tend to exhibit a pessimistic bias, overestimating the time needed. The planning fallacy involves estimates of task
 | ||
|             completion times more optimistic than those encountered in similar projects in the past.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Real-world examples:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - The Sydney Opera House was expected to be completed in 1963. A scaled-down version opened in 1973, a decade later.
 | ||
|               The original cost was estimated at $7 million, but its delayed completion led to a cost of $102 million.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - The Eurofighter Typhoon defense project took six years longer than expected, with an overrun cost of 8 billion euros.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - The Big Dig which undergrounded the Boston Central Artery was completed seven years later than planned, for $8.08
 | ||
|               billion on a budget of $2.8 billion (in 1988 dollars).
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - The Denver International Airport opened sixteen months later than scheduled, with a total cost of $4.8 billion,
 | ||
|               over $2 billion more than expected.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - The Berlin Brandenburg Airport is another case. After 15 years of planning, construction began in 2006, with the
 | ||
|               opening planned for October 2011. There were numerous delays. It was finally opened on October 31, 2020. The
 | ||
|               original budget was €2.83 billion; current projections are close to €10.0 billion.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3 faced severe delay and a cost overrun. The construction started in 2005 and
 | ||
|               was expected to be completed by 2009, but completed only in 2023. Initially, the estimated cost of the project was
 | ||
|               around 3 billion euros, but the cost has escalated to approximately 10 billion euros.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - California High-Speed Rail is still under construction, with tens of billions of dollars in overruns expected,
 | ||
|               and connections to major cities postponed until after completion of the rural segment.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - The James Webb Space Telescope went over budget by approximately 9 billion dollars, and was sent into orbit 14
 | ||
|               years later than its originally planned launch date.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("7bf44f8f-a4b0-404c-8f15-8ca6e3322d32"), // OPTIMISM_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planning_fallacy",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias PESSIMISM_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("67041978-ac8e-4254-ae2c-509e7301619f"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Pessimism Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Pessimism Bias
 | ||
|             The opposite of optimism bias is pessimism bias (or pessimistic bias), because the principles of the optimistic
 | ||
|             bias continue to be in effect in situations where individuals regard themselves as worse off than others. Optimism
 | ||
|             may occur from either a distortion of personal estimates, representing personal optimism, or a distortion for others,
 | ||
|             representing personal pessimism.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Pessimism bias is an effect in which people exaggerate the likelihood that negative things will happen to them. It
 | ||
|             contrasts with optimism bias. People with depression are particularly likely to exhibit pessimism bias. Surveys of
 | ||
|             smokers have found that their ratings of their risk of heart disease showed a small but significant pessimism bias;
 | ||
|             however, the literature as a whole is inconclusive.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("7bf44f8f-a4b0-404c-8f15-8ca6e3322d32"), // OPTIMISM_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optimism_bias#Pessimism_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias DECLINISM = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("23e4b2ad-c915-4d47-ab2d-79a3dce2a7e5"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Declinism",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Declinism
 | ||
|             Declinism is the belief that a society or institution is tending towards decline. Particularly, it is the
 | ||
|             predisposition, caused by cognitive biases such as rosy retrospection, to view the past more favourably and
 | ||
|             the future more negatively. "The great summit of declinism" according to Adam Gopnick, "was established in
 | ||
|             1918, in the book that gave decline its good name in publishing: the German historian Oswald Spengler's
 | ||
|             best-selling, thousand-page work *The Decline of the West*."
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("5e08ec28-0814-499f-82bd-eb7afb2080aa"), // ROSY_RETROSPECTION
 | ||
|             new Guid("8533edf9-3117-48c5-8f78-efbd996911f0"), // CONSERVATISM_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declinism",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias MORAL_LUCK = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("7534480a-1abf-40d5-acec-ace1bfc5be3a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Moral Luck",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Moral Luck
 | ||
|             Moral luck describes circumstances whereby a moral agent is assigned moral blame or praise for an action or
 | ||
|             its consequences even if it is clear that said agent did not have full control over either the action or its
 | ||
|             consequences.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example: There are two people driving cars, Driver A and Driver B. They are alike in every way. Driver A is
 | ||
|             driving down a road and in a moment of inattention runs a red light as a child is crossing the street. Driver
 | ||
|             A slams the brakes, swerves, and does everything to try to avoid hitting the child. Alas, the car hits and
 | ||
|             kills the child. Driver B in the meantime also runs a red light, but since no one is crossing, gets a traffic
 | ||
|             ticket but nothing more.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             If it is given that moral responsibility should only be relevant when the agent voluntarily performed or
 | ||
|             failed to perform some action, Drivers A and B should be blamed equally, or praised equally, as may be
 | ||
|             the case. However, due to the effect of Moral Luck, if a bystander were asked to morally evaluate Drivers
 | ||
|             A and B, there is very good reason to expect them to say that Driver A is due more moral blame than Driver B.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_luck",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias OUTCOME_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("a3f4415d-b7fa-4668-bcc2-20c79f714bdd"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Outcome Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Outcome Bias
 | ||
|             The outcome bias is an error made in evaluating the quality of a decision when the outcome of that decision is
 | ||
|             already known. Specifically, the outcome effect occurs when the same "behavior produce[s] more ethical condemnation
 | ||
|             when it happen[s] to produce bad rather than good outcome, even if the outcome is determined by chance."
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             While similar to the hindsight bias, the two phenomena are markedly different. Hindsight bias focuses on memory
 | ||
|             distortion to favor the actor, while the outcome bias focuses exclusively on weighting the outcome heavier than
 | ||
|             other pieces of information in deciding if a past decision was correct.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The outcome bias is closely related to the philosophical concept of moral luck as in both concepts, the evaluation
 | ||
|             of actions is influenced by factors that are not logically justifiable.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("7534480a-1abf-40d5-acec-ace1bfc5be3a"), // MORAL_LUCK
 | ||
|             new Guid("b9edd2f0-8503-4eb5-a4c3-369fcb318894"), // HINDSIGHT_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outcome_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias HINDSIGHT_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("b9edd2f0-8503-4eb5-a4c3-369fcb318894"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NOT_ENOUGH_MEANING,
 | ||
|         Name = "Hindsight Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Hindsight Bias
 | ||
|             Hindsight bias, also known as the knew-it-all-along phenomenon or creeping determinism, is the common tendency
 | ||
|             for people to perceive past events as having been more predictable than they were. After an event has occurred,
 | ||
|             people often believe that they could have predicted or perhaps even known with a high degree of certainty what
 | ||
|             the outcome of the event would be before it occurred. Hindsight bias may cause distortions of memories of what
 | ||
|             was known or believed before an event occurred and is a significant source of overconfidence in one’s ability
 | ||
|             to predict the outcomes of future events. Examples of hindsight bias can be seen in the writings of historians
 | ||
|             describing the outcomes of battles, in physicians’ recall of clinical trials, and in criminal or civil trials
 | ||
|             as people tend to assign responsibility on the basis of the supposed predictability of accidents.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Hindsight bias has both positive and negative consequences. The bias also plays a role in the process of
 | ||
|             decision-making within the medical field.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Positive consequences of hindsight bias is an increase in one's confidence and performance, as long as the bias
 | ||
|             distortion is reasonable and does not create overconfidence. Another positive consequence is that one's
 | ||
|             self-assurance of their knowledge and decision-making, even if it ends up being a poor decision, can be
 | ||
|             beneficial to others; allowing others to experience new things or to learn from those who made the poor
 | ||
|             decisions.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Negative: Hindsight bias causes overconfidence in one's performance relative to others. Hindsight bias
 | ||
|             decreases one's rational thinking because of when a person experiences strong emotions, which in turn
 | ||
|             decreases rational thinking. Another negative consequence of hindsight bias is the interference of one's
 | ||
|             ability to learn from experience, as a person is unable to look back on past decisions and learn from
 | ||
|             mistakes. A third consequence is a decrease in sensitivity toward a victim by the person who caused the
 | ||
|             wrongdoing. The person demoralizes the victim and does not allow for a correction of behaviors and actions.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Medical decision-making: Hindsight bias may lead to overconfidence and malpractice in regards to physicians.
 | ||
|             Hindsight bias and overconfidence is often attributed to the number of years of experience the physician has.
 | ||
|             After a procedure, physicians may have a "knew it the whole time" attitude, when in reality they may not have
 | ||
|             known it. Medical decision support systems are designed to assist physicians in diagnosis and treatment, and
 | ||
|             have been suggested as a way to counteract hindsight bias. However, these decision support systems come with
 | ||
|             drawbacks, as going against a recommended decision resulted in more punitive jury outcomes when physicians
 | ||
|             were found liable for causing harm.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("af63ce77-f6c6-4e0f-8a9e-3daedc497f9a"), // CONFIRMATION_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("697f58a7-45d7-4268-8951-81681fb005de"), // CURSE_OF_KNOWLEDGE
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindsight_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
|     
 | ||
|     #endregion
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     #region NEED_TO_ACT_FAST
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias LESS_IS_BETTER_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("593f2a10-46a6-471e-9ab3-86df740df6f2"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Less-Is-Better Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Less-Is-Better Effect
 | ||
|             The less-is-better effect is a type of preference reversal that occurs when the lesser
 | ||
|             or smaller alternative of a proposition is preferred when evaluated separately, but not
 | ||
|             evaluated together.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In a 1998 study, Hsee, a professor at the Graduate School of Business of The University
 | ||
|             of Chicago, discovered a less-is-better effect in three contexts:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - (1) a person giving a $45 scarf (from scarves ranging from $5-$50) as a gift was
 | ||
|                perceived to be more generous than one giving a $55 coat (from coats ranging from $50-$500);
 | ||
|                
 | ||
|             - (2) an overfilled ice cream serving with 7 oz of ice cream was valued more than an underfilled
 | ||
|               serving with 8 oz of ice cream;
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             - (3) a dinnerware set with 24 intact pieces was judged more favourably than one with 31 intact
 | ||
|               pieces (including the same 24) plus a few broken ones.
 | ||
|               
 | ||
|             Hsee noted that the less-is-better effect was observed "only when the options were evaluated 
 | ||
|             separately, and reversed itself when the options were juxtaposed.” Hsee explained these seemingly
 | ||
|             counterintuitive results “in terms of the evaluability hypothesis, which states that separate
 | ||
|             evaluations of objects are often influenced by attributes that are easy to evaluate rather than
 | ||
|             by those that are important."
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The less-is-better effect occurs only under specific circumstances. Evidence has shown that it
 | ||
|             manifests itself only when the options are evaluated individually; it disappears when they are
 | ||
|             assessed jointly. "If the options are put right next to each other, the effect disappears, as
 | ||
|             people see the true value of both," states one source. "It's just the gifts in isolation that
 | ||
|             give people a flipped sense of happiness and gratitude."
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Less-is-better_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias OCCAMS_RAZOR = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("3d5e3115-a98e-4d11-9760-4a3ddbbe6c69"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Occam's Razor",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Occam’s Razor
 | ||
|             Among competing hypotheses, the one with the fewest assumptions should be selected. Alternatively,
 | ||
|             other things being equal, simpler explanations are generally better than more complex ones.
 | ||
|             Controversial. This is not a cognitive bias. It is a heuristic, but not one that deviates from
 | ||
|             rationality in judgment.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CONJUNCTION_FALLACY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("b0c60f50-cc40-4bde-996c-1833741622a0"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Conjunction Fallacy",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Conjunction Fallacy
 | ||
|             The conjunction fallacy (also known as the Linda problem) is an inference that a conjoint set of two or more
 | ||
|             specific conclusions is likelier than any single member of that same set, in violation of the laws of
 | ||
|             probability. It is a type of formal fallacy.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The most often-cited example of this fallacy originated with Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             "Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she
 | ||
|             was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
 | ||
|             demonstrations."
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Which is more probable?
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Linda is a bank teller.
 | ||
|             - Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The majority of those asked chose option 2. However, the probability of two events occurring together
 | ||
|             (that is, in conjunction) is always less than or equal to the probability of either one occurring itself.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Tversky and Kahneman argue that most people get this problem wrong because they use a heuristic (an easily
 | ||
|             calculated) procedure called representativeness to make this kind of judgment: Option 2 seems more
 | ||
|             "representative" of Linda from the description of her, even though it is clearly mathematically less likely.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## Debiasing
 | ||
|             Drawing attention to set relationships, using frequencies instead of probabilities, and/or thinking
 | ||
|             diagrammatically (e.g. use a Venn diagram) sharply reduce the error in some forms of the conjunction
 | ||
|             fallacy.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In one experiment the question of the Linda problem was reformulated as follows:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             "There are 100 persons who fit the description above (that is, Linda's). How many of them are:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Bank tellers? __ of 100
 | ||
|             - Bank tellers and active in the feminist movement? __ of 100"
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Whereas previously 85% of participants gave the wrong answer (bank teller and active in the feminist
 | ||
|             movement), in experiments done with this questioning the proportion of incorrect answers is dramatically
 | ||
|             reduced (to ~20%). Participants were forced to use a mathematical approach and thus recognized the
 | ||
|             difference more easily.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             However, in some tasks only based on frequencies, not on stories, that used clear logical formulations,
 | ||
|             conjunction fallacies continued to occur dominantly, with only few exceptions, when the observed pattern
 | ||
|             of frequencies resembled a conjunction.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conjunction_fallacy",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias DELMORE_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("93a3d088-183f-47e7-a010-721f1cd6bac8"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Delmore Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Delmore Effect
 | ||
|             The Delmore effect is about how we tend to set clearer and more detailed goals for less important areas
 | ||
|             of our lives. In other words, we distract ourselves from the most important tasks by focusing on the
 | ||
|             easy stuff instead.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://www.42courses.com/blog/home/2022/9/2/42-effects-you-should-know-part-2",
 | ||
|             "https://bias.transhumanity.net/delmore-effect/",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias PARKINSONS_LAW_OF_TRIVIALITY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("d3ec6a5d-91cf-4aec-8541-bd87e1ad834b"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Law of Triviality",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Law of Triviality
 | ||
|             The law of triviality is C. Northcote Parkinson's 1957 argument that people within an organization commonly
 | ||
|             give disproportionate weight to trivial issues. Parkinson provides the example of a fictional committee
 | ||
|             whose job was to approve the plans for a nuclear power plant spending the majority of its time on discussions
 | ||
|             about relatively minor but easy-to-grasp issues, such as what materials to use for the staff bicycle shed,
 | ||
|             while neglecting the proposed design of the plant itself, which is far more important and a far more difficult
 | ||
|             and complex task.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The law has been applied to software development and other activities. The terms bicycle-shed effect,
 | ||
|             bike-shed effect, and bike-shedding were coined based on Parkinson's example; it was popularized in the
 | ||
|             Berkeley Software Distribution community by the Danish software developer Poul-Henning Kamp in 1999
 | ||
|             and, due to that, has since become popular within the field of software development generally.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b9c06da1-d2eb-4871-8159-a2a6d25e9eff"), // DUNNING_KRUGER_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("ad32d669-fc79-44c9-a570-609e1ccdc799"), // OMISSION_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_triviality",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias RHYME_AS_REASON_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("0d290221-81a0-4e44-bdec-30709117d90d"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Rhyme as Reason Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Rhyme as Reason Effect
 | ||
|             The rhyme-as-reason effect, also known as the Eaton–Rosen phenomenon, is a cognitive bias where sayings
 | ||
|             or aphorisms are perceived as more accurate or truthful when they rhyme. In experiments, participants
 | ||
|             evaluated variations of sayings that either rhymed or did not rhyme. Those that rhymed were consistently
 | ||
|             judged as more truthful, even when the meaning was controlled for. For instance, the rhyming saying "What
 | ||
|             sobriety conceals, alcohol reveals" was rated as more accurate on average than its non-rhyming counterpart,
 | ||
|             "What sobriety conceals, alcohol unmasks," across different groups of subjects (each group assessed the
 | ||
|             accuracy of only one version of the statement).
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             This effect may be explained by the Keats heuristic, which suggests that people assess a statement's truth
 | ||
|             based on its aesthetic qualities. Another explanation is the fluency heuristic, which posits that statements
 | ||
|             are preferred due to their ease of cognitive processing.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("cadafb8f-d1ed-4c92-9c29-2f1cb0797a66"), // ILLUSORY_TRUTH_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("1c5aa90a-e732-4f45-bf26-1b86c49a82f9"), // BELIEF_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhyme-as-reason_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias BELIEF_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("1c5aa90a-e732-4f45-bf26-1b86c49a82f9"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Belief Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Belief Bias
 | ||
|             Belief bias is the tendency to judge the strength of arguments based on the plausibility of their conclusion
 | ||
|             rather than how strongly they justify that conclusion. A person is more likely to accept an argument that
 | ||
|             supports a conclusion that aligns with their values, beliefs and prior knowledge, while rejecting counter
 | ||
|             arguments to the conclusion. Belief bias is an extremely common and therefore significant form of error;
 | ||
|             we can easily be blinded by our beliefs and reach the wrong conclusion. Belief bias has been found to
 | ||
|             influence various reasoning tasks, including conditional reasoning, relation reasoning and transitive reasoning.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belief_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias INFORMATION_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("d0e251bb-3e09-43f5-8c5e-bc933e743509"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Information Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Information Bias
 | ||
|             The tendency to seek information when it does not affect action. An example of information bias is believing
 | ||
|             that the more information that can be acquired to make a decision, the better, even if that extra information
 | ||
|             is irrelevant for the decision.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_bias_(psychology)",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias AMBIGUITY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("e9b00144-0cb3-46de-8a68-09daa00de1e4"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Ambiguity Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Ambiguity Effect
 | ||
|             The ambiguity effect is a cognitive tendency where decision making is affected by a lack of information, or
 | ||
|             "ambiguity". The effect implies that people tend to select options for which the probability of a favorable
 | ||
|             outcome is known, over an option for which the probability of a favorable outcome is unknown. The effect was
 | ||
|             first described by Daniel Ellsberg in 1961.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             One possible explanation of the effect is that people have a rule of thumb (heuristic) to avoid options where
 | ||
|             information is missing. This will often lead them to seek out the missing information. In many cases, though,
 | ||
|             the information cannot be obtained. The effect is often the result of calling some particular missing piece of
 | ||
|             information to the person's attention.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("44c6efd7-53f1-4d22-82fe-25e941390089"), // NEGLECT_OF_PROBABILITY
 | ||
|             new Guid("73ca0caa-25e5-4edb-91d4-f375a773f82c"), // APPEAL_TO_POSSIBILITY
 | ||
|             new Guid("b0c60f50-cc40-4bde-996c-1833741622a0"), // CONJUNCTION_FALLACY
 | ||
|             new Guid("656c78c9-d75a-4c07-a80d-f3a5026f859c"), // PSEUDOCERTAINTY_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambiguity_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias STATUS_QUO_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("b9e05a25-ac09-407d-8aee-f54a04decf0b"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Status Quo Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Status Quo Bias
 | ||
|             A status quo bias or default bias is a cognitive bias which results from a preference for the maintenance
 | ||
|             of one's existing state of affairs. The current baseline (or status quo) is taken as a reference point,
 | ||
|             and any change from that baseline is perceived as a loss or gain. Corresponding to different alternatives,
 | ||
|             this current baseline or default option is perceived and evaluated by individuals as a positive.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Status quo bias should be distinguished from a rational preference for the status quo ante, as when the
 | ||
|             current state of affairs is objectively superior to the available alternatives, or when imperfect information
 | ||
|             is a significant problem. A large body of evidence, however, shows that status quo bias frequently affects
 | ||
|             human decision-making. Status quo bias should also be distinguished from psychological inertia, which refers
 | ||
|             to a lack of intervention in the current course of affairs.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The bias intersects with other non-rational cognitive processes such as loss aversion, in which losses
 | ||
|             comparative to gains are weighed to a greater extent. Further non-rational cognitive processes include
 | ||
|             existence bias, endowment effect, longevity, mere exposure, and regret avoidance. Experimental evidence
 | ||
|             for the detection of status quo bias is seen through the use of the reversal test. A vast amount of
 | ||
|             experimental and field examples exist. Behaviour in regard to economics, retirement plans, health, and
 | ||
|             ethical choices show evidence of the status quo bias.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b81482f8-b2cf-4b86-a5a4-fcd29aee4e69"), // ENDOWMENT_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("ad32d669-fc79-44c9-a570-609e1ccdc799"), // OMISSION_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("ad3ed908-c56e-411b-a130-8af8574ff67b"), // LOSS_AVERSION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Status_quo_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SOCIAL_COMPARISON_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("09527928-6417-4eea-9719-d8ed4748691f"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Social Comparison Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Social Comparison Bias
 | ||
|             Social comparison bias is the tendency to have feelings of dislike and competitiveness with someone seen as
 | ||
|             physically, socially, or mentally better than oneself. Social comparison bias or social comparison theory is
 | ||
|             the idea that individuals determine their own worth based on how they compare to others. The theory was
 | ||
|             developed in 1954 by psychologist Leon Festinger. This can be compared to social comparison, which is
 | ||
|             believed to be central to achievement motivation, feelings of injustice, depression, jealousy, and people's
 | ||
|             willingness to remain in relationships or jobs. The basis of the theory is that people are believed to
 | ||
|             compete for the best outcome in relation to their peers. For example, one might make a comparison between the
 | ||
|             low-end department stores they go to frequently and the designer stores of their peers. Such comparisons may
 | ||
|             evoke feelings of resentment, anger, and envy with their peers. This bias revolves mostly around wealth and
 | ||
|             social status; it is unconscious and people who make these are largely unaware of them. In most cases, people
 | ||
|             try to compare themselves to those in their peer group or with whom they are similar.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_comparison_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias DECOY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("c8a532e9-5958-4894-aa0d-29ed6412780f"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Decoy Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Decoy Effect
 | ||
|             In marketing, the decoy effect (or attraction effect or asymmetric dominance effect) is the phenomenon
 | ||
|             whereby consumers will tend to have a specific change in preference between two options when also presented
 | ||
|             with a third option that is asymmetrically dominated. An option is asymmetrically dominated when it is
 | ||
|             inferior in all respects to one option; but, in comparison to the other option, it is inferior in some
 | ||
|             respects and superior in others. In other words, in terms of specific attributes determining preferences,
 | ||
|             it is completely dominated by (i.e., inferior to) one option and only partially dominated by the other.
 | ||
|             When the asymmetrically dominated option is present, a higher percentage of consumers will prefer the
 | ||
|             dominating option than when the asymmetrically dominated option is absent. The asymmetrically dominated
 | ||
|             option is therefore a decoy serving to increase preference for the dominating option. The decoy effect
 | ||
|             is also an example of the violation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom of decision
 | ||
|             theory. More simply, when deciding between two options, an unattractive third option can change the
 | ||
|             perceived preference between the other two.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The decoy effect is considered particularly important in choice theory because it is a violation of the
 | ||
|             assumption of "regularity" present in all axiomatic choice models, for example in a Luce model of choice.
 | ||
|             Regularity means that it should not be possible for the market share of any alternative to increase when
 | ||
|             another alternative is added to the choice set. The new alternative should reduce, or at best leave unchanged,
 | ||
|             the choice share of existing alternatives. Regularity is violated in the example shown below where a new
 | ||
|             alternative C not only changes the relative shares of A and B but actually increases the share of A in
 | ||
|             absolute terms. Similarly, the introduction of a new alternative D increases the share of B in absolute
 | ||
|             terms.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## Example
 | ||
|             Suppose there is a consideration set (options to choose from in a menu) that involves smartphones. Consumers
 | ||
|             will generally see higher storage capacity (number of GB) and lower price as positive attributes; while some
 | ||
|             consumers may want a device that can store more photos, music, etc., other consumers will want a device that
 | ||
|             costs less. In Consideration Set 1, two devices are available:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Consideration Set 1:
 | ||
|             - A: $400, 300GB
 | ||
|             - B: $300, 200GB
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In this case, some consumers will prefer A for its greater storage capacity, while others will prefer B for
 | ||
|             its lower price.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Now suppose that a new player, C, the "decoy", is added to the market; it is more expensive than both A, the
 | ||
|             "target", and B, the "competitor", and has more storage than B but less than A:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Consideration Set 2:
 | ||
|             - A (target): $400, 300GB
 | ||
|             - B (competitor): $300, 200GB
 | ||
|             - C (decoy): $450, 250GB
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The addition of decoy C — which consumers would presumably avoid, given that a lower price can be paid for a
 | ||
|             model with more storage—causes A, the dominating option, to be chosen more often than if only the two choices
 | ||
|             in Consideration Set 1 existed; C affects consumer preferences by acting as a basis of comparison for A and B.
 | ||
|             Because A is better than C in both respects, while B is only partially better than C, more consumers will
 | ||
|             prefer A now than did before. C is therefore a decoy whose sole purpose is to increase sales of A.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Conversely, suppose that instead of C, a player D is introduced that has less storage than both A and B, and
 | ||
|             that is more expensive than B but not as expensive as A:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Consideration Set 3:
 | ||
|             - A (competitor): $400, 300GB
 | ||
|             - B (target): $300, 200GB
 | ||
|             - D (decoy): $350, 150GB
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The result here is similar: consumers will not prefer D, because it is not as good as B in any respect. However,
 | ||
|             whereas C increased preference for A, D has the opposite effect, increasing preference for B.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decoy_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias REACTANCE = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("d3c2cb4b-ec29-4cf3-a485-9a98e9f1f223"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Reactance",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Reactance
 | ||
|             In psychology, reactance is an unpleasant motivational reaction to offers, persons, rules, regulations, advice, or
 | ||
|             recommendations that are perceived to threaten or eliminate specific behavioral freedoms. Reactance occurs when an
 | ||
|             individual feels that an agent is attempting to limit one's choice of response and/or range of alternatives.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Reactance can occur when someone is heavily pressured into accepting a certain view or attitude. Reactance can
 | ||
|             encourage an individual to adopt or strengthen a view or attitude which is indeed contrary to that which was
 | ||
|             intended — which is to say, to a response of noncompliance — and can also increase resistance to persuasion.
 | ||
|             Some individuals might employ reverse psychology in a bid to exploit reactance for their benefit, in an attempt
 | ||
|             to influence someone to choose the opposite of what is being requested. Reactance can occur when an individual
 | ||
|             senses that someone is trying to compel them to do something; often the individual will offer resistance and
 | ||
|             attempt to extricate themselves from the situation.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Some individuals are naturally high in reactance, a personality characteristic called trait reactance.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("a9c7faa7-2368-4be5-9eda-a37ffd8f7ab1"), // REVERSE_PSYCHOLOGY
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactance_(psychology)",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias REVERSE_PSYCHOLOGY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("a9c7faa7-2368-4be5-9eda-a37ffd8f7ab1"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Reverse Psychology",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Reverse Psychology
 | ||
|             Reverse psychology is a technique involving the assertion of a belief or behavior that is opposite to the one desired, with the expectation
 | ||
|             that this approach will encourage the subject of the persuasion to do what is actually desired. This technique relies on the psychological
 | ||
|             phenomenon of reactance, in which a person has a negative emotional reaction to being persuaded, and thus chooses the option which is being
 | ||
|             advocated against. This may work especially well on a person who is resistant by nature, while direct requests work best for people who are
 | ||
|             compliant. The one being manipulated is usually unaware of what is really going on.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("d3c2cb4b-ec29-4cf3-a485-9a98e9f1f223"), // REACTANCE
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_psychology",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SYSTEM_JUSTIFICATION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("755c8f9e-b172-4ff7-9797-9cc130bf4939"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "System Justification",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # System Justification
 | ||
|             System justification theory is a theory within social psychology that system-justifying beliefs serve a psychologically
 | ||
|             palliative function. It proposes that people have several underlying needs, which vary from individual to individual,
 | ||
|             that can be satisfied by the defense and justification of the status quo, even when the system may be disadvantageous
 | ||
|             to certain people. People have epistemic, existential, and relational needs that are met by and manifest as ideological
 | ||
|             support for the prevailing structure of social, economic, and political norms. Need for order and stability, and thus
 | ||
|             resistance to change or alternatives, for example, can be a motivator for individuals to see the status quo as good,
 | ||
|             legitimate, and even desirable.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             According to system justification theory, people desire not only to hold favorable attitudes about themselves
 | ||
|             (ego-justification) and the groups to which they belong (group-justification), but also to hold positive attitudes
 | ||
|             about the overarching social structure in which they are entwined and find themselves obligated to (system-justification).
 | ||
|             This system-justifying motive sometimes produces the phenomenon known as out-group favoritism, an acceptance of inferiority
 | ||
|             among low-status groups and a positive image of relatively higher status groups. Thus, the notion that individuals are
 | ||
|             simultaneously supporters and victims of the system-instilled norms is a central idea in system justification theory.
 | ||
|             Additionally, the passive ease of supporting the current structure, when compared to the potential price (material,
 | ||
|             social, psychological) of acting out against the status quo, leads to a shared environment in which the existing social,
 | ||
|             economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred. Alternatives to the status quo tend to be disparaged, and
 | ||
|             inequality tends to perpetuate.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b9e05a25-ac09-407d-8aee-f54a04decf0b"), // STATUS_QUO_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("b1cc861b-f445-450b-9bdf-e9d222abdb4e"), // IN_GROUP_FAVORITISM
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/System_justification",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias BELIEF_PERSEVERANCE = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("bf8f304d-2e8e-4a90-a9c5-7bd56f6058a6"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Belief Perseverance",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Belief Perseverance
 | ||
|             Belief perseverance (also known as conceptual conservatism) is maintaining a belief despite new information that
 | ||
|             firmly contradicts it. Since rationality involves conceptual flexibility, belief perseverance is consistent with
 | ||
|             the view that human beings act at times in an irrational manner. Philosopher F.C.S. Schiller holds that belief
 | ||
|             perseverance "deserves to rank among the fundamental 'laws' of nature".
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             If beliefs are strengthened after others attempt to present evidence debunking them, this is known as a backfire
 | ||
|             effect. There are psychological mechanisms by which backfire effects could potentially occur, but the evidence on
 | ||
|             this topic is mixed, and backfire effects are very rare in practice. A 2020 review of the scientific literature on
 | ||
|             backfire effects found that there have been widespread failures to replicate their existence, even under conditions
 | ||
|             that would be theoretically favorable to observing them. Due to the lack of reproducibility, as of 2020 most
 | ||
|             researchers believe that backfire effects are either unlikely to occur on the broader population level, or they
 | ||
|             only occur in very specific circumstances, or they do not exist. For most people, corrections and fact-checking
 | ||
|             are very unlikely to have a negative impact, and there is no specific group of people in which backfire effects
 | ||
|             have been consistently observed.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belief_perseverance",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ENDOWMENT_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("b81482f8-b2cf-4b86-a5a4-fcd29aee4e69"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Endowment Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Endowment Effect
 | ||
|             In psychology and behavioral economics, the endowment effect, also known as divestiture aversion, is the finding
 | ||
|             that people are more likely to retain an object they own than acquire that same object when they do not own it.
 | ||
|             The endowment theory can be defined as "an application of prospect theory positing that loss aversion associated
 | ||
|             with ownership explains observed exchange asymmetries."
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             This is typically illustrated in two ways. In a valuation paradigm, people's maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to
 | ||
|             acquire an object is typically lower than the least amount they are willing to accept (WTA) to give up that same
 | ||
|             object when they own it—even when there is no cause for attachment, or even if the item was only obtained minutes
 | ||
|             ago. In an exchange paradigm, people given a good are reluctant to trade it for another good of similar value.
 | ||
|             For example, participants first given a pen of equal expected value to that of a coffee mug were generally unwilling
 | ||
|             to trade, whilst participants first given the coffee mug were also unwilling to trade it for the pen.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("ad3ed908-c56e-411b-a130-8af8574ff67b"), // LOSS_AVERSION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endowment_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias PROCESSING_DIFFICULTY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("4f61b9fa-146a-4b6e-b075-f0ba2ee0d9d0"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Processing Difficulty Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Processing Difficulty Effect
 | ||
|             That information that takes longer to read and is thought about more (processed with more difficulty) is more easily remembered.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("a4027640-1f52-4ff1-ae13-bd14a30d5b8d"), // LEVELS_OF_PROCESSING_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases#Other_memory_biases",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias PSEUDOCERTAINTY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("656c78c9-d75a-4c07-a80d-f3a5026f859c"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Pseudocertainty Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Pseudocertainty Effect
 | ||
|             In prospect theory, the pseudocertainty effect is the tendency for people to perceive an outcome as certain while it is
 | ||
|             actually uncertain in multi-stage decision making. The evaluation of the certainty of the outcome in a previous stage of
 | ||
|             decisions is disregarded when selecting an option in subsequent stages. Not to be confused with certainty effect, the
 | ||
|             pseudocertainty effect was discovered from an attempt at providing a normative use of decision theory for the certainty
 | ||
|             effect by relaxing the cancellation rule.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("ad3ed908-c56e-411b-a130-8af8574ff67b"), // LOSS_AVERSION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudocertainty_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias CERTAINTY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("ac7d745c-d66e-4886-87d7-ddaba349d4e8"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Certainty Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Certainty Effect
 | ||
|             The certainty effect is the psychological effect resulting from the reduction of probability from certain to probable
 | ||
|             (Tversky & Kahneman 1986). It is an idea introduced in prospect theory. Normally a reduction in the probability of
 | ||
|             winning a reward (e.g., a reduction from 80% to 20% in the chance of winning a reward) creates a psychological effect
 | ||
|             such as displeasure to individuals, which leads to the perception of loss from the original probability thus favoring
 | ||
|             a risk-averse decision. However, the same reduction results in a larger psychological effect when it is done from
 | ||
|             certainty than from uncertainty.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certainty_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias DISPOSITION_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("4ecb0187-b2e2-446f-87e2-1e32f269e497"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Disposition Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Disposition Effect
 | ||
|             The disposition effect is an anomaly discovered in behavioral finance. It relates to the tendency of investors to sell
 | ||
|             assets that have increased in value, while keeping assets that have dropped in value. Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman
 | ||
|             identified and named the effect in their 1985 paper, which found that people dislike losing significantly more than they
 | ||
|             enjoy winning. The disposition effect has been described as one of the foremost vigorous actualities around individual
 | ||
|             investors because investors will hold stocks that have lost value yet sell stocks that have gained value.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky traced the cause of the disposition effect to the so-called "prospect theory".
 | ||
|             The prospect theory proposes that when an individual is presented with two equal choices, one having possible gains and
 | ||
|             the other with possible losses, the individual is more likely to opt for the former choice even though both would yield
 | ||
|             the same economic result.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The disposition effect can be minimized by means of a mental approach called "hedonic framing". For example, individuals
 | ||
|             can try to force themselves to think of a single large gain as a number of smaller gains, to think of a number of smaller
 | ||
|             losses as a single large loss, to think of the combination of a major gain and a minor loss as a net minor gain, and, in
 | ||
|             the case of a combined major loss and minor gain, to think of the two separately. In a similar manner, investors show a
 | ||
|             reversed disposition effect when they are framed to think of their investment as progress towards a specific investment
 | ||
|             goal rather than a generic investment.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disposition_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ZERO_RISK_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("77553998-bfa7-450e-acd9-586a55064302"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Zero-Risk Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Zero-Risk Bias
 | ||
|             Zero-risk bias is a tendency to prefer the complete elimination of risk in a sub-part over alternatives with greater
 | ||
|             overall risk reduction. It often manifests in cases where decision makers address problems concerning health, safety,
 | ||
|             and the environment. Its effect on decision making has been observed in surveys presenting hypothetical scenarios.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Zero-risk bias is based on the way people feel better if a risk is eliminated instead of being merely mitigated.
 | ||
|             Scientists identified a zero-risk bias in responses to a questionnaire about a hypothetical cleanup scenario involving
 | ||
|             two hazardous sites X and Y, with X causing 8 cases of cancer annually and Y causing 4 cases annually. The respondents
 | ||
|             ranked three cleanup approaches: two options each reduced the total number of cancer cases by 6, while the third reduced
 | ||
|             the number by 5 and eliminated the cases at site Y. While the latter option featured the worst reduction overall, 42% of
 | ||
|             the respondents ranked it better than at least one of the other options. This conclusion resembled one from an earlier
 | ||
|             economics study that found people were willing to pay high costs to eliminate a risk. It has a normative justification
 | ||
|             since once risk is eliminated, people would have less to worry about and such removal of worry also has utility. It is
 | ||
|             also driven by our preference for winning much more than losing as well as the old instead of the new way, all of which
 | ||
|             cloud the way the world is viewed.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-risk_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias UNIT_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("ff43a9e2-7dde-47ca-a3ef-5a9c2d3117c9"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Unit Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Unit Bias
 | ||
|             The standard suggested amount of consumption (e.g., food serving size) is perceived to be appropriate, and a person would
 | ||
|             consume it all even if it is too much for this particular person.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases#Other",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias IKEA_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("565616dc-ed84-42af-b9cc-6fa666cc5d66"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "IKEA Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # IKEA Effect
 | ||
|             The IKEA effect is a cognitive bias in which consumers place a disproportionately high value on products they
 | ||
|             partially created. The name refers to Swedish manufacturer and furniture retailer IKEA, which sells many items
 | ||
|             of furniture that require assembly. A 2011 study found that subjects were willing to pay 63% more for furniture
 | ||
|             they had assembled themselves than for equivalent pre-assembled items.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b9c06da1-d2eb-4871-8159-a2a6d25e9eff"), // DUNNING_KRUGER_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("30deb7d6-4019-4fef-9823-8d8126e54f0a"), // ESCALATION_OF_COMMITMENT
 | ||
|             new Guid("ad32d669-fc79-44c9-a570-609e1ccdc799"), // OMISSION_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IKEA_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias LOSS_AVERSION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("ad3ed908-c56e-411b-a130-8af8574ff67b"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Loss Aversion",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Loss Aversion
 | ||
|             In cognitive science and behavioral economics, loss aversion refers to a cognitive bias in which the same situation
 | ||
|             is perceived as worse if it is framed as a loss, rather than a gain. It should not be confused with risk aversion,
 | ||
|             which describes the rational behavior of valuing an uncertain outcome at less than its expected value.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## Application
 | ||
|             In marketing, the use of trial periods and rebates tries to take advantage of the buyer's tendency to value the good
 | ||
|             more after the buyer incorporates it in the status quo. In past behavioral economics studies, users participate up
 | ||
|             until the threat of loss equals any incurred gains. Methods established by Botond Kőszegi and Matthew Rabin in
 | ||
|             experimental economics illustrates the role of expectation, wherein an individual's belief about an outcome can
 | ||
|             create an instance of loss aversion, whether or not a tangible change of state has occurred.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Whether a transaction is framed as a loss or as a gain is important to this calculation. The same change in price
 | ||
|             framed differently, for example as a $5 discount or as a $5 surcharge avoided, has a significant effect on
 | ||
|             consumer behavior. Although traditional economists consider this "endowment effect", and all other effects of
 | ||
|             loss aversion, to be completely irrational, it is important to the fields of marketing and behavioral finance.
 | ||
|             Users in behavioral and experimental economics studies decided to cease participation in iterative money-making
 | ||
|             games when the threat of loss was close to the expenditure of effort, even when the user stood to further their
 | ||
|             gains. Loss aversion coupled with myopia has been shown to explain macroeconomic phenomena, such as the equity
 | ||
|             premium puzzle. Loss aversion to kinship is an explanation for aversion to inheritance tax.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b81482f8-b2cf-4b86-a5a4-fcd29aee4e69"), // ENDOWMENT_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("ef521fbb-c20b-47c9-87f8-a571a06a03eb"), // NEGATIVITY_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loss_aversion",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias GENERATION_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("af442ab1-ffc5-404c-9ee8-3497fe6992ec"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Generation Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Generation Effect
 | ||
|             The generation effect is a phenomenon whereby information is better remembered if it is generated from one's own
 | ||
|             mind rather than simply read. Researchers have struggled to fully explain why generated information is better
 | ||
|             recalled than read information, as no single explanation has been comprehensive.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generation_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ESCALATION_OF_COMMITMENT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("30deb7d6-4019-4fef-9823-8d8126e54f0a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Escalation of Commitment",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Escalation of Commitment
 | ||
|             Escalation of commitment is a human behavior pattern in which an individual or group facing increasingly negative
 | ||
|             outcomes from a decision, action, or investment nevertheless continue the behavior instead of altering course.
 | ||
|             The actor maintains behaviors that are irrational, but align with previous decisions and actions.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Economists and behavioral scientists use a related term, sunk-cost fallacy, to describe the justification of
 | ||
|             increased investment of money or effort in a decision, based on the cumulative prior investment ("sunk cost")
 | ||
|             despite new evidence suggesting that the future cost of continuing the behavior outweighs the expected benefit.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             In sociology, irrational escalation of commitment or commitment bias describe similar behaviors. The phenomenon
 | ||
|             and the sentiment underlying them are reflected in such proverbial images as "throwing good money after bad",
 | ||
|             or "In for a penny, in for a pound", or "It's never the wrong time to make the right decision", or "If you find
 | ||
|             yourself in a hole, stop digging."
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("9a2d58f5-bbf1-4b34-8e1b-f9bcd8814f05"), // SUNK_COST_FALLACY
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escalation_of_commitment",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SUNK_COST_FALLACY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("9a2d58f5-bbf1-4b34-8e1b-f9bcd8814f05"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Sunk Cost Fallacy",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Sunk Cost Fallacy
 | ||
|             The Misconception: You make rational decisions based on the future value of objects, investments and experiences.
 | ||
|             The Truth: Your decisions are tainted by the emotional investments you accumulate, and the more you invest in
 | ||
|             something the harder it becomes to abandon it.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Example: R&D costs. Once spent, such costs are sunk and should have no effect on future pricing decisions. So a
 | ||
|             pharmaceutical company's attempt to justify high prices because of the need to recoup R&D expenses is fallacious.
 | ||
|             The company will charge market prices whether R&D had cost one dollar or one million dollars. However, R&D costs,
 | ||
|             and the ability to recoup those costs, are a factor in deciding whether to spend the money on R&D. It’s important
 | ||
|             to distinguish that while justifying high prices on past R&D is a fallacy, raising prices in order to finance
 | ||
|             future R&D is not.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Counterpoint: It is sometimes not that simple. In a broad range of situations, it is rational for people to condition
 | ||
|             behavior on sunk costs, because of informational content, reputational concerns, or financial and time constraints.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("30deb7d6-4019-4fef-9823-8d8126e54f0a"), // ESCALATION_OF_COMMITMENT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost#Fallacy_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias IDENTIFIABLE_VICTIM_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("0c18a8bd-5e5f-4cf0-a90e-47dd7a421035"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Identifiable Victim Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Identifiable Victim Effect
 | ||
|             The identifiable victim effect is the tendency of individuals to offer greater aid when a specific, identifiable
 | ||
|             person ("victim") is observed under hardship, as compared to a large, vaguely defined group with the same need.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The identifiable victim effect has two components. People are more inclined to help an identified victim than an
 | ||
|             unidentified one, and people are more inclined to help a single identified victim than a group of identified victims.
 | ||
|             Although helping an identified victim may be commendable, the identifiable victim effect is considered a cognitive
 | ||
|             bias. From a consequentialist point of view, the cognitive error is the failure to offer N times as much help to N
 | ||
|             unidentified victims.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The identifiable victim effect has a mirror image that is sometimes called the identifiable perpetrator effect.
 | ||
|             Research has shown that individuals are more inclined to mete out punishment, even at their own expense, when they
 | ||
|             are punishing a specific, identified perpetrator.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The conceptualization of the identifiable victim effect as it is known today is commonly attributed to American
 | ||
|             economist Thomas Schelling. He wrote that harm to a particular person invokes "anxiety and sentiment, guilt and awe,
 | ||
|             responsibility and religion, [but]…most of this awesomeness disappears when we deal with statistical death".
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Historical figures from Joseph Stalin to Mother Teresa are credited with statements that epitomize the identifiable
 | ||
|             victim effect. The remark "One death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic" is widely, although probably
 | ||
|             incorrectly, attributed to Stalin. The remark "If I look at the mass I will never act. If I look at the one, I
 | ||
|             will," is attributed to Mother Teresa.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identifiable_victim_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias APPEAL_TO_NOVELTY = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("2d57f4d6-e599-4738-812a-c12cef877779"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Appeal to Novelty",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Appeal to Novelty
 | ||
|             The appeal to novelty (also called appeal to modernity or argumentum ad novitatem) is a fallacy in which one
 | ||
|             prematurely claims that an idea or proposal is correct or superior, exclusively because it is new and modern.
 | ||
|             In a controversy between status quo and new inventions, an appeal to novelty argument is not in itself a valid
 | ||
|             argument. The fallacy may take two forms: overestimating the new and modern, prematurely and without investigation
 | ||
|             assuming it to be best-case, or underestimating status quo, prematurely and without investigation assuming it to
 | ||
|             be worst-case.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Investigation may prove these claims to be true, but it is a fallacy to prematurely conclude this only from the
 | ||
|             general claim that all novelty is good.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeal_to_novelty",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias HYPERBOLIC_DISCOUNTING = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("19a483d0-2c8f-486f-bf9e-619d0df4c916"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Hyperbolic Discounting",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Hyperbolic Discounting
 | ||
|             Given two similar rewards, humans show a preference for one that arrives in a more prompt timeframe. Humans are said
 | ||
|             to discount the value of the later reward, by a factor that increases with the length of the delay. In the financial
 | ||
|             world, this process is normally modeled in the form of exponential discounting, a time-consistent model of discounting.
 | ||
|             Many psychological studies have since demonstrated deviations in instinctive preference from the constant discount rate
 | ||
|             assumed in exponential discounting. Hyperbolic discounting is an alternative mathematical model that agrees more closely
 | ||
|             with these findings.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperbolic_discounting",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias RISK_COMPENSATION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("10fcc295-02b6-4dbf-b655-f5bcff3c1ca7"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Risk Compensation",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Risk Compensation
 | ||
|             Risk compensation is a theory which suggests that people typically adjust their behavior in response to perceived
 | ||
|             levels of risk, becoming more careful where they sense greater risk and less careful if they feel more protected.
 | ||
|             Although usually small in comparison to the fundamental benefits of safety interventions, it may result in a lower
 | ||
|             net benefit than expected or even higher risks.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             By way of example, it has been observed that motorists drove closer to the vehicle in front when the vehicles were
 | ||
|             fitted with anti-lock brakes. There is also evidence that the risk compensation phenomenon could explain the failure
 | ||
|             of condom distribution programs to reverse HIV prevalence and that condoms may foster disinhibition, with people
 | ||
|             engaging in risky sex both with and without condoms.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             By contrast, shared space is an urban street design method which consciously aims to increase the level of perceived
 | ||
|             risk and uncertainty, thereby slowing traffic and reducing the number and seriousness of injuries.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_compensation",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias EFFORT_JUSTIFICATION = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("cff2c74d-a160-4a90-b0b2-10f145b804cb"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Effort Justification",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Effort Justification
 | ||
|             Effort justification is an idea and paradigm in social psychology stemming from Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive
 | ||
|             dissonance. Effort justification is a person's tendency to attribute the value of an outcome they put effort into
 | ||
|             achieving as greater than the objective value of the outcome.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Cognitive dissonance theory explains changes in people's attitudes or beliefs as the result of an attempt to reduce a
 | ||
|             dissonance (discrepancy) between contradicting ideas or cognitions. In the case of effort justification, there is a
 | ||
|             dissonance between the amount of effort exerted into achieving a goal or completing a task (high effort equalling high
 | ||
|             "cost") and the subjective reward for that effort (lower than was expected for such an effort). By adjusting and increasing
 | ||
|             one's attitude or subjective value of the goal, this dissonance is resolved.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             One of the first and most classic examples of effort justification is Aronson and Mills's study. A group of young women
 | ||
|             who volunteered to join a discussion group on the topic of the psychology of sex were asked to do a small reading test
 | ||
|             to make sure they were not too embarrassed to talk about sexual-related topics with others. The mild-embarrassment
 | ||
|             condition subjects were asked to read aloud a list of sex-related words such as prostitute or virgin. The
 | ||
|             severe-embarrassment condition subjects were asked to read aloud a list of highly sexual words (e.g. fuck, cock) and
 | ||
|             to read two vivid descriptions of sexual activity taken from contemporary novels. All subjects then listened to a
 | ||
|             recording of a discussion about sexual behavior in animals which was dull and unappealing. When asked to rate the
 | ||
|             group and its members, control and mild-embarrassment groups did not differ, but the severe-embarrassment group's
 | ||
|             ratings were significantly higher. This group, whose initiation process was more difficult (embarrassment equalling
 | ||
|             effort), had to increase their subjective value of the discussion group to resolve the dissonance.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("565616dc-ed84-42af-b9cc-6fa666cc5d66"), // IKEA_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("ad32d669-fc79-44c9-a570-609e1ccdc799"), // OMISSION_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effort_justification",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias TRAIT_ASCRIPTION_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("4727839d-64c5-4ba4-b044-6b09f14d5a34"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Trait Ascription Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Trait Ascription Bias
 | ||
|             Trait ascription bias is the tendency for people to view themselves as relatively variable in terms of personality,
 | ||
|             behavior and mood while viewing others as much more predictable in their personal traits across different situations.
 | ||
|             More specifically, it is a tendency to describe one's own behaviour in terms of situational factors while preferring
 | ||
|             to describe another's behaviour by ascribing fixed dispositions to their personality. This may occur because peoples'
 | ||
|             own internal states are more readily observable and available to them than those of others.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             This attributional bias intuitively plays a role in the formation and maintenance of stereotypes and prejudice,
 | ||
|             combined with the negativity effect. However, trait ascription and trait-based models of personality remain
 | ||
|             contentious in modern psychology and social science research. Trait ascription bias refers to the situational
 | ||
|             and dispositional evaluation and description of personality traits on a personal level. A similar bias on the
 | ||
|             group level is called the outgroup homogeneity bias. 
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("ef521fbb-c20b-47c9-87f8-a571a06a03eb"), // NEGATIVITY_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("2cb8514a-c4a2-4cf6-aed7-72d7870ace84"), // BARNUM_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("f1570784-f8ec-46fd-8bb8-763aef31a04a"), // FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("a44a6bcf-b2b8-47f1-84e0-d740af56aa1e"), // ILLUSION_OF_ASYMMETRIC_INSIGHT
 | ||
|             new Guid("f8fd4635-69b3-47be-8243-8c7c6749cae2"), // ILLUSORY_SUPERIORITY
 | ||
|             new Guid("80f9b496-798a-4a1e-a426-815f23b8698e"), // INTROSPECTION_ILLUSION
 | ||
|             new Guid("5ae6f7ec-3be2-47ad-ad75-0ed114f97fe0"), // NAÏVE_CYNICISM
 | ||
|             new Guid("ca2d4f1f-924f-44ae-886b-19240cf2c8c0"), // ULTIMATE_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trait_ascription_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias DEFENSIVE_ATTRIBUTION_HYPOTHESIS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("5a973490-c19a-43c7-8a01-a26e0d05f275"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Defensive Attribution Hypothesis",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Defensive Attribution Hypothesis
 | ||
|             The defensive attribution hypothesis (or bias, theory, or simply defensive attribution) is a social
 | ||
|             psychological term where an observer attributes the causes for a mishap to minimize their fear of
 | ||
|             being a victim or a cause in a similar situation. The attributions of blame are negatively correlated
 | ||
|             to similarities between the observer and the people involved in the mishap, i.e. more responsibility
 | ||
|             is attributed to the people involved who are dissimilar to the observer. Assigning responsibility
 | ||
|             allows the observer to believe that the mishap was controllable and thus preventable.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             A defensive attribution may also be used to protect the person's self-esteem if, despite everything,
 | ||
|             the mishap does occur, because blame can be assigned to the "other" (person or situation). The use of
 | ||
|             defensive attributions is considered a cognitive bias because an individual will change their beliefs
 | ||
|             about a situation based upon their motivations or desires rather than the factual characteristics of
 | ||
|             the situation.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             ## Sexual assault
 | ||
|             Researchers examining sexual assault have consistently found that male participants blamed rapists less
 | ||
|             than female participants did, and that male participants blamed the rape victims more than female
 | ||
|             participants did. These findings support Shaver's similarity-responsibility hypothesis: male participants,
 | ||
|             who are personally similar to (male) rapists, blame rapists less than female participants who are dissimilar
 | ||
|             to rapists. On the other hand, female participants, who are personally similar to (female) rape victims,
 | ||
|             blame the victims less than male participants.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("efceb4b1-e19f-4997-9f96-1657bb269b2d"), // ATTRIBUTION_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("ad32d669-fc79-44c9-a570-609e1ccdc799"), // OMISSION_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defensive_attribution_hypothesis",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("f1570784-f8ec-46fd-8bb8-763aef31a04a"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Fundamental Attribution Error",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Fundamental Attribution Error
 | ||
|             In social psychology, the fundamental attribution error (FAE) [a] is a cognitive attribution bias in which
 | ||
|             observers underemphasize situational and environmental factors for the behavior of an actor while overemphasizing
 | ||
|             dispositional or personality factors. In other words, observers tend to overattribute the behaviors of others to
 | ||
|             their personality (e.g., he is late because he's selfish) and underattribute them to the situation or context
 | ||
|             (e.g., he is late because he got stuck in traffic). Although personality traits and predispositions are considered
 | ||
|             to be observable facts in psychology, the fundamental attribution error is an error because it misinterprets their
 | ||
|             effects.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The group attribution error (GAE) is identical to the fundamental attribution error, where the bias is shown between
 | ||
|             members of different groups rather than different individuals. The ultimate attribution error is a derivative of the
 | ||
|             FAE and GAE relating to the actions of groups, with an additional layer of self-justification relating to whether
 | ||
|             the action of an individual is representative of the wider group.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("ca2d4f1f-924f-44ae-886b-19240cf2c8c0"), // ULTIMATE_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("577e79e5-0a53-4c4c-a2ea-d039870bfbb9"), // GROUP_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamental_attribution_error",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ILLUSION_OF_CONTROL = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("7fce783e-2120-4aad-9805-2c2a2b937b7d"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Illusion of Control",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Illusion of Control
 | ||
|             The illusion of control is the tendency for people to overestimate their ability to control events. It was named
 | ||
|             by U.S. psychologist Ellen Langer and is thought to influence gambling behavior and belief in the paranormal.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             It is the tendency for people to overestimate their ability to control events, for example, when someone feels a
 | ||
|             sense of control over outcomes that they demonstrably do not influence. The illusion might arise because a person
 | ||
|             lacks direct introspective insight into whether they are in control of events. This has been called the introspection
 | ||
|             illusion. Instead, they may judge their degree of control by a process which is often unreliable. As a result, they see
 | ||
|             themselves as responsible for events to which there is little or no causal link. For example, in one study, college
 | ||
|             students were in a virtual reality setting to treat a fear of heights using an elevator. Those who were told that they
 | ||
|             had control, yet had none, felt as though they had as much control as those who actually did have control over the
 | ||
|             elevator. Those who were led to believe they did not have control said they felt as though they had little control.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The illusion is more common in familiar situations, and in situations where the person knows the desired outcome.
 | ||
|             Feedback that emphasizes success rather than failure can increase the effect, while feedback that emphasizes failure
 | ||
|             can decrease or reverse the effect. The illusion is weaker for depressed individuals and is stronger when individuals
 | ||
|             have an emotional need to control the outcome. The illusion is strengthened by stressful and competitive situations,
 | ||
|             including financial trading. Although people are likely to overestimate their control when the situations are heavily
 | ||
|             chance-determined, they also tend to underestimate their control when they actually have it, which runs contrary to
 | ||
|             some theories of the illusion and its adaptiveness. People also showed a higher illusion of control when they were
 | ||
|             allowed to become familiar with a task through practice trials, make their choice before the event happens like
 | ||
|             with throwing dice, and when they can make their choice rather than have it made for them with the same odds.
 | ||
|             People are more likely to show control when they have more answers right at the beginning than at the end,
 | ||
|             even when the people had the same number of correct answers.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Being in a position of power enhances the illusion of control, which may lead to overreach in risk taking.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("80f9b496-798a-4a1e-a426-815f23b8698e"), // INTROSPECTION_ILLUSION
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusion_of_control",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias ACTOR_OBSERVER_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("5da6dcf4-ed01-4e14-99b0-7a624b16cf17"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Actor-Observer Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Actor-Observer Bias
 | ||
|             Actor–observer asymmetry (also actor–observer bias) is a bias one makes when forming attributions about the behavior
 | ||
|             of others or themselves. When people judge their own behavior, they are more likely to attribute their actions to the
 | ||
|             particular situation than to their personality. However, when an observer is explaining the behavior of another person,
 | ||
|             they are more likely to attribute this behavior to the actors' personality rather than to situational factors.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Sometimes the actor–observer asymmetry is defined as the fundamental attribution error, which is when people tend to
 | ||
|             explain behavior on the internal, personal characteristics rather than the external factors or situational influences.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The specific hypothesis of an actor–observer asymmetry in attribution was originally proposed by Edward Jones and
 | ||
|             Richard Nisbett, where they said that "actors tend to attribute the causes of their behavior to stimuli inherent
 | ||
|             in the situation, while observers tend to attribute behavior to stable dispositions of the actor". Supported by
 | ||
|             initial evidence, the hypothesis was long held as firmly established. However, a meta-analysis of all the published
 | ||
|             tests of the hypothesis between 1971 and 2004 found that there was no actor–observer asymmetry of the sort that had
 | ||
|             been previously proposed. The author of the study interpreted this result not so much as proof that actors and observers
 | ||
|             explained behavior exactly the same way but as evidence that the original hypothesis was fundamentally flawed in the way
 | ||
|             it framed people's explanations of behavior as attributions to either stable dispositions or the situation.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Considerations of actor–observer differences can be found in other disciplines as well, such as philosophy (e.g.
 | ||
|             privileged access, incorrigibility), management studies, artificial intelligence, semiotics, anthropology, and
 | ||
|             political science.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("ca2d4f1f-924f-44ae-886b-19240cf2c8c0"), // ULTIMATE_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("f1570784-f8ec-46fd-8bb8-763aef31a04a"), // FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("b57a862b-b490-4d61-96b8-29d548c2eee4"), // POSITIVITY_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Actor%E2%80%93observer_asymmetry",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SELF_SERVING_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("923ee6c0-2f9c-47fc-a570-339190c1a250"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Self-Serving Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Self-Serving Bias
 | ||
|             A self-serving bias is any cognitive or perceptual process that is distorted by the need to maintain and enhance
 | ||
|             self-esteem, or the tendency to perceive oneself in an overly favorable manner. It is the belief that individuals
 | ||
|             tend to ascribe success to their own abilities and efforts, but ascribe failure to external factors. When individuals
 | ||
|             reject the validity of negative feedback, focus on their strengths and achievements but overlook their faults and
 | ||
|             failures, or take more credit for their group's work than they give to other members, they are protecting their
 | ||
|             self-esteem from threat and injury. These cognitive and perceptual tendencies perpetuate illusions and error, but
 | ||
|             they also serve the self's need for esteem. For example, a student who attributes earning a good grade on an exam
 | ||
|             to their own intelligence and preparation but attributes earning a poor grade to the teacher's poor teaching ability
 | ||
|             or unfair test questions might be exhibiting a self-serving bias. Studies have shown that similar attributions are
 | ||
|             made in various situations, such as the workplace, interpersonal relationships, sports, and consumer decisions.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Both motivational processes (i.e. self-enhancement, self-presentation) and cognitive processes (i.e. locus of control,
 | ||
|             self-esteem) influence the self-serving bias. There are both cross-cultural (i.e. individualistic and collectivistic
 | ||
|             culture differences) and special clinical population (i.e. depression) considerations within the bias. Much of the
 | ||
|             research on the self-serving bias has used participant self-reports of attribution based on experimental manipulation
 | ||
|             of task outcomes or in naturalistic situations. Some more modern research, however, has shifted focus to physiological
 | ||
|             manipulations, such as emotional inducement and neural activation, in an attempt to better understand the biological
 | ||
|             mechanisms that contribute to the self-serving bias.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b9c06da1-d2eb-4871-8159-a2a6d25e9eff"), // DUNNING_KRUGER_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("f1570784-f8ec-46fd-8bb8-763aef31a04a"), // FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR
 | ||
|             new Guid("f8fd4635-69b3-47be-8243-8c7c6749cae2"), // ILLUSORY_SUPERIORITY
 | ||
|             new Guid("ad32d669-fc79-44c9-a570-609e1ccdc799"), // OMISSION_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("7bf44f8f-a4b0-404c-8f15-8ca6e3322d32"), // OPTIMISM_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("b821d449-64e5-4c0a-9d5a-3fda609a9b86"), // OVERCONFIDENCE_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("e36f82b7-43dd-4073-99d9-c33073007185"), // MORAL_CREDENTIAL_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-serving_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias OPTIMISM_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("7bf44f8f-a4b0-404c-8f15-8ca6e3322d32"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Optimism Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Optimism Bias
 | ||
|             Optimism bias or optimistic bias is a cognitive bias that causes someone to believe that they themselves
 | ||
|             are less likely to experience a negative event. It is also known as unrealistic optimism or comparative optimism.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Optimism bias is common and transcends gender, ethnicity, nationality, and age. However, autistic people are less
 | ||
|             susceptible to this kind of biases. Optimistic biases have also reported in other animals, such as rats and birds.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Four factors can cause a person to be optimistically biased: their desired end state, their cognitive mechanisms,
 | ||
|             the information they have about themselves versus others, and overall mood. The optimistic bias is seen in a number
 | ||
|             of situations. For example: people believing that they are less at risk of being a crime victim, smokers believing
 | ||
|             that they are less likely to contract lung cancer or disease than other smokers, first-time bungee jumpers believing
 | ||
|             that they are less at risk of an injury than other jumpers, or traders who think they are less exposed to potential
 | ||
|             losses in the markets.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Although the optimism bias occurs for both positive events (such as believing oneself to be more financially successful
 | ||
|             than others) and negative events (such as being less likely to have a drinking problem), there is more research and
 | ||
|             evidence suggesting that the bias is stronger for negative events (the valence effect). Different consequences result
 | ||
|             from these two types of events: positive events often lead to feelings of well being and self-esteem, while negative
 | ||
|             events lead to consequences involving more risk, such as engaging in risky behaviors and not taking precautionary
 | ||
|             measures for safety.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("67041978-ac8e-4254-ae2c-509e7301619f"), // PESSIMISM_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("7fce783e-2120-4aad-9805-2c2a2b937b7d"), // ILLUSION_OF_CONTROL
 | ||
|             new Guid("f8fd4635-69b3-47be-8243-8c7c6749cae2"), // ILLUSORY_SUPERIORITY
 | ||
|             new Guid("ef521fbb-c20b-47c9-87f8-a571a06a03eb"), // NEGATIVITY_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("b57a862b-b490-4d61-96b8-29d548c2eee4"), // POSITIVITY_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("923ee6c0-2f9c-47fc-a570-339190c1a250"), // SELF_SERVING_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optimism_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias EGOCENTRIC_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("953746dc-ce10-4e3b-8f9e-9246de63f531"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Egocentric Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Egocentric Bias
 | ||
|             Egocentric bias is the tendency to rely too heavily on one's own perspective and/or have a higher opinion of
 | ||
|             oneself than reality. It appears to be the result of the psychological need to satisfy one's ego and to be
 | ||
|             advantageous for memory consolidation. Research has shown that experiences, ideas, and beliefs are more easily
 | ||
|             recalled when they match one's own, causing an egocentric outlook. Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly first identified
 | ||
|             this cognitive bias in their 1979 paper, "Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution". Egocentric bias is
 | ||
|             referred to by most psychologists as a general umbrella term under which other related phenomena fall.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The effects of egocentric bias can differ based on personal characteristics, such as age and the number of
 | ||
|             languages one speaks. Thus far, there have been many studies focusing on specific implications of egocentric
 | ||
|             bias in different contexts. Research on collaborative group tasks have emphasized that people view their own
 | ||
|             contributions differently than they view that of others. Other areas of research have been aimed at studying
 | ||
|             how mental health patients display egocentric bias, and at the relationship between egocentric bias and voter
 | ||
|             distribution. These types of studies surrounding egocentric bias usually involve written or verbal questionnaires,
 | ||
|             based on the subject's personal life or their decision in various hypothetical scenarios. 
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("923ee6c0-2f9c-47fc-a570-339190c1a250"), // SELF_SERVING_BIAS
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egocentric_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias DUNNING_KRUGER_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("b9c06da1-d2eb-4871-8159-a2a6d25e9eff"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Dunning-Kruger Effect", 
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Dunning-Kruger Effect
 | ||
|             The Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which people with limited competence in a particular domain overestimate
 | ||
|             their abilities. It was first described by Justin Kruger and David Dunning in 1999. Some researchers also include the
 | ||
|             opposite effect for high performers: their tendency to underestimate their skills. In popular culture, the Dunning–Kruger
 | ||
|             effect is often misunderstood as a claim about general overconfidence of people with low intelligence instead of specific
 | ||
|             overconfidence of people unskilled at a particular task.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("f8fd4635-69b3-47be-8243-8c7c6749cae2"), // ILLUSORY_SUPERIORITY
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias HARD_EASY_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("07f0c252-1d97-4207-8000-8e4d8800fb42"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Hard-Easy Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Hard-Easy Effect
 | ||
|             The hard–easy effect is a cognitive bias that manifests itself as a tendency to overestimate the probability of
 | ||
|             one's success at a task perceived as hard, and to underestimate the likelihood of one's success at a task perceived
 | ||
|             as easy. The hard-easy effect takes place, for example, when individuals exhibit a degree of underconfidence in
 | ||
|             answering relatively easy questions and a degree of overconfidence in answering relatively difficult questions.
 | ||
|             "Hard tasks tend to produce overconfidence but worse-than-average perceptions," reported Katherine A. Burson,
 | ||
|             Richard P. Larrick, and Jack B. Soll in a 2005 study, "whereas easy tasks tend to produce underconfidence and
 | ||
|             better-than-average effects."
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             The hard-easy effect falls under the umbrella of "social comparison theory", which was originally formulated by
 | ||
|             Leon Festinger in 1954. Festinger argued that individuals are driven to evaluate their own opinions and abilities
 | ||
|             accurately, and social comparison theory explains how individuals carry out those evaluations by comparing themselves
 | ||
|             to others.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b821d449-64e5-4c0a-9d5a-3fda609a9b86"), // OVERCONFIDENCE_EFFECT
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard%E2%80%93easy_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias FALSE_CONSENSUS_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("bc0dc6d3-5115-4def-91ae-a38aebed185e"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "False Consensus Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # False Consensus Effect
 | ||
|             In psychology, the false consensus effect, also known as consensus bias, is a pervasive cognitive bias that causes
 | ||
|             people to "see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively common and appropriate to existing
 | ||
|             circumstances". In other words, they assume that their personal qualities, characteristics, beliefs, and actions
 | ||
|             are relatively widespread through the general population.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             This false consensus is significant because it increases self-esteem (overconfidence effect). It can be derived from
 | ||
|             a desire to conform and be liked by others in a social environment. This bias is especially prevalent in group
 | ||
|             settings where one thinks the collective opinion of their own group matches that of the larger population. Since
 | ||
|             the members of a group reach a consensus and rarely encounter those who dispute it, they tend to believe that
 | ||
|             everybody thinks the same way. The false-consensus effect is not restricted to cases where people believe that
 | ||
|             their values are shared by the majority, but it still manifests as an overestimate of the extent of their belief.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Additionally, when confronted with evidence that a consensus does not exist, people often assume that those who
 | ||
|             do not agree with them are defective in some way. There is no single cause for this cognitive bias; the
 | ||
|             availability heuristic, self-serving bias, and naïve realism have been suggested as at least partial underlying
 | ||
|             factors. The bias may also result, at least in part, from non-social stimulus-reward associations. Maintenance
 | ||
|             of this cognitive bias may be related to the tendency to make decisions with relatively little information.
 | ||
|             When faced with uncertainty and a limited sample from which to make decisions, people often "project"
 | ||
|             themselves onto the situation. When this personal knowledge is used as input to make generalizations,
 | ||
|             it often results in the false sense of being part of the majority.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [
 | ||
|             new Guid("b821d449-64e5-4c0a-9d5a-3fda609a9b86"), // OVERCONFIDENCE_EFFECT
 | ||
|             new Guid("d749ce96-32f3-4c3d-86f7-26ff4edabe4a"), // AVAILABILITY_HEURISTIC
 | ||
|             new Guid("923ee6c0-2f9c-47fc-a570-339190c1a250"), // SELF_SERVING_BIAS
 | ||
|             new Guid("f0ad095e-8e9c-4bfb-855e-11fb5dd58cea"), // NAÏVE_REALISM
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_consensus_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias THIRD_PERSON_EFFECT = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("b9186d75-3362-4dd4-a3ec-4345a04161c9"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Third-Person Effect",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Third-Person Effect
 | ||
|             The third-person effect hypothesis predicts that people tend to perceive that mass media messages have a greater
 | ||
|             effect on others than on themselves, based on personal biases. The third-person effect manifests itself through
 | ||
|             an individual's overestimation of the effect of a mass communicated message on the generalized other, or an
 | ||
|             underestimation of the effect of a mass communicated message on themselves.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             These types of perceptions stem from a self-motivated social desirability (not feeling influenced by mass messages
 | ||
|             promotes self-esteem), a social-distance corollary (choosing to dissociate oneself from the others who may be
 | ||
|             influenced), and a perceived exposure to a message (others choose to be influenced by persuasive communication).
 | ||
|             Other names for the effect are "Third-person perception" and "Web Third-person effect". From 2015, the effect is
 | ||
|             named "Web Third-person effect" when it is verified in social media, media websites, blogs and in websites in general.
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third-person_effect",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|     private static readonly Bias SOCIAL_DESIRABILITY_BIAS = new()
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         Id = new Guid("a378b725-8bf9-4213-a875-326426d5c759"),
 | ||
|         Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
 | ||
|         Name = "Social-Desirability Bias",
 | ||
|         Description =
 | ||
|             """
 | ||
|             # Social-Desirability Bias
 | ||
|             In social science research, social-desirability bias is a type of response bias that is the tendency of survey
 | ||
|             respondents to answer questions in a manner that will be viewed favorably by others. It can take the form of
 | ||
|             over-reporting "good behavior" or under-reporting "bad", or undesirable behavior. The tendency poses a serious
 | ||
|             problem with conducting research with self-reports. This bias interferes with the interpretation of average
 | ||
|             tendencies as well as individual differences.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Topics where socially desirable responding (SDR) is of special concern are self-reports of abilities, personality,
 | ||
|             sexual behavior, and drug use. When confronted with the question "How often do you masturbate?," for example,
 | ||
|             respondents may be pressured by a social taboo against masturbation, and either under-report the frequency or
 | ||
|             avoid answering the question. Therefore, the mean rates of masturbation derived from self-report surveys are
 | ||
|             likely to be severely underestimated.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             When confronted with the question, "Do you use drugs/illicit substances?" the respondent may be influenced by
 | ||
|             the fact that controlled substances, including the more commonly used marijuana, are generally illegal.
 | ||
|             Respondents may feel pressured to deny any drug use or rationalize it, e.g. "I only smoke marijuana when my
 | ||
|             friends are around." The bias can also influence reports of number of sexual partners. In fact, the bias
 | ||
|             may operate in opposite directions for different subgroups: Whereas men tend to inflate the numbers, women
 | ||
|             tend to underestimate theirs. In either case, the mean reports from both groups are likely to be distorted
 | ||
|             by social desirability bias.
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             Other topics that are sensitive to social-desirability bias include:
 | ||
|             
 | ||
|             - Self-reported personality traits will correlate strongly with social desirability bias
 | ||
|             - Personal income and earnings, often inflated when low and deflated when high
 | ||
|             - Feelings of low self-worth and/or powerlessness, often denied
 | ||
|             - Excretory functions, often approached uncomfortably, if discussed at all
 | ||
|             - Compliance with medicinal-dosing schedules, often inflated
 | ||
|             - Family planning, including use of contraceptives and abortion
 | ||
|             - Religion, often either avoided or uncomfortably approached
 | ||
|             - Patriotism, either inflated or, if denied, done so with a fear of other party's judgment
 | ||
|             - Bigotry and intolerance, often denied, even if it exists within the responder
 | ||
|             - Intellectual achievements, often inflated
 | ||
|             - Physical appearance, either inflated or deflated
 | ||
|             - Acts of real or imagined physical violence, often denied
 | ||
|             - Indicators of charity or "benevolence," often inflated
 | ||
|             - Illegal acts, often denied
 | ||
|             - Voter turnout
 | ||
|             """,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         Related = [],
 | ||
|         Links =
 | ||
|         [
 | ||
|             "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social-desirability_bias",
 | ||
|         ],
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
|     
 | ||
|     #endregion
 | ||
|     
 | ||
|     public static readonly IReadOnlyDictionary<Guid, Bias> ALL_BIAS = new Dictionary<Guid, Bias>
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         { SOCIAL_DESIRABILITY_BIAS.Id, SOCIAL_DESIRABILITY_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { THIRD_PERSON_EFFECT.Id, THIRD_PERSON_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { FALSE_CONSENSUS_EFFECT.Id, FALSE_CONSENSUS_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { HARD_EASY_EFFECT.Id, HARD_EASY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { DUNNING_KRUGER_EFFECT.Id, DUNNING_KRUGER_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { EGOCENTRIC_BIAS.Id, EGOCENTRIC_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { OPTIMISM_BIAS.Id, OPTIMISM_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { SELF_SERVING_BIAS.Id, SELF_SERVING_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { ACTOR_OBSERVER_BIAS.Id, ACTOR_OBSERVER_BIAS }, 
 | ||
|         { ILLUSION_OF_CONTROL.Id, ILLUSION_OF_CONTROL },
 | ||
|         { FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR.Id, FUNDAMENTAL_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR }, 
 | ||
|         { DEFENSIVE_ATTRIBUTION_HYPOTHESIS.Id, DEFENSIVE_ATTRIBUTION_HYPOTHESIS },
 | ||
|         { TRAIT_ASCRIPTION_BIAS.Id, TRAIT_ASCRIPTION_BIAS }, 
 | ||
|         { EFFORT_JUSTIFICATION.Id, EFFORT_JUSTIFICATION },
 | ||
|         { RISK_COMPENSATION.Id, RISK_COMPENSATION },
 | ||
|         { HYPERBOLIC_DISCOUNTING.Id, HYPERBOLIC_DISCOUNTING },
 | ||
|         { APPEAL_TO_NOVELTY.Id, APPEAL_TO_NOVELTY },
 | ||
|         { IDENTIFIABLE_VICTIM_EFFECT.Id, IDENTIFIABLE_VICTIM_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { SUNK_COST_FALLACY.Id, SUNK_COST_FALLACY },
 | ||
|         { ESCALATION_OF_COMMITMENT.Id, ESCALATION_OF_COMMITMENT },
 | ||
|         { GENERATION_EFFECT.Id, GENERATION_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { LOSS_AVERSION.Id, LOSS_AVERSION },
 | ||
|         { IKEA_EFFECT.Id, IKEA_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { UNIT_BIAS.Id, UNIT_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { ZERO_RISK_BIAS.Id, ZERO_RISK_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { DISPOSITION_EFFECT.Id, DISPOSITION_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { CERTAINTY_EFFECT.Id, CERTAINTY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { PSEUDOCERTAINTY_EFFECT.Id, PSEUDOCERTAINTY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { PROCESSING_DIFFICULTY_EFFECT.Id, PROCESSING_DIFFICULTY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { ENDOWMENT_EFFECT.Id, ENDOWMENT_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { BELIEF_PERSEVERANCE.Id, BELIEF_PERSEVERANCE },
 | ||
|         { SYSTEM_JUSTIFICATION.Id, SYSTEM_JUSTIFICATION },
 | ||
|         { REVERSE_PSYCHOLOGY.Id, REVERSE_PSYCHOLOGY },
 | ||
|         { REACTANCE.Id, REACTANCE },
 | ||
|         { DECOY_EFFECT.Id, DECOY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { SOCIAL_COMPARISON_BIAS.Id, SOCIAL_COMPARISON_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { STATUS_QUO_BIAS.Id, STATUS_QUO_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { AMBIGUITY_EFFECT.Id, AMBIGUITY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { INFORMATION_BIAS.Id, INFORMATION_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { BELIEF_BIAS.Id, BELIEF_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { RHYME_AS_REASON_EFFECT.Id, RHYME_AS_REASON_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { PARKINSONS_LAW_OF_TRIVIALITY.Id, PARKINSONS_LAW_OF_TRIVIALITY },
 | ||
|         { DELMORE_EFFECT.Id, DELMORE_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { CONJUNCTION_FALLACY.Id, CONJUNCTION_FALLACY },
 | ||
|         { OCCAMS_RAZOR.Id, OCCAMS_RAZOR },
 | ||
|         { LESS_IS_BETTER_EFFECT.Id, LESS_IS_BETTER_EFFECT},
 | ||
|         { HINDSIGHT_BIAS.Id, HINDSIGHT_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { OUTCOME_BIAS.Id, OUTCOME_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { MORAL_LUCK.Id, MORAL_LUCK },
 | ||
|         { DECLINISM.Id, DECLINISM },
 | ||
|         { PESSIMISM_BIAS.Id, PESSIMISM_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { PLANNING_FALLACY.Id, PLANNING_FALLACY },
 | ||
|         { TIME_SAVING_BIAS.Id, TIME_SAVING_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { PRO_INNOVATION_BIAS.Id, PRO_INNOVATION_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { IMPACT_BIAS.Id, IMPACT_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { PROJECTION_BIAS.Id, PROJECTION_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { ROSY_RETROSPECTION.Id, ROSY_RETROSPECTION },
 | ||
|         { TELESCOPING_EFFECT.Id, TELESCOPING_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { ILLUSION_OF_ASYMMETRIC_INSIGHT.Id, ILLUSION_OF_ASYMMETRIC_INSIGHT },
 | ||
|         { ILLUSION_OF_EXTERNAL_AGENCY.Id, ILLUSION_OF_EXTERNAL_AGENCY },
 | ||
|         { EXTRINSIC_INCENTIVE_BIAS.Id, EXTRINSIC_INCENTIVE_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { SPOTLIGHT_EFFECT.Id, SPOTLIGHT_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { CURSE_OF_KNOWLEDGE.Id, CURSE_OF_KNOWLEDGE },
 | ||
|         { ILLUSION_OF_TRANSPARENCY.Id, ILLUSION_OF_TRANSPARENCY },
 | ||
|         { MILLERS_LAW.Id, MILLERS_LAW },
 | ||
|         { DENOMINATION_EFFECT.Id, DENOMINATION_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { SUBADDITIVITY_EFFECT.Id, SUBADDITIVITY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { SURVIVORSHIP_BIAS.Id, SURVIVORSHIP_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { ZERO_SUM_BIAS.Id, ZERO_SUM_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { NORMALCY_BIAS.Id, NORMALCY_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { APPEAL_TO_POSSIBILITY.Id, APPEAL_TO_POSSIBILITY },
 | ||
|         { MENTAL_ACCOUNTING.Id, MENTAL_ACCOUNTING },
 | ||
|         { WELL_TRAVELLED_ROAD_EFFECT.Id, WELL_TRAVELLED_ROAD_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { REACTIVE_DEVALUATION.Id, REACTIVE_DEVALUATION },
 | ||
|         { NOT_INVENTED_HERE.Id, NOT_INVENTED_HERE },
 | ||
|         { POSITIVITY_EFFECT.Id, POSITIVITY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { CHEERLEADER_EFFECT.Id, CHEERLEADER_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { CROSS_RACE_EFFECT.Id, CROSS_RACE_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { OUT_GROUP_HOMOGENEITY.Id, OUT_GROUP_HOMOGENEITY },
 | ||
|         { PLACEBO_EFFECT.Id, PLACEBO_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { BANDWAGON_EFFECT.Id, BANDWAGON_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { AUTOMATION_BIAS.Id, AUTOMATION_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { AUTHORITY_BIAS.Id, AUTHORITY_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { ARGUMENT_FROM_FALLACY.Id, ARGUMENT_FROM_FALLACY },
 | ||
|         { JUST_WORLD_FALLACY.Id, JUST_WORLD_FALLACY },
 | ||
|         { MORAL_CREDENTIAL_EFFECT.Id, MORAL_CREDENTIAL_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { FUNCTIONAL_FIXEDNESS.Id, FUNCTIONAL_FIXEDNESS },
 | ||
|         { ESSENTIALISM.Id, ESSENTIALISM },
 | ||
|         { STEREOTYPING.Id, STEREOTYPING },
 | ||
|         { IN_GROUP_FAVORITISM.Id, IN_GROUP_FAVORITISM },
 | ||
|         { ULTIMATE_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR.Id, ULTIMATE_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR },
 | ||
|         { HOSTILE_ATTRIBUTION_BIAS.Id, HOSTILE_ATTRIBUTION_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { ATTRIBUTION_BIAS.Id, ATTRIBUTION_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { GROUP_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR.Id, GROUP_ATTRIBUTION_ERROR },
 | ||
|         { ANTHROPOMORPHISM.Id, ANTHROPOMORPHISM },
 | ||
|         { APOPHENIA.Id, APOPHENIA },
 | ||
|         { PAREIDOLIA.Id, PAREIDOLIA },
 | ||
|         { ILLUSORY_CORRELATION.Id, ILLUSORY_CORRELATION },
 | ||
|         { HOT_HAND_FALLACY.Id, HOT_HAND_FALLACY },
 | ||
|         { GAMBLERS_FALLACY.Id, GAMBLERS_FALLACY },
 | ||
|         { RECENCY_ILLUSION.Id, RECENCY_ILLUSION },
 | ||
|         { MASKED_MAN_FALLACY.Id, MASKED_MAN_FALLACY },
 | ||
|         { WYSIATI.Id, WYSIATI },
 | ||
|         { ILLUSION_OF_VALIDITY.Id, ILLUSION_OF_VALIDITY },
 | ||
|         { ANECDOTAL_FALLACY.Id, ANECDOTAL_FALLACY },
 | ||
|         { NEGLECT_OF_PROBABILITY.Id, NEGLECT_OF_PROBABILITY },
 | ||
|         { INSENSITIVITY_TO_SAMPLE_SIZE.Id, INSENSITIVITY_TO_SAMPLE_SIZE },
 | ||
|         { CLUSTERING_ILLUSION.Id, CLUSTERING_ILLUSION },
 | ||
|         { CONFABULATION.Id, CONFABULATION },
 | ||
|         { NAÏVE_REALISM.Id, NAÏVE_REALISM },
 | ||
|         { NAÏVE_CYNICISM.Id, NAÏVE_CYNICISM },
 | ||
|         { OVERCONFIDENCE_EFFECT.Id, OVERCONFIDENCE_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { ILLUSORY_SUPERIORITY.Id, ILLUSORY_SUPERIORITY },
 | ||
|         { INTROSPECTION_ILLUSION.Id, INTROSPECTION_ILLUSION },
 | ||
|         { BIAS_BLIND_SPOT.Id, BIAS_BLIND_SPOT },
 | ||
|         { SEMMELWEIS_REFLEX.Id, SEMMELWEIS_REFLEX },
 | ||
|         { CONTINUED_INFLUENCE_EFFECT.Id, CONTINUED_INFLUENCE_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { BARNUM_EFFECT.Id, BARNUM_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { SUBJECTIVE_VALIDATION.Id, SUBJECTIVE_VALIDATION },
 | ||
|         { OSTRICH_EFFECT.Id, OSTRICH_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { OBSERVER_EXPECTANCY_EFFECT.Id, OBSERVER_EXPECTANCY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { SELECTIVE_PERCEPTION.Id, SELECTIVE_PERCEPTION },
 | ||
|         { CHOICE_SUPPORTIVE_BIAS.Id, CHOICE_SUPPORTIVE_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { CONGRUENCE_BIAS.Id, CONGRUENCE_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { CONFIRMATION_BIAS.Id, CONFIRMATION_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { WEBER_FECHNER_LAW.Id, WEBER_FECHNER_LAW },
 | ||
|         { MONEY_ILLUSION.Id, MONEY_ILLUSION },
 | ||
|         { FRAMING_EFFECT.Id, FRAMING_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { FOCUSING_EFFECT.Id, FOCUSING_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { DISTINCTION_BIAS.Id, DISTINCTION_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { CONTRAST_EFFECT.Id, CONTRAST_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { CONSERVATISM_BIAS.Id, CONSERVATISM_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { ANCHORING_EFFECT.Id, ANCHORING_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { SELF_REFERENCE_EFFECT.Id, SELF_REFERENCE_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { PICTURE_SUPERIORITY_EFFECT.Id, PICTURE_SUPERIORITY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { VON_RESTORFF_EFFECT.Id, VON_RESTORFF_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { HUMOUR_EFFECT.Id, HUMOUR_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { BIZARRENESS_EFFECT.Id, BIZARRENESS_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { BASE_RATE_FALLACY.Id, BASE_RATE_FALLACY },
 | ||
|         { OMISSION_BIAS.Id, OMISSION_BIAS},
 | ||
|         { HOT_COLD_EMPATHY_GAP.Id, HOT_COLD_EMPATHY_GAP },
 | ||
|         { FREQUENCY_ILLUSION.Id, FREQUENCY_ILLUSION },
 | ||
|         { CONTEXT_DEPENDENT_MEMORY.Id, CONTEXT_DEPENDENT_MEMORY },
 | ||
|         { STATE_DEPENDENT_MEMORY.Id, STATE_DEPENDENT_MEMORY },
 | ||
|         { CUE_DEPENDENT_FORGETTING.Id, CUE_DEPENDENT_FORGETTING },
 | ||
|         { CONTEXT_EFFECT.Id, CONTEXT_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { MERE_EXPOSURE_EFFECT.Id, MERE_EXPOSURE_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { ILLUSORY_TRUTH_EFFECT.Id, ILLUSORY_TRUTH_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { ATTENTIONAL_BIAS.Id, ATTENTIONAL_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { AVAILABILITY_HEURISTIC.Id, AVAILABILITY_HEURISTIC },
 | ||
|         { MODALITY_EFFECT.Id, MODALITY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { MEMORY_INHIBITION.Id, MEMORY_INHIBITION },
 | ||
|         { PRIMACY_EFFECT.Id, PRIMACY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { RECENCY_EFFECT.Id, RECENCY_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { PART_LIST_CUING.Id, PART_LIST_CUING },
 | ||
|         { SERIAL_POSITION_EFFECT.Id, SERIAL_POSITION_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { SUFFIX_EFFECT.Id, SUFFIX_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { LEVELS_OF_PROCESSING_EFFECT.Id, LEVELS_OF_PROCESSING_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { ABSENT_MINDEDNESS.Id, ABSENT_MINDEDNESS },
 | ||
|         { TESTING_EFFECT.Id, TESTING_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { NEXT_IN_LINE_EFFECT.Id, NEXT_IN_LINE_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { GOOGLE_EFFECT.Id, GOOGLE_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { TIP_OF_THE_TONGUE_PHENOMENON.Id, TIP_OF_THE_TONGUE_PHENOMENON },
 | ||
|         { SUGGESTIBILITY.Id, SUGGESTIBILITY },
 | ||
|         { SPACING_EFFECT.Id, SPACING_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { MISATTRIBUTION_OF_MEMORY.Id, MISATTRIBUTION_OF_MEMORY },
 | ||
|         { LIST_LENGTH_EFFECT.Id, LIST_LENGTH_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { MISINFORMATION_EFFECT.Id, MISINFORMATION_EFFECT },
 | ||
|         { LEVELING_AND_SHARPENING.Id, LEVELING_AND_SHARPENING },
 | ||
|         { PEAK_END_RULE.Id, PEAK_END_RULE },
 | ||
|         { FADING_AFFECT_BIAS.Id, FADING_AFFECT_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { NEGATIVITY_BIAS.Id, NEGATIVITY_BIAS },
 | ||
|         { PREJUDICE.Id, PREJUDICE },
 | ||
|         { IMPLICIT_STEREOTYPES.Id, IMPLICIT_STEREOTYPES },
 | ||
|         { IMPLICIT_ASSOCIATIONS.Id, IMPLICIT_ASSOCIATIONS },
 | ||
|     };
 | ||
|     
 | ||
|     public static Bias GetRandomBias(IList<int> usedBias)
 | ||
|     {
 | ||
|         if(usedBias.Count >= ALL_BIAS.Count)
 | ||
|             usedBias.Clear();
 | ||
| 
 | ||
|         var randomBiasIndex = Random.Shared.Next(0, ALL_BIAS.Count);
 | ||
|         while(usedBias.Contains(randomBiasIndex))
 | ||
|             randomBiasIndex = Random.Shared.Next(0, ALL_BIAS.Count);
 | ||
|         
 | ||
|         usedBias.Add(randomBiasIndex);
 | ||
|         return ALL_BIAS.Values.ElementAt(randomBiasIndex);
 | ||
|     }
 | ||
| } |