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WIP: Added more bias
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@ -4505,17 +4505,556 @@ public static class BiasCatalog
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Some individuals are naturally high in reactance, a personality characteristic called trait reactance.
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Some individuals are naturally high in reactance, a personality characteristic called trait reactance.
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""",
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""",
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Related = [],
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Related = [
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new Guid("a9c7faa7-2368-4be5-9eda-a37ffd8f7ab1"), // REVERSE_PSYCHOLOGY
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],
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Links =
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Links =
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[
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[
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactance_(psychology)",
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactance_(psychology)",
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],
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],
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};
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};
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private static readonly Bias REVERSE_PSYCHOLOGY = new()
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{
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Id = new Guid("a9c7faa7-2368-4be5-9eda-a37ffd8f7ab1"),
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Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
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Description =
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"""
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# Reverse Psychology
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Reverse psychology is a technique involving the assertion of a belief or behavior that is opposite to the one desired, with the expectation
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that this approach will encourage the subject of the persuasion to do what is actually desired. This technique relies on the psychological
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phenomenon of reactance, in which a person has a negative emotional reaction to being persuaded, and thus chooses the option which is being
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advocated against. This may work especially well on a person who is resistant by nature, while direct requests work best for people who are
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compliant. The one being manipulated is usually unaware of what is really going on.
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""",
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Related = [
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new Guid("d3c2cb4b-ec29-4cf3-a485-9a98e9f1f223"), // REACTANCE
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],
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Links =
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[
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_psychology",
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],
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};
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private static readonly Bias SYSTEM_JUSTIFICATION = new()
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{
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Id = new Guid("755c8f9e-b172-4ff7-9797-9cc130bf4939"),
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Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
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Description =
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"""
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# System Justification
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System justification theory is a theory within social psychology that system-justifying beliefs serve a psychologically
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palliative function. It proposes that people have several underlying needs, which vary from individual to individual,
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that can be satisfied by the defense and justification of the status quo, even when the system may be disadvantageous
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to certain people. People have epistemic, existential, and relational needs that are met by and manifest as ideological
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support for the prevailing structure of social, economic, and political norms. Need for order and stability, and thus
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resistance to change or alternatives, for example, can be a motivator for individuals to see the status quo as good,
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legitimate, and even desirable.
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According to system justification theory, people desire not only to hold favorable attitudes about themselves
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(ego-justification) and the groups to which they belong (group-justification), but also to hold positive attitudes
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about the overarching social structure in which they are entwined and find themselves obligated to (system-justification).
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This system-justifying motive sometimes produces the phenomenon known as out-group favoritism, an acceptance of inferiority
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among low-status groups and a positive image of relatively higher status groups. Thus, the notion that individuals are
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simultaneously supporters and victims of the system-instilled norms is a central idea in system justification theory.
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Additionally, the passive ease of supporting the current structure, when compared to the potential price (material,
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social, psychological) of acting out against the status quo, leads to a shared environment in which the existing social,
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economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred. Alternatives to the status quo tend to be disparaged, and
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inequality tends to perpetuate.
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""",
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Related = [
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new Guid("b9e05a25-ac09-407d-8aee-f54a04decf0b"), // STATUS_QUO_BIAS
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new Guid("b1cc861b-f445-450b-9bdf-e9d222abdb4e"), // IN_GROUP_FAVORITISM
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],
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Links =
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[
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/System_justification",
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],
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};
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private static readonly Bias BELIEF_PERSEVERANCE = new()
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{
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Id = new Guid("bf8f304d-2e8e-4a90-a9c5-7bd56f6058a6"),
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Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
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Description =
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"""
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# Belief Perseverance
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Belief perseverance (also known as conceptual conservatism) is maintaining a belief despite new information that
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firmly contradicts it. Since rationality involves conceptual flexibility, belief perseverance is consistent with
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the view that human beings act at times in an irrational manner. Philosopher F.C.S. Schiller holds that belief
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perseverance "deserves to rank among the fundamental 'laws' of nature".
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If beliefs are strengthened after others attempt to present evidence debunking them, this is known as a backfire
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effect. There are psychological mechanisms by which backfire effects could potentially occur, but the evidence on
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this topic is mixed, and backfire effects are very rare in practice. A 2020 review of the scientific literature on
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backfire effects found that there have been widespread failures to replicate their existence, even under conditions
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that would be theoretically favorable to observing them.[8] Due to the lack of reproducibility, as of 2020 most
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researchers believe that backfire effects are either unlikely to occur on the broader population level, or they
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only occur in very specific circumstances, or they do not exist. For most people, corrections and fact-checking
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are very unlikely to have a negative impact, and there is no specific group of people in which backfire effects
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have been consistently observed.
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""",
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Related = [],
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Links =
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[
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belief_perseverance",
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],
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};
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private static readonly Bias ENDOWMENT_EFFECT = new()
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{
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Id = new Guid("b81482f8-b2cf-4b86-a5a4-fcd29aee4e69"),
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Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
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Description =
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"""
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# Endowment Effect
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In psychology and behavioral economics, the endowment effect, also known as divestiture aversion, is the finding
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that people are more likely to retain an object they own than acquire that same object when they do not own it.
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The endowment theory can be defined as "an application of prospect theory positing that loss aversion associated
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with ownership explains observed exchange asymmetries."
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This is typically illustrated in two ways. In a valuation paradigm, people's maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to
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acquire an object is typically lower than the least amount they are willing to accept (WTA) to give up that same
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object when they own it—even when there is no cause for attachment, or even if the item was only obtained minutes
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ago. In an exchange paradigm, people given a good are reluctant to trade it for another good of similar value.
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For example, participants first given a pen of equal expected value to that of a coffee mug were generally unwilling
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to trade, whilst participants first given the coffee mug were also unwilling to trade it for the pen.
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""",
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Related = [
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new Guid("ad3ed908-c56e-411b-a130-8af8574ff67b"), // LOSS_AVERSION
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],
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Links =
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[
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endowment_effect",
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],
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};
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private static readonly Bias PROCESSING_DIFFICULTY_EFFECT = new()
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{
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Id = new Guid("4f61b9fa-146a-4b6e-b075-f0ba2ee0d9d0"),
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Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
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Description =
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"""
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# Processing Difficulty Effect
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That information that takes longer to read and is thought about more (processed with more difficulty) is more easily remembered.
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""",
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Related = [
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new Guid("a4027640-1f52-4ff1-ae13-bd14a30d5b8d"), // LEVELS_OF_PROCESSING_EFFECT
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],
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Links =
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[
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases#Other_memory_biases",
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],
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};
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private static readonly Bias PSEUDOCERTAINTY_EFFECT = new()
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{
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Id = new Guid("656c78c9-d75a-4c07-a80d-f3a5026f859c"),
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Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
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Description =
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"""
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# Pseudocertainty Effect
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In prospect theory, the pseudocertainty effect is the tendency for people to perceive an outcome as certain while it is
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actually uncertain in multi-stage decision making. The evaluation of the certainty of the outcome in a previous stage of
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decisions is disregarded when selecting an option in subsequent stages. Not to be confused with certainty effect, the
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pseudocertainty effect was discovered from an attempt at providing a normative use of decision theory for the certainty
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effect by relaxing the cancellation rule.
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""",
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Related = [
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new Guid("ad3ed908-c56e-411b-a130-8af8574ff67b"), // LOSS_AVERSION
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],
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Links =
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[
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudocertainty_effect",
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],
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};
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private static readonly Bias CERTAINTY_EFFECT = new()
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{
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Id = new Guid("ac7d745c-d66e-4886-87d7-ddaba349d4e8"),
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Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
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Description =
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"""
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# Certainty Effect
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The certainty effect is the psychological effect resulting from the reduction of probability from certain to probable
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(Tversky & Kahneman 1986). It is an idea introduced in prospect theory. Normally a reduction in the probability of
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winning a reward (e.g., a reduction from 80% to 20% in the chance of winning a reward) creates a psychological effect
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such as displeasure to individuals, which leads to the perception of loss from the original probability thus favoring
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a risk-averse decision. However, the same reduction results in a larger psychological effect when it is done from
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certainty than from uncertainty.
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""",
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Related = [],
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Links =
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[
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certainty_effect",
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],
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};
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private static readonly Bias DISPOSITION_EFFECT = new()
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{
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Id = new Guid("4ecb0187-b2e2-446f-87e2-1e32f269e497"),
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Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
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Description =
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"""
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# Disposition Effect
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The disposition effect is an anomaly discovered in behavioral finance. It relates to the tendency of investors to sell
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assets that have increased in value, while keeping assets that have dropped in value. Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman
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identified and named the effect in their 1985 paper, which found that people dislike losing significantly more than they
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enjoy winning. The disposition effect has been described as one of the foremost vigorous actualities around individual
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investors because investors will hold stocks that have lost value yet sell stocks that have gained value.
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In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky traced the cause of the disposition effect to the so-called "prospect theory".
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The prospect theory proposes that when an individual is presented with two equal choices, one having possible gains and
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the other with possible losses, the individual is more likely to opt for the former choice even though both would yield
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the same economic result.
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The disposition effect can be minimized by means of a mental approach called "hedonic framing". For example, individuals
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can try to force themselves to think of a single large gain as a number of smaller gains, to think of a number of smaller
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losses as a single large loss, to think of the combination of a major gain and a minor loss as a net minor gain, and, in
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the case of a combined major loss and minor gain, to think of the two separately. In a similar manner, investors show a
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reversed disposition effect when they are framed to think of their investment as progress towards a specific investment
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goal rather than a generic investment.
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""",
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Related = [],
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Links =
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[
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disposition_effect",
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],
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};
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private static readonly Bias ZERO_RISK_BIAS = new()
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{
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Id = new Guid("77553998-bfa7-450e-acd9-586a55064302"),
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Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
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Description =
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"""
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# Zero-Risk Bias
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Zero-risk bias is a tendency to prefer the complete elimination of risk in a sub-part over alternatives with greater
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overall risk reduction. It often manifests in cases where decision makers address problems concerning health, safety,
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and the environment. Its effect on decision making has been observed in surveys presenting hypothetical scenarios.
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Zero-risk bias is based on the way people feel better if a risk is eliminated instead of being merely mitigated.
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Scientists identified a zero-risk bias in responses to a questionnaire about a hypothetical cleanup scenario involving
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two hazardous sites X and Y, with X causing 8 cases of cancer annually and Y causing 4 cases annually. The respondents
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ranked three cleanup approaches: two options each reduced the total number of cancer cases by 6, while the third reduced
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the number by 5 and eliminated the cases at site Y. While the latter option featured the worst reduction overall, 42% of
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the respondents ranked it better than at least one of the other options. This conclusion resembled one from an earlier
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economics study that found people were willing to pay high costs to eliminate a risk. It has a normative justification
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since once risk is eliminated, people would have less to worry about and such removal of worry also has utility. It is
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also driven by our preference for winning much more than losing as well as the old instead of the new way, all of which
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cloud the way the world is viewed.
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""",
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Related = [],
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Links =
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[
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-risk_bias",
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],
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};
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private static readonly Bias UNIT_BIAS = new()
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{
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Id = new Guid("ff43a9e2-7dde-47ca-a3ef-5a9c2d3117c9"),
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Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
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Description =
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"""
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# Unit Bias
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The standard suggested amount of consumption (e.g., food serving size) is perceived to be appropriate, and a person would
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consume it all even if it is too much for this particular person.
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""",
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Related = [],
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Links =
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[
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases#Other",
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],
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};
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private static readonly Bias IKEA_EFFECT = new()
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{
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Id = new Guid("565616dc-ed84-42af-b9cc-6fa666cc5d66"),
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Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
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Description =
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"""
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# IKEA Effect
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The IKEA effect is a cognitive bias in which consumers place a disproportionately high value on products they
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partially created. The name refers to Swedish manufacturer and furniture retailer IKEA, which sells many items
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of furniture that require assembly. A 2011 study found that subjects were willing to pay 63% more for furniture
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they had assembled themselves than for equivalent pre-assembled items.
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""",
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Related = [
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new Guid("b9c06da1-d2eb-4871-8159-a2a6d25e9eff"), // DUNNING_KRUGER_EFFECT
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new Guid("30deb7d6-4019-4fef-9823-8d8126e54f0a"), // ESCALATION_OF_COMMITMENT
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new Guid("ad32d669-fc79-44c9-a570-609e1ccdc799"), // OMISSION_BIAS
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],
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Links =
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[
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"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IKEA_effect",
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],
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};
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private static readonly Bias LOSS_AVERSION = new()
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{
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Id = new Guid("ad3ed908-c56e-411b-a130-8af8574ff67b"),
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Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
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Description =
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"""
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# Loss Aversion
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In cognitive science and behavioral economics, loss aversion refers to a cognitive bias in which the same situation
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is perceived as worse if it is framed as a loss, rather than a gain. It should not be confused with risk aversion,
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which describes the rational behavior of valuing an uncertain outcome at less than its expected value.
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## Application
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In marketing, the use of trial periods and rebates tries to take advantage of the buyer's tendency to value the good
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more after the buyer incorporates it in the status quo. In past behavioral economics studies, users participate up
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until the threat of loss equals any incurred gains. Methods established by Botond Kőszegi and Matthew Rabin in
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experimental economics illustrates the role of expectation, wherein an individual's belief about an outcome can
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create an instance of loss aversion, whether or not a tangible change of state has occurred.
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Whether a transaction is framed as a loss or as a gain is important to this calculation. The same change in price
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framed differently, for example as a $5 discount or as a $5 surcharge avoided, has a significant effect on
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consumer behavior. Although traditional economists consider this "endowment effect", and all other effects of
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loss aversion, to be completely irrational, it is important to the fields of marketing and behavioral finance.
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Users in behavioral and experimental economics studies decided to cease participation in iterative money-making
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games when the threat of loss was close to the expenditure of effort, even when the user stood to further their
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gains. Loss aversion coupled with myopia has been shown to explain macroeconomic phenomena, such as the equity
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premium puzzle. Loss aversion to kinship is an explanation for aversion to inheritance tax.
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""",
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|
||||||
|
Related = [
|
||||||
|
new Guid("b81482f8-b2cf-4b86-a5a4-fcd29aee4e69"), // ENDOWMENT_EFFECT
|
||||||
|
new Guid("ef521fbb-c20b-47c9-87f8-a571a06a03eb"), // NEGATIVITY_BIAS
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
Links =
|
||||||
|
[
|
||||||
|
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loss_aversion",
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private static readonly Bias GENERATION_EFFECT = new()
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
Id = new Guid("af442ab1-ffc5-404c-9ee8-3497fe6992ec"),
|
||||||
|
Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
|
||||||
|
Description =
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
# Generation Effect
|
||||||
|
The generation effect is a phenomenon whereby information is better remembered if it is generated from one's own
|
||||||
|
mind rather than simply read. Researchers have struggled to fully explain why generated information is better
|
||||||
|
recalled than read information, as no single explanation has been comprehensive.
|
||||||
|
""",
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Related = [],
|
||||||
|
Links =
|
||||||
|
[
|
||||||
|
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generation_effect",
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private static readonly Bias ESCALATION_OF_COMMITMENT = new()
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
Id = new Guid("30deb7d6-4019-4fef-9823-8d8126e54f0a"),
|
||||||
|
Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
|
||||||
|
Description =
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
# Escalation of Commitment
|
||||||
|
Escalation of commitment is a human behavior pattern in which an individual or group facing increasingly negative
|
||||||
|
outcomes from a decision, action, or investment nevertheless continue the behavior instead of altering course.
|
||||||
|
The actor maintains behaviors that are irrational, but align with previous decisions and actions.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Economists and behavioral scientists use a related term, sunk-cost fallacy, to describe the justification of
|
||||||
|
increased investment of money or effort in a decision, based on the cumulative prior investment ("sunk cost")
|
||||||
|
despite new evidence suggesting that the future cost of continuing the behavior outweighs the expected benefit.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In sociology, irrational escalation of commitment or commitment bias describe similar behaviors. The phenomenon
|
||||||
|
and the sentiment underlying them are reflected in such proverbial images as "throwing good money after bad",
|
||||||
|
or "In for a penny, in for a pound", or "It's never the wrong time to make the right decision", or "If you find
|
||||||
|
yourself in a hole, stop digging."
|
||||||
|
""",
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Related = [
|
||||||
|
new Guid("9a2d58f5-bbf1-4b34-8e1b-f9bcd8814f05"), // SUNK_COST_FALLACY
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
Links =
|
||||||
|
[
|
||||||
|
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escalation_of_commitment",
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private static readonly Bias SUNK_COST_FALLACY = new()
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
Id = new Guid("9a2d58f5-bbf1-4b34-8e1b-f9bcd8814f05"),
|
||||||
|
Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
|
||||||
|
Description =
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
# Sunk Cost Fallacy
|
||||||
|
The Misconception: You make rational decisions based on the future value of objects, investments and experiences.
|
||||||
|
The Truth: Your decisions are tainted by the emotional investments you accumulate, and the more you invest in
|
||||||
|
something the harder it becomes to abandon it.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Example: R&D costs. Once spent, such costs are sunk and should have no effect on future pricing decisions. So a
|
||||||
|
pharmaceutical company's attempt to justify high prices because of the need to recoup R&D expenses is fallacious.
|
||||||
|
The company will charge market prices whether R&D had cost one dollar or one million dollars. However, R&D costs,
|
||||||
|
and the ability to recoup those costs, are a factor in deciding whether to spend the money on R&D. It’s important
|
||||||
|
to distinguish that while justifying high prices on past R&D is a fallacy, raising prices in order to finance
|
||||||
|
future R&D is not.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Counterpoint: It is sometimes not that simple. In a broad range of situations, it is rational for people to condition
|
||||||
|
behavior on sunk costs, because of informational content, reputational concerns, or financial and time constraints.
|
||||||
|
""",
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Related = [
|
||||||
|
new Guid("30deb7d6-4019-4fef-9823-8d8126e54f0a"), // ESCALATION_OF_COMMITMENT
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
Links =
|
||||||
|
[
|
||||||
|
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost#Fallacy_effect",
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private static readonly Bias IDENTIFIABLE_VICTIM_EFFECT = new()
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
Id = new Guid("0c18a8bd-5e5f-4cf0-a90e-47dd7a421035"),
|
||||||
|
Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
|
||||||
|
Description =
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
# Identifiable Victim Effect
|
||||||
|
The identifiable victim effect is the tendency of individuals to offer greater aid when a specific, identifiable
|
||||||
|
person ("victim") is observed under hardship, as compared to a large, vaguely defined group with the same need.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The identifiable victim effect has two components. People are more inclined to help an identified victim than an
|
||||||
|
unidentified one, and people are more inclined to help a single identified victim than a group of identified victims.
|
||||||
|
Although helping an identified victim may be commendable, the identifiable victim effect is considered a cognitive
|
||||||
|
bias. From a consequentialist point of view, the cognitive error is the failure to offer N times as much help to N
|
||||||
|
unidentified victims.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The identifiable victim effect has a mirror image that is sometimes called the identifiable perpetrator effect.
|
||||||
|
Research has shown that individuals are more inclined to mete out punishment, even at their own expense, when they
|
||||||
|
are punishing a specific, identified perpetrator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The conceptualization of the identifiable victim effect as it is known today is commonly attributed to American
|
||||||
|
economist Thomas Schelling. He wrote that harm to a particular person invokes "anxiety and sentiment, guilt and awe,
|
||||||
|
responsibility and religion, [but]…most of this awesomeness disappears when we deal with statistical death".
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Historical figures from Joseph Stalin to Mother Teresa are credited with statements that epitomize the identifiable
|
||||||
|
victim effect. The remark "One death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic" is widely, although probably
|
||||||
|
incorrectly, attributed to Stalin. The remark "If I look at the mass I will never act. If I look at the one, I
|
||||||
|
will," is attributed to Mother Teresa.
|
||||||
|
""",
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Related = [],
|
||||||
|
Links =
|
||||||
|
[
|
||||||
|
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identifiable_victim_effect",
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private static readonly Bias APPEAL_TO_NOVELTY = new()
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
Id = new Guid("2d57f4d6-e599-4738-812a-c12cef877779"),
|
||||||
|
Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
|
||||||
|
Description =
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
# Appeal to Novelty
|
||||||
|
The appeal to novelty (also called appeal to modernity or argumentum ad novitatem) is a fallacy in which one
|
||||||
|
prematurely claims that an idea or proposal is correct or superior, exclusively because it is new and modern.
|
||||||
|
In a controversy between status quo and new inventions, an appeal to novelty argument is not in itself a valid
|
||||||
|
argument. The fallacy may take two forms: overestimating the new and modern, prematurely and without investigation
|
||||||
|
assuming it to be best-case, or underestimating status quo, prematurely and without investigation assuming it to
|
||||||
|
be worst-case.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Investigation may prove these claims to be true, but it is a fallacy to prematurely conclude this only from the
|
||||||
|
general claim that all novelty is good.
|
||||||
|
""",
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Related = [],
|
||||||
|
Links =
|
||||||
|
[
|
||||||
|
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeal_to_novelty",
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private static readonly Bias HYPERBOLIC_DISCOUNTING = new()
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
Id = new Guid("19a483d0-2c8f-486f-bf9e-619d0df4c916"),
|
||||||
|
Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
|
||||||
|
Description =
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
# Hyperbolic Discounting
|
||||||
|
Given two similar rewards, humans show a preference for one that arrives in a more prompt timeframe. Humans are said
|
||||||
|
to discount the value of the later reward, by a factor that increases with the length of the delay. In the financial
|
||||||
|
world, this process is normally modeled in the form of exponential discounting, a time-consistent model of discounting.
|
||||||
|
Many psychological studies have since demonstrated deviations in instinctive preference from the constant discount rate
|
||||||
|
assumed in exponential discounting. Hyperbolic discounting is an alternative mathematical model that agrees more closely
|
||||||
|
with these findings.
|
||||||
|
""",
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Related = [],
|
||||||
|
Links =
|
||||||
|
[
|
||||||
|
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperbolic_discounting",
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private static readonly Bias RISK_COMPENSATION = new()
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
Id = new Guid("10fcc295-02b6-4dbf-b655-f5bcff3c1ca7"),
|
||||||
|
Category = BiasCategory.NEED_TO_ACT_FAST,
|
||||||
|
Description =
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
# Risk Compensation
|
||||||
|
Risk compensation is a theory which suggests that people typically adjust their behavior in response to perceived
|
||||||
|
levels of risk, becoming more careful where they sense greater risk and less careful if they feel more protected.
|
||||||
|
Although usually small in comparison to the fundamental benefits of safety interventions, it may result in a lower
|
||||||
|
net benefit than expected or even higher risks.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
By way of example, it has been observed that motorists drove closer to the vehicle in front when the vehicles were
|
||||||
|
fitted with anti-lock brakes. There is also evidence that the risk compensation phenomenon could explain the failure
|
||||||
|
of condom distribution programs to reverse HIV prevalence and that condoms may foster disinhibition, with people
|
||||||
|
engaging in risky sex both with and without condoms.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
By contrast, shared space is an urban street design method which consciously aims to increase the level of perceived
|
||||||
|
risk and uncertainty, thereby slowing traffic and reducing the number and seriousness of injuries.
|
||||||
|
""",
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Related = [],
|
||||||
|
Links =
|
||||||
|
[
|
||||||
|
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_compensation",
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#endregion
|
#endregion
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
public static readonly IReadOnlyDictionary<Guid, Bias> ALL_BIAS = new Dictionary<Guid, Bias>
|
public static readonly IReadOnlyDictionary<Guid, Bias> ALL_BIAS = new Dictionary<Guid, Bias>
|
||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
|
{ RISK_COMPENSATION.Id, RISK_COMPENSATION },
|
||||||
|
{ HYPERBOLIC_DISCOUNTING.Id, HYPERBOLIC_DISCOUNTING },
|
||||||
|
{ APPEAL_TO_NOVELTY.Id, APPEAL_TO_NOVELTY },
|
||||||
|
{ IDENTIFIABLE_VICTIM_EFFECT.Id, IDENTIFIABLE_VICTIM_EFFECT },
|
||||||
|
{ SUNK_COST_FALLACY.Id, SUNK_COST_FALLACY },
|
||||||
|
{ ESCALATION_OF_COMMITMENT.Id, ESCALATION_OF_COMMITMENT },
|
||||||
|
{ GENERATION_EFFECT.Id, GENERATION_EFFECT },
|
||||||
|
{ LOSS_AVERSION.Id, LOSS_AVERSION },
|
||||||
|
{ IKEA_EFFECT.Id, IKEA_EFFECT },
|
||||||
|
{ UNIT_BIAS.Id, UNIT_BIAS },
|
||||||
|
{ ZERO_RISK_BIAS.Id, ZERO_RISK_BIAS },
|
||||||
|
{ DISPOSITION_EFFECT.Id, DISPOSITION_EFFECT },
|
||||||
|
{ CERTAINTY_EFFECT.Id, CERTAINTY_EFFECT },
|
||||||
|
{ PSEUDOCERTAINTY_EFFECT.Id, PSEUDOCERTAINTY_EFFECT },
|
||||||
|
{ PROCESSING_DIFFICULTY_EFFECT.Id, PROCESSING_DIFFICULTY_EFFECT },
|
||||||
|
{ ENDOWMENT_EFFECT.Id, ENDOWMENT_EFFECT },
|
||||||
|
{ BELIEF_PERSEVERANCE.Id, BELIEF_PERSEVERANCE },
|
||||||
|
{ SYSTEM_JUSTIFICATION.Id, SYSTEM_JUSTIFICATION },
|
||||||
|
{ REVERSE_PSYCHOLOGY.Id, REVERSE_PSYCHOLOGY },
|
||||||
{ REACTANCE.Id, REACTANCE },
|
{ REACTANCE.Id, REACTANCE },
|
||||||
{ DECOY_EFFECT.Id, DECOY_EFFECT },
|
{ DECOY_EFFECT.Id, DECOY_EFFECT },
|
||||||
{ SOCIAL_COMPARISON_BIAS.Id, SOCIAL_COMPARISON_BIAS },
|
{ SOCIAL_COMPARISON_BIAS.Id, SOCIAL_COMPARISON_BIAS },
|
||||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user