Web search restrictions after internal content (#1074)

Co-authored-by: Thorsten Sommer <SommerEngineering@users.noreply.github.com>
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Peer HogeterpandThorsten Sommer authored and GitHub committed 2026-10-18 19:39:55 +02:00
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commit 1f8d72aa45
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@@ -22,6 +22,22 @@ public sealed class WebPageRetrievalOptions
public bool PublicTargetsOnly { get; init; }
/// <summary>
/// Whether every request has to reach non-public addresses only, the counterpart of
/// PublicTargetsOnly.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// For an address the model chose on a host which counts as internal, such as one of the
/// allowed private hosts, while its chat may not send data to third parties. A host name says
/// nothing about where it leads: a pattern such as *.example.org matches public hosts as well,
/// and an intranet server may redirect anywhere. Every request is therefore checked, redirects
/// included, and one which would reach a public address is refused before anything is sent.
/// <br/><br/>
/// Holds whoever chose the address, because it guards what the address may carry rather than
/// where the user may go.
/// </remarks>
public bool NonPublicTargetsOnly { get; init; }
public ConfidenceLevel ProviderConfidence { get; init; } = ConfidenceLevel.NONE;
public bool UseOsSso { get; init; }