Web search restrictions after internal content (#1074)

Co-authored-by: Thorsten Sommer <SommerEngineering@users.noreply.github.com>
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Peer HogeterpandThorsten Sommer authored and GitHub committed 2026-10-18 19:39:55 +02:00
1 parent f38c4aa563
commit 1f8d72aa45
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@@ -25,4 +25,20 @@ public sealed class RetrievedWebPage
public required DateTimeOffset RetrievedAtUtc { get; init; }
public ConfidenceLevel RequiredProviderConfidence { get; init; } = ConfidenceLevel.NONE;
/// <summary>
/// Whether the page was read from a non-public address, such as one in the intranet or behind
/// a VPN.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Only the request which returned the page counts, the last one after every redirect: it is
/// where the content came from. A public address which redirects into the intranet therefore
/// counts, and an intranet address which redirects to a public page, such as a sign-in page,
/// does not.<br/><br/>
/// The content of such a page is internal, so a caller which hands it to a model has to keep
/// it from leaving the organization. Stated here rather than read from
/// RequiredProviderConfidence, which answers another question: it counts every request, so the
/// address of an intranet page does not reach a less trusted provider either.
/// </remarks>
public bool ReachedNonPublicAddress { get; init; }
}